The Philippines’ journey to democracy, like many other nation-states in the Global South, is filled with conflicts and tensions. These conflicts are broadly understood within the framework and context of clientelism and elite democracy. Substantial works on Philippine politics argue that the country's path to democratization contends with the perpetuation of elite rule that deploys various forms of patron–client relationships and, sometimes, violence to continually manipulate the outcomes of democratic processes rendering the participation of the masses and the middle class in state affairs less meaningful. Within these frameworks, there is an implied assumption in treating the masses or even the middle class as passive actors.
Kusaka's Moral Politics in the Philippines contributes in these current discussions by asserting that while class positions limit the agency of the impoverished class and the middle class to counter elite hegemony, they are not necessarily passive political actors. His work may well be situated within the long line of understanding Philippine politics from the vantage point of contested democracy that highlights how civil society engages the ruling elite in the quest for more profound forms of political participation. Although his assertion is not entirely novel, Kusaka uniquely contributes to the current debates by looking at how moral discourses – that is, discourses constructing who are essentially good and evil – play into Philippine politics.
In this book, Kusaka asks three important questions. First, he problematizes the ambiguous and contingent roles of both the masses and the middle class in the institution and deepening of democracy in the Philippines. He contextualizes these ambiguities and contingencies within the moralities broadly held by both classes of people. He, then, proceeds to inquire what types of moralities hasten and halt the consolidation of democracy in the country. Finally, by responding to these questions, he attempts to explain the volatile character of democratic institutions in highly stratified societies like the Philippines.
Kusaka frames his answer to these questions by looking at how two spheres – civic and mass – interact with each other. In his conceptualization, the civic sphere is the middle-class segment of civil society while the mass sphere is where the impoverished class generally resides. This division, he asserts, is not merely shaped by the capacity to produce and consume. More importantly, this division exposes differences in moralities broadly held by these respective spheres. While the middle class generally value modern values of efficiency, legality, and good governance, the most important value among the poor is survival.
Different moralities, as Kusaka illustrates, encounter each other in various contact zones in the pursuit of winning the hegemonic game within civil society. He foregrounds various historical moments when this division is temporarily ameliorated, that is, a moment of moral solidarity, and when it is reinforced, that is, as a moment of moral division. He then utilizes insights from his observations of these events to instantiate how the hegemony of various moralities advances and halts the consolidation of Philippine democracy.
To help empirically demonstrate moral solidarity and division, Kusaka deploys various sources of data. The vast majority of his analyses rely on ethnographic data gathered while he lived in Pechayan – an informal settlement area in Quezon City. His interviews with people from the mass and civic spheres provide insights on how various moralities compete in a hegemonic game within civil society. He also utilizes statistical data and content analyses of print and broadcast media to illustrate the distinct moralities held by various actors. Although his method of triangulation is appropriate, his decision is to focus on what he calls ‘unorganized’ masses – that is, the segment of the masses that has virtually no contact with the Philippine Left – limits the forms of contestation that he is able to capture in this book. He excludes voices from more “organized” forms of resistance linked with the Philippine Left which, I assert, would have provided other relevant forms of resistance.
Drawing from his theoretical framework and ethnographic data, Kusaka argues that democracy seems volatile in both cases of moral solidarity and division. In moments of moral solidarity, the middle and lower classes meet in a contact zone and unite against a defined enemy while rendering socio-economic issues invisible. Although the first People Power dismantled an authoritarian regime in 1986, it also failed to address socio-economic inequalities and, in fact, reinforced elite rule by ignoring issues of wealth redistribution. In moments of moral division, the two spheres contend with each other, making their respective moralities visible. While the poor fight for their survival through informal or illegal means like squatting, illegal vending, bribery, and receiving dole-outs for votes, the middle class views these practices as indicators of the immorality of the poor, rendering them as non-citizens and invalidating their right to participate.
Kusaka concludes that a moral politics seeking to annihilate or invalidate the legitimacy of the other in view of winning the hegemonic battle constitutes volatile democratic regimes. The creation of an illegitimate “other” cripples deeper forms of political participation. Towards the end of the book, he situates this moral antagonism within the neo-liberal world. Since the demise of welfare and the resurgence of the neo-liberal economy, the insecurity of labor has worsened and the celebration of individualism and diverse lifestyles intensified. Kusaka argues that this economic condition breeds a climate in which various classes of people hold on to their moral absolutes. Therefore, neo-liberalism becomes the backdrop of moral antagonism.
To respond to the dilemma of moral politics, Kusaka suggests ways through which a certain kind of morality could be deployed in order to hasten democracy. He cites Mouffe's concept of agonism – which is a form of relationship in which adversaries recognize each other's legitimacy – to frame his normative claims. To get to this point, Kusaka prescribes the widening of the contact zones. He subscribes to the assumption that more meaningful interactions with the “other” shape nuanced empathy, providing more chances of ameliorating the line that divides the civic and moral spheres. These interactions, he further states, should speak in the language of interests rather than a morality that invalidates the constructed “other.” This requires members of each sphere to recognize the vulnerabilities unique to its “adversary.”
While Kusaka's theoretical and empirical analyses of moral politics within the context of neo-liberalism are quite effective at illustrating how antagonism halts the consolidation of democracy, his normative claims do not quite add up to the equation. On the one hand, he effectively recognizes the neo-liberal structure that helps shape moral antagonism. On the other hand, he suggests the deployment of new moral discourses in order to promote agonism. Without invalidating the importance of this goal, I feel the need to push the normative claims toward a more radical end that not only promotes empathy but also targets the structural conditions that help shape antagonism. Kusaka lacks ways of illustrating how his suggested new forms of moral discourses of care and empathy will contest and, eventually, address the structural dimension of antagonism that, he claims, lies within the Philippine's efforts to appropriate a neo-liberal economic structure.
I assert that by stopping at the morality of empathy and care aimed at equalizing civil society as a playing field, Kusaka's normative claims in this book fail to address the structural dimensions of moral antagonism that he himself recognizes. If we are convinced that the differences in language, living spaces, and media consumption are coupled with the material conditions of labor insecurity in a neo-liberal world, then empathy is only half of the solution. The other half of the solution lies in efforts to transform neo-liberal structures that help bring about moral antagonism to begin with. To strengthen his normative claims, Kusaka should have pushed his arguments by demonstrating how the deployment of a specific type of morality helps not only hasten democracy but also counter the hegemonic rule of neo-liberalism which, he claims, is the backdrop of moral antagonism.
