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A Human Security Angle of Conflicts: The Case of Farmer–Herder Conflict in Ghana

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 April 2022

Samuel Marfo*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science and History, SD Dombo University of Business and Integrated Development Studies, Post Office Box WA 64, Wa, Ghana
Mohammed Hadi Abdul-Ganiy Bolaji
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science and History, SD Dombo University of Business and Integrated Development Studies, Post Office Box WA 64, Wa, Ghana
Tobias Tseer
Affiliation:
Ghana Education Service, Tamale, Northern Region, Ghana
*
*Corresponding Author: Dr Samuel Marfo, Department of Political Science and History, SD Dombo University of Business and Integrated Development Studies, Post Office Box WA 64, Wa, Ghana. Email: marfoms@yahoo.com
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Abstract

In Ghana, the economic costs of violent conflicts (loss of jobs and revenue, drop in gross domestic product, and disruption of production chain) have been well documented. However, there is little scholarly work on such conflicts’ human security costs, a critical element in contemporary security management arrangements. This study examines the costs of violent conflicts from a human security perspective using the farmer–herder conflict in the Agogo community in the Ashanti region of Ghana as a case study. A total of 400 participants were randomly and purposely selected. A χ2 test was employed to determine the association of rape, armed robbery, arson and murder with the farmer–herder conflict. The study found that at a 5% margin of error, the p value for armed robbery was 0.01, rape was 0.01, arson was 0.03 and murder was 0.00, indicating a close association between these variables and the conflict.

Abstracto

Abstracto

En Ghana, los costos económicos de los conflictos violentos – pérdida de empleos e ingresos, caída del PIB e interrupción de la cadena de producción – han sido bien documentados. Sin embargo, hay poco trabajo académico sobre los costos de seguridad humana de tales conflictos, un elemento crítico en los arreglos contemporáneos de gestión de la seguridad. Este estudio examina los costos de los conflictos violentos desde una perspectiva de seguridad humana utilizando el conflicto entre agricultores y pastores en la comunidad de Agogo en la región Ashanti de Ghana como estudio de caso. Cuatrocientos participantes fueron seleccionados al azar y deliberadamente. Se empleó una prueba de chi-cuadrado para determinar la asociación de violación, robo a mano armada, incendio provocado y asesinato con el conflicto entre agricultores y pastores. El estudio encontró que con un margen de error del 5%, el valor p para robo a mano armada fue 0,01, violación fue 0,01, incendio provocado fue 0,03 y asesinato fue 0,00, lo que indica una estrecha asociación entre estas variables y el conflicto.

Abstrait

Abstrait

Au Ghana, les coûts économiques des conflits violents – perte d’emplois et de revenus, baisse du PIB et perturbation de la chaîne de production – ont été bien documentés. Cependant, il existe peu de travaux universitaires sur les coûts de sécurité humaine de ces conflits, un élément essentiel des dispositifs contemporains de gestion de la sécurité. Cette étude examine les coûts des conflits violents du point de vue de la sécurité humaine en utilisant le conflit entre agriculteurs et éleveurs dans la communauté d’Agogo dans la région d’Ashanti au Ghana comme étude de cas. Quatre cents participants ont été choisis au hasard et à dessein. Un test du chi carré a été utilisé pour déterminer l’association du viol, du vol à main armée, de l’incendie criminel et du meurtre avec le conflit entre agriculteurs et éleveurs. Lʼétude a révélé qu’avec une marge d’erreur de 5%, la valeur p pour le vol à main armée était de 0,01, le viol de 0,01, l’incendie criminel de 0,03 et le meurtre de 0,00, indiquant une association étroite entre ces variables et le conflit.

抽象的

抽象的

在加纳,暴力冲突的经济成本(工作和收入损失、GDP 下降和生产链中断)已得到充分证明。 然而,关于此类冲突的人类安全成本的学术工作很少,这是当代安全管理安排中的一个关键因素。 本研究以加纳阿散蒂地区 Agogo 社区的农牧冲突为例,从人类安全的角度研究暴力冲突的成本。 400 名参与者是随机和有意选择的。 使用卡方检验来确定强奸、武装抢劫、纵火和谋杀与农牧冲突的关联。 研究发现,在 5% 的误差范围内,武装抢劫的 p 值为 0.01,强奸为 0.01,纵火为 0.03,谋杀为 0.00,表明这些变量与冲突之间存在密切关联。

الملخص

الملخص

في غانا ، تم توثيق التكاليف الاقتصادية للنزاعات العنيفة (فقدان الوظائف والإيرادات ، وانخفاض الناتج المحلي الإجمالي ، وتعطيل سلسلة الإنتاج) بشكل جيد. ومع ذلك ، هناك القليل من العمل الأكاديمي حول تكاليف الأمن البشري لمثل هذه النزاعات ، وهو عنصر حاسم في ترتيبات إدارة الأمن المعاصرة. تبحث هذه الدراسة في تكاليف النزاعات العنيفة من منظور الأمن البشري باستخدام الصراع بين المزارعين والرعاة في مجتمع أغوغو في منطقة أشانتي في غانا كدراسة حالة. تم اختيار أربعمائة مشارك بشكل عشوائي ومتعمد. تم استخدام اختبار chi-square لتحديد ارتباط الاغتصاب والسطو المسلح والحرق العمد والقتل بنزاع المزارعين والرعاة. وجدت الدراسة أنه عند هامش الخطأ 5٪ ، كانت القيمة الاحتمالية للسطو المسلح 0.01 ، والاغتصاب 0.01 ، والحرق العمد 0.03 ، والقتل 0.00 ، مما يشير إلى ارتباط وثيق بين هذه المتغيرات والصراع.

Type
Article
Copyright
© International Society of Criminology 2022

INTRODUCTION

Security is necessary for human development. As earlier stated by the United Nations Development Programme (1994), violence and insecurity conditions impede development through induced migration, restrained accessibility to education and health care, subverting livelihoods and commercial activity, and destroying infrastructure.

Traditionally, security has been viewed narrowly as having to do with a military threat to national sovereignty (Jolly and Ray Reference Jolly and Basu Ray2006). However, it is broadly conceptualized as freedom from criminal threats, want and degrading treatment (Annan Reference Annan2005; Commission on Human Security 2003). This underscores the former United Nations (UN) General Secretary Boutros-Ghali’s (Reference Boutros-Ghali1994) assertion that security in the changing context of today’s world is no longer limited to questions of land and weapons but now encompasses economic wellbeing, environmental sustainability and the protection of human rights. Security is thus characterized by the existence of law, order and freedom. This accentuates the whole philosophy of human security in contemporary global discourse. In this regard, former UN General Secretary Annan (Reference Annan2005) expressed that no society can long remain secure or prosperous without respect for human rights and the rule of law. A security barometer thus includes the absence of criminal attacks, the safety of lives and properties, and mutual trust and respect for human dignity.

In Africa, farmer–herder conflicts, among others, have undermined the vital core of all human lives, which is construed broadly as human security (Commission on Human Security 2003), including promoting human dignity, the right to life, and freedom from criminal attacks. The pervasiveness of farmer–herder conflicts on the continent is due to the high percentage of people who practise farming and animal rearing (Bulus and Wizor Reference Bulus and Wizor2020). It is estimated that about 268 million people use about 43% of the landmass of Africa by practising some form of pastoralism either as nomads, transhumants or agro-pastoralists (Food and Agriculture Organization 2018).

Herders, Farmers and Jihadists

Dal Santo and van der Heide (Reference Dal Santo and van der Heide2018), in their study, found that jihadist groups, like the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimeen (SNLM), a coalition of extremist groups operating in Central Mali in West Africa, have exploited the volatile security situation created by the conflict between Fulani herders and the Bambara and Dogon farming communities. They took advantage of it to unleash terror on innocent unprotected civilians in the farming communities. Aluko’s (Reference Aluko2017) study involving 457 participants also found that the influx of weapons from Libya through Mali into West Africa has made farmer–herder conflicts more complicated and sophisticated by increasing the levels of Fulani herders’ attacks on farmers and the scale of human casualties. He concluded that the peril of nomads caused insecurity in West Africa.

Violent conflicts damage human development (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 2016). The irony is that while there is a plethora of information on the economic cost of conflicts (Institute for Economics and Peace 2015; United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 2016), the human security cost of violent clashes is overlooked for being incalculable. The Institute for Economics and Peace (2015) estimated that the global price tag for the containment of crime and violence in 2014 alone, for instance, was US$1.989 trillion.

Like other West African countries such as Nigeria (Chiamogu and Chiamogu Reference Chiamogu and Chiamogu2020), Cameroon (Awazi and Avana-Tientcheu Reference Awazi and Avana-Tientcheu2020) and Mali (Priehodová et al. Reference Priehodová, Frédéric Austerlitz, Jana Nováčková, Hofmanová, Schlebusch and Černý2020), Ghana has for some time now been plagued with farmer–herder conflicts (Agyemang Reference Agyemang2017; Tonah Reference Tonah2006; Otu, Impraim, and Twumhene Reference Otu, Impraim and Twumhene2020) with profound consequences for the country. Not much has been done about the human security costs of these destructive conflicts, creating a scholarly gap in Ghana and the need for an empirical study of this nature. Atienza (Reference Atienza and Maria Ela2010) noted that a violent/armed conflict environment foments critical threats to human security. He argued that it would be difficult to fashion out a security architecture targeting short- and long-term security threats without a more accurate picture of the human security situation. The assurance of human security in any community is fundamental to meaningful conflict resolution and development. In the view of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (1998), peace cannot be preserved if the basic rights and fundamental freedoms of individuals and groups are violated. This is the niche of the research. For instance, Antwi’s (Reference Antwi2018) study involving 240 participants found that the farmer–herder conflict in the Afram plains in Ghana contributed to the proliferation of arms in the area, which further escalated the war and led to the formation of armed sanctuaries. He concluded that some ill-intentioned persons hide under the shield of the conflict to perpetrate evil acts using the weapons made available to them. The study is more silent about the broader issues bordering on human security.

Theoretical Consideration

This study was anchored in Wilson and Kelling’s (Reference Wilson and Kelling1982) broken window theory. The broken window theory posits that minor lapses/crimes and problems may lead to a flood of more significant crimes, in the absence of timely intervention (Skolnick and Bayley Reference Skolnick and Bayley1988). The theory indicates that lawbreakers will continue to smash windows or worse if the broken ones are not repaired. In this regard, maintaining a constant clean environment signals that the area is monitored and that criminal behaviour will not be tolerated. Conversely, an unrepaired window (broken window) displays to criminals the community’s lack of control measures, vulnerability and defenceless against criminal assault (Arase and Iwuofor Reference Arase and Iwuofor2007). The import is that if the community does not confront a social problem like crime with concerted efforts, its existence will rapidly lead to more social ills.

The theory espouses that communities with a strong sense of cohesion will fix broken windows, assert social responsibility upon themselves, and effectively take control over their space. Increased police presence, enforcement of informal rules of conduct and laws, and increased presence and involvement of residents in their community can make a community less chaotic and safer and lower crime rates (Palmiotto Reference Palmiotto2000).

The assumption of the broken window theory that most neighbourhood crimes are more often than not perpetrated by offenders who reside near the victims has been criticized. Critics argue that criminal acts cannot solely be conceptualized as a local product. Notwithstanding the criticism, a community that is security conscious and regularly monitors and observes (would-be) criminals can help reduce the crime rate (Marfo Reference Marfo2015).

The application of the theory to the community being studied here is quite relevant. The supposition is that violent/armed conflicts, as in the case of violent farmer–herder clashes, open the flood gate for other criminal and related activities such as murder, rape, arson and robbery if they are not swiftly and holistically addressed by society. The inability of the police and other critical stakeholders to promptly address what began in the early 1990s as a protest movement by a few farming communities over what they termed to be “Fulani harassment” and “the destruction of their crops by Fulani herds” (baseline personal interview conducted in 2020) has now become a considerable, deep-seated violent conflict between farmers and Fulani herdsmen (Agyemang Reference Agyemang2017) in the entire Asante Akim North District with associated rape, murder and robbery (Agogo Municipal Police Command 2020). Atienza (Reference Atienza and Maria Ela2010) has expressed that an armed conflict environment poses critical threats to human security. He noted that threats to individuals’ wellbeing might include death and injuries, displacement and destruction of property and livelihood as manifested in the Philippines. These acts create a widening gap of insecurity and ultimately undermine any form of development.

Adeoye (Reference Adeoye2017), in his study, found that during the farmer–herder conflicts in some farming communities in Benue, Yobe and Kanu states of Nigeria, various weapons, including AK-47, short guns, arrows and spears, swords, daggers and knives, were used. He noted that the youths who had access to the weapons used them for robbery, kidnapping and rape expedition. His study further revealed that apart from the insecurity created at the outbreak of the conflicts, the insecurity continued even after the clashes were over because the hostilities had equipped young men with weapons and set them against innocent unarmed citizens who were either raped or robbed at gunpoint. The implication is that if violent conflicts are not addressed, they may culminate in other acts (off-shoots), which invariably and cumulatively undermine the vital core of all humans. In this regard, a collaborative security architecture targeting the improvement of the human security condition of people is critical. The United Nations and the World Bank (2018) noted that the state holds the primary responsibility for preventing crime and violence. However, effectiveness demands the participation of civil society, the private sector, and regional and international organizations.

METHODOLOGY

Research Design

The study adopted the mixed-method design as suitable for achieving the study’s objectives. This enabled the researchers to tap into the strength of both the qualitative and quantitative approaches.

Profile of the Study Locality

Agogo is the administrative capital of Asante Akyem North District, a predominantly farming community (Ghana Statistical Service 2012) with a landmass of about 1125.69 km2 (Kuusaana and Bukari Reference Kuusaana and Bukari2015). It has a wet and fertile ground that supports crop cultivation and animal rearing throughout the year. Over 72.2% of its population of 68,186 (Ghana Statistical Service 2012) cultivate plantain, maize, watermelon, cassava, yam, palm trees and vegetables (Kuusaana and Bukari Reference Kuusaana and Bukari2015). Four districts surround it: Kumawu – to the north; Kwabre East – to the east; Kwahu East – to the south; and Sekyere East – to the west. Clashes of interests between farmers and Fulani herders over the years have undermined the security of the people in the community.

Sample

Given the competing interests of the target population (farmers, herders, indigenous cattle owners, intermediaries and chiefs, among others), a combined 400 participants were selected randomly and purposely. Kothari’s (Reference Kothari2004) proposition that the Cochran formula is appropriate in determining a sample size of a target population if it is either unknown or infinite or large guided the researchers in selecting 385 participants besides the 15 key informants as captured below:

$$n = {{{z^2} \times P(1 - P)} \over {{E^2}}},$$

where n is the required sample size, Z is the Z score value corresponding to the level of confidence, P is the standard deviation or estimated proportion/prevalence of attribute that is present in the population, and E is the margin of error (confidence interval or level of precision).

These values were then substituted into Cochran’s formula:

$$n = {{{{1.96}^2} \times 0.5(1 - 0.5)} \over {{{(0.5)}^2}}}.$$

Thus, n = 384.1, rounded to 385 respondents for computation.

Various sample frames were obtained from appropriate bodies to compute the 385 respondents. A list of farmers affected by the conflict was obtained from Asante Akyem North Farmers Association executives. This umbrella association comprises all the other farmer associations within the district. The researchers also obtained a list of all Fulani herder residents within the district from the Ardo (chief) of Fulanis, validated by the Veterinary Office. The Indigenous Cattle Owners Association (ICOA) provided a list of indigenous cattle owners, while the Association of Livestock Traders in the district furnished a list of go-betweens. The Agogo Traditional Council contributed the list of all chiefs and sub-chiefs. All these lists constituted a sampling frame for each of the targeted groups. A quota of 20% was assigned to each stratum, and a simple random sampling technique was used to select respective participants from each stratum, as shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Sampling Procedure

Source: Field data, 2020.

Moreover, 15 key informants were purposely selected from different backgrounds due to their in-depth knowledge about the subject matter and their critical role in addressing the conflict (see Table 2).

Table 2. Summary of Key Informants

Source: Field data, 2020.

Data Sources and Instruments

The study utilized both primary and secondary sources of information. Primary data were gathered from 370 respondents using questionnaires. Similarly, in-depth interviews following interview guides were employed to gather information from the 15 key informants. Additionally, the study conducted focus group discussions with three groups of five farmers each at Bebume, Nyamebekyere and Abrewapong.

Secondary information generated through a critical review of books, journals, magazines, periodicals, dissertations, newspapers, government reports and the Internet complemented primary data. The researchers respected the participants’ rights to anonymity, confidentiality and informed consent.

Data Analysis

The χ 2 test was employed to determine the association of rape, armed robbery, arson and murder with the conflict in the Agogo community. Qualitative data were transcribed, edited and then triangulated with the quantitative results before making the final interpretation and inferences. The researchers revisited the reviewed theories and empirical works to see how they contradicted or corroborated the study’s findings.

RESULTS

Human Security Implications of the Farmer–Herder Conflict in Agogo

The study sought to establish how the farmer–herder conflict has affected people’s human security. The χ 2 test was employed to determine the association of rape, armed robbery, arson and murder with the conflict in the Agogo community. These variables were considered because extant literature has implicated them in destructive conflicts (Adeoye Reference Adeoye2017; Aluko Reference Aluko2017; Antwi Reference Antwi2018; Ijirshar, Ker, and Terlumun Reference Ijirshar, Ker and Clement Terlumun2015). The results are shown in Table 3.

Table 3. Human Security Implications of Farmer–Herder Conflict in Agogo Community

Source: Field data, 2020.

From Table 3, at a 5% margin of error, the p value for armed robbery was 0.01, rape was 0.01, arson was 0.03 and murder was 0.00. These items were statistically significant at a 95% confidence level, indicating a close association between them and the farmer–herder conflict in the Agogo community.

DISCUSSION

Armed Robbery

The p value for armed robbery as a threat to human security was 0.01, meaning that the rate of armed robbery incidences in the study locality is dependent on the conflict between Fulani herders and farmers. All 15 discussants at three separate focus group discussions held with farmers in three affected villages corroborated this view. The participants were emphatic that the coming of Fulani herders had increased the rate of armed robbery there, a significant challenge to human security. They asserted that the Fulani herders possess sophisticated arms such as pump guns (AK-47) and other weapons that they use in their robbery operations. One of the participants, a traditional leader at Bebuso, explained:

Since these Fulani herders came into this District in 1992, there has been a new trend in crime rates. We never recorded armed robbery cases in Bebuso until 2010, when the Fulani herders began to terrorize the people. They rob our people at gunpoint in their houses, on the road, and even on their way from the farm. If you fail to accede to their demands, it means you are prepared to die.

Another traditional authority at Kowereso shared similar sentiments and explained:

Fulani herders are almost synonymous with crime. Their presence in any community is marked with heightened criminal activities. Their stay in this district is like a curse. Every day, they rob or rape, kill or butcher our people. Honestly, they are in their own world.

Farmers believed that the advent of the Fulani herders in their communities increased arms proliferation. One of the opinion leaders at Abrewapong remarked:

The Fulani herders have trained and armed some of our lazy boys with guns. They are now attacking innocent civilians. It was quite strange for a person to possess a gun in this village in the past. But today, the Fulani herders have made acquiring a gun as easy as buying a mobile phone. This is why the incidences of crime are increasingly high.

A key informant who was an Ardo, the Fulani equivalent of a chief, admitted that some Fulani youth herders could be deviants. He, however, debunked the assertion that all Fulani herders are robbers. His opinion buttressed the findings of the Ashanti Regional Security Council (REGSEC) (2018) report. The report indicated that the claim that Fulani herders have sophisticated weapons for robbery could not be physically verified. The Committee, however, was of the view that their nomadic nature makes the possession of such weapons a possibility. The Committee further reported that Fulani herders have sharp weapons such as knives and cutlasses, which they sometimes use against each other, as reported by the Ashanti Regional Security Council (REGSEC) (2014). The crime statistics obtained from the Agogo Municipal Police Command (2020) show that since 2011, armed robbery has been increasing but that it declined in 2019 after the Fulani herders were forcibly removed from some of the villages in the Asante Akyem North Municipal (AANM) (see Table 4). The researchers’ check at the Agogo Police Station confirmed that some robberies had been reported. The police, however, indicated that the few suspects arrested had both natives and Fulani herders as gang members. This further validates the association of armed robbery with the farmer–herder conflict.

Table 4. Statistics of Reported Crime Cases at the Agogo Police Station

Source: Agogo Municipal Police Command (2020).

Table 4 shows that the total reported armed robbery cases in the AANM were higher in 2012 and 2018. These were the years in which the conflict escalated to uncontrollably high levels. The Table further points out that armed robbery is the factor that profoundly affects people from a human security point of view. For nine years, the total reported armed robbery cases were 84, representing about 38% of all the factors undermining human security within the stated period. This supports the view that there is a close association between the conflict and robbery cases. In an interview with an official from the Agogo Municipal Police Command (2020), the section of the Ghana Police Service that has immediate jurisdiction over the study locality, he explained this further:

Of course, during conflicts, there is normally a breakdown of law and order, so people take advantage of the volatile situation to engage in various criminal activities, including robbery. Armed robbery cases are difficult to record because sometimes, before the police get to the scene, the robbers have executed their operations and are gone. In this way, getting reliable accounts about the robbery becomes difficult.

Other studies have established the association of farmer–herder conflict with armed robbery. In a qualitative study, Otu et al. (Reference Otu, Impraim and Twumhene2020) examined the farmer–herder conflict in the Afram plains and its security implications. They found that the conflict increased the spate of armed robberies at Kwahu East and other areas of the Afram plains. They concluded that the Fulani herders used various ways to force farmers to abandon their farms to graze on them, which had adverse consequences on human security. Lenshie et al. (Reference Lenshie, Okengwu, Ogbonna and Ezeibe2021) also investigated how the state’s failure to provide security governance in Nigeria endangered the lives of smallholder farmers in Southern Nigeria. Their study, using a mixed-method strategy with 88 respondents, revealed that poor security governance escalated the southward migration of herders and contributed to the intensification of herder–farmer conflicts in Nigeria. They also found that the disputes endangered human lives and the livelihoods of smallholder farmers as they and their families were killed, robbed, raped, and had their properties burnt, confiscated or destroyed. They concluded that effective security governance was necessary for regulating the southward migration of herders, mitigating herder–farmer conflicts, and promoting human security in Nigeria.

Rape

The p value for rape was 0.01, indicating a strong association with the farmer–herder conflict. In an interview, a key informant who was a member of the security personnel confirmed that there had been an increase in rape cases since the last escalation of the conflict in 2017 between farmers and Fulani herders. He explained:

I was transferred to this municipal in 2015. The conflict between the farmers and herders escalates and de-escalates at varying times. The latest escalation was in 2016 when a farmer who was also a chief priest was shot and killed by Fulani herders in Nyamekyere. Since then, there has been an increase in the reported cases of rape. In many instances, the people accuse Fulani herders as being the perpetrators.

Farmers believed that rape has been among the acts that have most threatened the people’s security due to the conflict. They indicated that rape cases increased during the conflict between farmers and herders. A participant from the Bebuso Plantain Farmers Association had this to say:

The Fulani herders use rape as one of their tools to fight farmers. They attack and rape women on their way to farms and defile our girls who fetch water from the streams. They may even come to your house and rape you at gunpoint. Some years ago, they raped and killed one Amah Dagarti, a migrant farmer from the Northern part of Ghana. They have raped several women in that way.

The Fulani herders had a contrary view. They expressed that they are always tagged with criminal acts as rapists without any proof. A check from the police (Ashanti Regional Security Council 2014) revealed that the Dadson Committee Report could not establish that Amah Dagarti died from rape but ordered that the police further investigate the case alongside another case of attempted rape which at that time was still under investigation by the police. The statistics of reported crimes in the study of the Agogo Municipality, as indicated in Table 4, shows that the police recorded 11 cases of rape in 2018, the highest since 2011. The police statistics show that rape is the second dominant reported case next to armed robbery, recording about 24% of all total cases within the said nine-year period.

The analysis shows that the conflict has increased the rate of rape incidence in the District. Other studies by Olaniyi (Reference Olaniyi2015) and Odalonu (Reference Odalonu2020) found that rape cases increased during the farmer–Fulani herder conflict in South-Western Nigeria, an insult to the vital core of the people. Studies by Otu et al. (Reference Otu, Impraim and Twumhene2020) also found that rape cases increased in Kwahu East during the conflict between farmers and Fulani herders in that area. Given the under-reported nature of rape in Ghana due to the stigma attached to such an act, it is likely that a good number of such cases have not been officially reported to the police in the study locality, thereby escaping the police crime statistics. Finding a better way to improve the human security condition of the people in the conflict-prone communities as espoused by the broken window theory is, thus, quite critical.

Arson

Arson, except in suicide-related cases, is the act of deliberately setting someone’s legally acquired property on fire (Malainey and Anderson Reference Malainey and Anderson2020). It happens mainly in periods of war, pogroms, insurgency, violent conflicts, suicides, and attempts to destroy evidence (Malainey and Anderson Reference Malainey and Anderson2020). The χ 2 test statistics in Table 3 put the p value of 0.03 at the 95% degree of confidence for arson. This means that arson is closely associated with the farmer–herder conflict in the Agogo community. The responses of participants corroborated this. Farmers claimed that the Fulani herders set their farms on fire and burnt farm produces to ashes. Some argued that the Fulani herders also razed villages that farmers abandoned. One of the participants at Brahabebum, a former assemblyman explained:

The Fulani herders burn our properties either by setting them on fire directly or by burning bush around them which later burns their farms and consumes everything around including food crops and cocoa farms. One of such incidences spread bushfires to the Brahabebum clinic and razed it down. That was the only clinic that provided health services to the community members, including those butchered by the Fulani herders in their farms.

In an interview with the Police Commander at Agogo, he pointed out that arson cases are sporadic, and when they are reported, the accused are always Fulani herders. He explained:

Between 2011 to date, we have had only 22 reported arson cases, the highest was in 2018, and that was at the peak of the conflict between the farmers and the Fulani herders. There have been reports of Fulani herders burning the bush to generate new grass for their grazing activities. In the process, the fires go wild and consume farmlands and other valuable properties belonging to farmers.

At a group discussion with the Fulani herders at Agogo, they denied every allegation of arson levelled against them by the farmers. They argued during the focus group discussion that because the farmers wanted them out of their communities, they could just set their own farms on fire and claim that the Fulani herders did that just to get media attention. One of them, who was a sub-chief for the Fulani herders at Agogo, explained:

We did not set any farms on fire. They simply wanted us out of their communities and would do anything to achieve that, including setting their own farms on fire. Most of the farms were even already harvested farms. They burnt the residues and claimed we are the perpetrators.

In their application to the Kumasi High Court, the residents of Agogo in 2018 included as exhibits pictures of burnt or burning farmlands which they claimed were perpetrated by the Fulani herders. Other studies have also established that arson is one of the tools used by Fulani herders to unleash terror on farmers wherever there is no adequate security to check their activities. Okoli and Atelhe’s (Reference Okoli and Atelhe2014) qualitative study involving 76 respondents drawn from farmers and herders in Nasarawa State in Nigeria found that rape, burning of food crops and houses, murder and armed robbery were consequences of the conflict. Mbih et al.ʼs (Reference Mbih, Driever, Ndzeidze, Mbuh, Bongadzem and Wirng2018) study on the implications of the farmer–herder conflict in Cameroon equally found that the war was characterized by rape, murder, burning of food products and destruction of properties belonging to farmers. They recommended that, due to the consequences of the conflicts between farmers and Fulani herders, the Government of Cameroon needed to find a way of accommodating the Fulani herders to coexist peacefully with farmers without the perennial conflict that had hitherto characterized their interactions. These studies and the findings from this current study suggest that the farmer–herder conflict undermines the principle of respect for human rights and the rule of law.

Murder

The killing of people has been one significant consequence of violent conflicts (Akov Reference Akov2017), which threaten individuals’ right to life, a critical human security concern. Conflicts increase the possibility of people being killed as there is often a breakdown of law and order. Most of the time, there are more weapons available to people during conflicts than at any other time (Bradley Reference Bradley2020). However, the human security challenge is that, apart from combatants who may be killed, unarmed civilians are often targeted, particularly in non-conventional wars like those between farmers and herders in conflict-prone communities (Okoli and Atelhe Reference Okoli and Atelhe2014). As indicated in Table 3, the Pearson χ 2 test showed that murder had a p value of 0.00, which was statistically significant in explaining it as a human security issue in the Agogo community. This view was corroborated by a key informant who was a security expert. He stated as follows:

Whenever there is conflict, there is disorder. Apart from the murders resulting from the confrontation between combatants, miscreants may take advantage of the volatile situation to perpetuate various criminal activities, including murder. This would not have happened if not for the conflict. The security consequence of any conflict goes beyond the conflict itself. Even after the confrontations might have been halted, arms would have been made available to people who otherwise would not have had access to such weapons.

The crime statistics as obtained from the Agogo Police Station in Table 4 show that from 2011 to 2019, there were 33 cases of reported murders in the Agogo Municipality, with the majority of the cases recorded in 2017 and 2018. This was the peak of the conflict between the farmers and the Fulani herders in the Agogo community. Discussions with the farmers during the focus group discussions held at Abrewapong, Brahabebum, Adoniemu and Kowereso also indicated that the conflict led to increasing murder cases in the municipality. They said that the Fulani herders attacked and killed farmers for spraying their farms or preventing them from grazing in their farmlands. One of the discussants, a former assemblyman at Abrewapong, explained:

Hitherto we lived in peace and harmony and went about our businesses peacefully. But since the coming of the Fulani herders here in 1992, things have changed. Since 2000, the Fulani herders have either shot and killed or butchered to death many people, including Seidu Busanga, Kwame Sakari, Kwame Fiape, Raphael Akpabili, Sissala Isssufu, Kofi Obeng, Sodzi Akpobili, Gzibo Efo, Kwesi Abu, Kwame Aqua, and many others that I cannot recall. Baba Abu and his six other family members were wiped out in 2011. The marauding herders also shot and injured many other people. My brother, murder in this district remains a serious issue. You may call it conflict, but we refer to it as terrorists’ attacks on defenceless people.

Murder from the perspective of the Criminal Code of Ghana (1960, Act 29) is a heinous crime that sends strong terror waves to people. From the analysis, murder appears to be a severe threat to human security. This finding corroborates the study of Ntangti et al. (Reference Ntangti, Angwafo, Gam and Fokeng2019). In qualitative research involving 60 participants from both farmers and herders, human insecurity was considered the main consequence of the conflict between farmers and herders in Menchum, North-West Cameroon. Nwokafor, Obasi, and Ejinwa’s (Reference Nwokafor, Obasi and Ejinwa2020) descriptive study involving 108 participants drawn from farmers and herders in Adamawa and Taraba States in Northern Nigeria revealed that the farmer–herder conflict was characterized by the wanton destruction of properties and the murder of unarmed farmers. They concluded that Fulani herders’ massive destruction of properties and terror unleashed on farmers created a general insecurity scenario in Northern Nigeria. Paolo’s (Reference Paolo2020) study equally found that the farmer–herder conflict in the Afram plains of Ghana has generated a sense of general insecurity in those areas. He suggested that the attempt to eject herders may not yield the needed results, so the state and other stakeholders may devise other means such as ranching or the creation of cattle colonies to address conflicts of such a nature in Ghana.

CONCLUSION

The study examined the human security costs of the farmer–herder conflict in the Agogo community from a human security point of view. The study revealed that crime has been a feature of the study community and that this situation has been fuelled by the conflict between Fulanis and the indigenous population. As validated by the Statistics of Reported Crime Cases at the Agogo Police Station (Agogo Municipal Police Command 2020), the conflict increased armed robbery, rape, arson and murder. The statistics show that the conflict has driven up the rate of robbery, theft, rape, arson and murder. Whenever the conflict escalates, the crime rate also increases. This development corroborates Atienza’s (Reference Atienza and Maria Ela2010) assertion that a violent/armed conflict environment stimulates critical threats to human security. As espoused by the broken window theory, the inability of proper security governance to address the conflict as sparked in the early 1990s in the form of a demonstration by a few farmers who lamented the destruction of their crops by Fulani herds has resulted in many other criminal acts that have undermined the people’s rights and freedom in the study locality.

Samuel Marfo is a Senior Lecturer in Conflict Resolution and Peace Building/Peace and Security Studies at SD Dombo University of Business and Integrated Development Studies, Ghana. For over three decades, Dr Marfo has worked in peace, security and conflict resolution. He is interested in crime control, peace and conflict resolution, road safety, democratic consolidation and food security.

Mohammed Hadi Abdul-Ganiy Bolaji is a Senior Lecturer in Conflict Resolution and Peace Building at SD Dombo University of Business and Integrated Development Studies, Ghana. He is interested in religious and ethnic conflict resolution and peace education. He has worked in those areas for more than three decades.

Tobias Tseer is a senior high school teacher with over 10 years of practical teaching experience. Mr Tseer is interested in inter-ethnic conflict and food security.

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Figure 0

Table 1. Sampling Procedure

Figure 1

Table 2. Summary of Key Informants

Figure 2

Table 3. Human Security Implications of Farmer–Herder Conflict in Agogo Community

Figure 3

Table 4. Statistics of Reported Crime Cases at the Agogo Police Station