A. Introduction
Deportation with assurances, or DWA, is a key element of the counter-terrorism policies of the British Government (HMG). My aim in this paper is to look in detail at the main criticisms levelled against DWA from the perspective of HMG’s practical experience. Before doing so I will give a brief explanation of DWA as used by HMG in national security deportation cases. This paper does not address any other uses of diplomatic assurances.
B. Brief Explanation of DWA
As is well known, Article 3 ECHR provides that ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.’ The UK endorses Article 3 and condemns torture and other ill-treatment. In Soering v the United Kingdom,Footnote 2 the European Court of Human Rights held that extradition of Mr Soering to the US would breach Article 3 because it would ‘expose him to a real risk of treatment going beyond the threshold set by Article 3’.Footnote 3 In Chahal v the United Kingdom,Footnote 4 the Grand Chamber rejected the proposal that the effect of Article 3 should be qualified in a case where a State sought to deport a non-national on grounds of national security. It confirmed that
Whenever substantial grounds have been shown for believing that an individual would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 if removed to another State, the responsibility of the Contracting State to safeguard him or her against such treatment is engaged in the event of expulsion.Footnote 5
It went on to say that ‘the activities of the individual in question, however undesirable or dangerous, cannot be a material consideration’.Footnote 6
The effect of this case law is that there are foreign nationals in the UK who pose a grave threat to national security but whom HMG is unable to deport because of a real risk that they would face torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment on return. If they commit crimes HMG's preferred option is always to prosecute these individuals, but there are cases in which that is not possible, for example because there is insufficient admissible evidence to support a prosecution.
Hence HMG has pursued the policy of obtaining assurances as a means of facilitating deportations in national security cases. The UK has entered arrangements for assurances with Jordan, Libya, Lebanon, and Algeria. The assurances provided by Jordan, Libya and Lebanon are in the form of Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs), which can be supplemented by specific assurances in the circumstances of an individual case. Those from Algeria are in an Exchange of Letters between President Bouteflika of Algeria and the former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, supplemented by written exchanges in individual cases.
In the MOUs, the UK and the other States concerned typically express political commitment that individuals to whom they apply, when deported, will be treated in accordance with international human rights standards, as detailed in the MOU. They also agree to allow an independent human rights monitoring body to monitor the implementation of the assurances in the MOU and report to both sides. As described further below, the UK puts in considerable effort, money and capacity building resource to ensure that the human rights monitoring body is in a position to carry out its monitoring mandate effectively.
HMG has not intended to deploy assurances in many cases. They are being used in a very small minority of cases in which prosecution is not an option and the individual cannot otherwise be deported.
As with all immigration decisions there is a right of appeal against a decision to deport a person with assurances. The appeal lies to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC), a court of higher record with special procedures to enable it to consider in full material that is too sensitive for open court for such reasons as national security or international relations. In SIAC proceedings a security-cleared Special Advocate is appointed to represent the appellant's interests during ‘closed’ hearings when sensitive material is considered. This paper does not discuss the detail of SIAC procedures.Footnote 7
To date, 18 Algerians, 3 Jordanians, and 12 Libyans, all of national security concern, have been served with notices of intention to deport with a view to deporting them with the protection of assurances.
Of the Algerians, nine have chosen to return to Algeria voluntarily, of whom eight have gone back to date. The remaining nine have appealed against their deportation to SIAC. I will come on to discuss the appeals in detail, but to cite the bare statistics:
SIAC has now heard seven of the nine Algerian cases, and in each of them it upheld HMG's view that deportation would not breach the UK's ECHR obligations.Footnote 8 Save in one case, Sihali, where it upheld Mr Sihali's appeal against the national security case against him, it dismissed the individuals' appeals against deportation.
The Court of Appeal has considered three of the cases dismissed by SIAC.Footnote 9 While endorsing the legal tests applied by SIAC, it remitted the cases back to SIAC for further consideration of specific factual points. The further SIAC hearings took place on 2–5 October 2007.
Of the Jordanians, one case, Abu Qatada's, has been heard to date. His appeal against deportation was dismissed on 26 February 2007.Footnote 10 An appeal to the Court of Appeal is pending.
Judgment in the first two Libyan cases, AS and DD, was handed down on 27 April 2007.Footnote 11 SIAC upheld their appeals. HMG has been granted permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal, focusing on the Article 3 test applied. The other six cases are stayed pending the Court of Appeal proceedings.
In every case decided to date save Sihali, SIAC has found expressly, on the basis of the evidence presented to and tested before it, that the individual in question presents a danger to the national security of the UK. SIAC has expressed its strongest view in respect of Abu Qatada, concluding ‘[h]is deportation is necessary in the interests of national security, by which we mean here that it is necessary as a measure of defence for the rights of those who live here.’Footnote 12
I will now turn to address the principal criticisms made of DWA, which are the focus of this paper.
C. Criticism No 1: DWA is a Means of Avoiding States' Non-Refoulement Obligations
As regards UK policy, this criticism is simply wrong. The UK's policy of DWA is a way of complying with its human rights obligations, not avoiding them.
UK policy, as well as its legal obligation, is not to deport someone where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would face a real risk of torture or other ill-treatment on their return. Even where arrangements for assurances are in place, the UK will not deport someone where there is a real risk of mistreatment.
As explained above, to safeguard the individual's human rights, all decisions to deport are subject to appeal to SIAC. It is for SIAC to decide, in light of all the evidence, whether on the facts there are substantial grounds for believing deportation would lead to a real risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, or be in breach of UK's other ECHR obligations. SIAC makes its own assessment of the facts; its independence is demonstrated particularly by its judgment in the two Libyan cases, where it has taken a different view from HMG of safety on return to Libya. As is evident from its judgments, SIAC carefully scrutinizes all the evidence, including extensive oral evidence given, in some cases, over a period of weeks.
SIAC's decisions may be appealed on points of law to the Court of Appeal and ultimately to the House of Lords. Should an individual's appeals be unsuccessful domestically, it is also open to the individual to challenge the decision to deport before the European Court of Human Rights. Thus there are extensive judicial safeguards to ensure that an individual will only be deported where compatible with, rather than in breach or avoidance of, the UK's non-refoulement obligations.
To re-emphasize, the UK rejects all forms of torture absolutely and without exception, wherever and by whomever they are committed. Moreover the UK is very firmly of the view that the protection of human rights is important not just for its own sake but also as an element of HMG's strategies to tackle terrorism. Measures taken by States to combat terrorism must be proportionate and justifiable. Promoting human rights, democracy, good governance and the rule of law is, in the long term, the best guarantee of our own security.
D. Criticism No 2: Assurances are Unreliable
As is generally known, there have been cases in the past where assurances against torture have appeared to be unreliable. The most well-known example is the case of Agiza v Sweden,Footnote 13 in which the UN Committee Against Torture found that assurances obtained by the Swedish Government from the Egyptian authorities were not sufficient to protect Mr Agiza from abuse.
But it is not logical to deduce from such examples a general proposition that assurances against torture are all inherently unreliable. Whether it is safe to return a person to their country of origin is a question of fact, to be assessed in all the circumstances, including by reference to any assurances received. The European Court of Human Rights, SIAC and now the Court of Appeal have taken the view that the reliability of assurances must be assessed on the facts. For example, in Y v SSHD SIAC said:Footnote 14
… there is no ECtHR authority which suggests that assurances are in principle to be ignored in deportation or extradition cases; it is difficult to see how such a conclusion could be reached. Its decisions in Chahal Footnote 15 and in Mamatkulov v Turkey (2005) 41 EHRR 25 for example, acknowledge that assurances can reduce the risk of a breach of Article 3 to below the threshold level. What matters to us is whether such assurances in any individual case signify that there is no real risk that the individual would be subject to treatment breaching Article 3, or whatever other Article is engaged. So a judgment as to their effectiveness in the light of all the circumstances of the case and country is called for.
Similarly the Court of Appeal in its judgment in MT (Algeria), under the heading ‘Are assurances ever appropriate?’, said
That the legitimacy of acceptance of assurances depends on the facts of each case can be demonstrated from Chahal. There, the ECtHR did not consider that the giving of assurances by the Indian Government was sufficient protection for Mr Chahal; but it reached that conclusion after an analysis of the facts of the case and of the particular vulnerability of Mr Chahal, rather than by the application of any rule of law or thumb.Footnote 16
Given that starting point, the question becomes one of the reliability of the assurances the UK has obtained in each specific case. In negotiating assurances and monitoring arrangements, HMG has learnt from cases, such as Agiza,Footnote 17 in which assurances have appeared ineffective. The assurances HMG has negotiated are significantly different from other assurances discussed in the human rights literature and deserve to be considered on their own merits.
The action the UK has taken to make assurances effective and reliable includes:
• Discussions about assurances at the ‘highest level’, ie between Heads of State or Heads of Government, to ensure buy-in throughout the administration;
• Detailed discussions at Ministerial and operational level with the other State about why assurances are sought and about what the assurances mean in practice—not always easy discussions to have;
• Placing the assurances at the heart of the bilateral relationship so that it is understood that there would be serious bilateral consequences if things went wrong;
• Finding out in considerable detail exactly what would happen to a person on return: where they would go, whether and where they would be detained, whether they would be charged and if so under what provisions, in which Court they would be tried and under what rules of procedure, their likely sentence and where they would be held if convicted, then trying to ensure that any ‘blind spots’ in those procedures are avoided or alleviated;
• Where possible, negotiation of independent monitoring arrangements providing for a trained human rights monitor to accompany the individual back from the UK to their country of return, to provide contact details and be contactable 24/7, to make contact weekly with the individual or their next of kin for the first year after the person returns, to have frequent, without notice, private visits to the person if in detention, and to arrange for prompt medical inspections at any time if they have concerns. These monitoring arrangements, which are agreed both with partner Governments and with the monitoring bodies concerned, draw on Part IV of the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention Against Torture (to which the UK is a party) and the recommendations in the September 2004 Report of Theo van Boven, then Special Rapporteur on Torture, to the UN General Assembly.Footnote 18
In addition, it should be noted that the UK's DWA policy is not just about assurances and monitoring. In the cases where the UK has assurances, other factors have also come into play in considering a person's safety on return. In Algeria, the 2006 Charter for National Peace and Reconciliation, embodying an amnesty against terrorist suspects, demonstrated the Algerian Government's determination to draw a line under the country's traumatic experience in the 1990s and move away from the way it had dealt with terrorist suspects in the past. In the Jordanian case of Abu Qatada, the Court found that his profile in the Arab world means that his treatment on return would be a matter for intense local and international media interest and scrutiny.Footnote 19 It found that if he were to be ill-treated there would probably be considerable outcry in Jordan, with a likely inflaming of Palestinian and extremist or anti-Western feelings which would be destabilizing for the Jordanian Government.Footnote 20
Hence in the Abu Qatada judgment, SIAC noted what it described as the ‘crucial differences’ between that case and Agiza in the following terms:
the strength, duration and depth of the bilateral relationship between the two countries by comparison with any that has been pointed to between Sweden and Egypt; the way in which the negotiations over the MOU have proceeded and the diplomatic assessment of their significance; the particular circumstances of this Appellant and Jordan; the degree of risk at the various stages, in the absence of the MOU … and the speed with which the monitors would be seeking and we believe obtaining access to the Appellant …Footnote 21
SIAC has also noted, in its judgment in U v SSHD, that in respect of those Algerians who had voluntarily returned to Algeria pursuant to assurances up to that date ‘the Algerian State has fulfilled to the letter, those parts of its assurances to the British Government which can be conclusively verified’.Footnote 22
E. Criticism No 3: The States with which the UK Makes Arrangements are those which Breach their Legally Binding Human Rights Obligations; Such States Would Not Comply with Non-Legally Binding MOUs
The States with which the UK has negotiated assurances are inevitably those whose human rights records have been criticized. There would be no need to seek assurances if HMG were fully confident that individuals of national security concern could be returned safely without them. While the MOUs reflect the express political commitment of the States concerned, they are not legally binding. But it does not follow from either point that assurances are necessarily unreliable.
The attitude to compliance of many States (particularly States which take a less than rigorous approach to their multilateral human rights obligations) will depend less on the legal status of a commitment and more on reasons and incentives they have to comply. Failure to comply with formal political commitments in an MOU or similar international instrument can do serious damage to diplomatic relations between the signatory States. In that respect the effect may be more acute than breach of a multilateral obligation owed to many States generally, but none specifically. In addition, allegations of a breach of assurances supplied at the highest possible level of government would inevitably attract considerable publicity and damage the international reputation of the governments involved. HMG sees this level of scrutiny, particularly by the international human rights community, as a further safeguard against breach.
In Abu Qatada SIAC expressed its view on this point in the following terms:
The political realities in a country matter rather more than the precise terminology of the assurances, and with the bilateral relationship, are the key to whether or not the assurances would be effective in that respect. The fact that the receiving State does not adhere fully or in large measure to its multilateral international human rights obligations is relevant to whether political realities and diplomatic relationships will lead to compliance, but cannot rule out assurances as a means of ensuring that the removing State's obligations are adhered to.Footnote 23
SIAC also addressed specifically an argument made by Manfred Nowak, UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, that it is unclear why a bilateral MOU would be adhered to where a multilateral human rights agreement has been breached. SIAC observed that ‘[t]he answer here … is precisely that it is bilateral, and is the result of a longstanding and friendly relationship in which there are incentives on both sides to comply once the agreement was signed.’Footnote 24
Hence the UK does believe that the governments who have provided it with assurances will comply with them. In the cases so far concerning Algeria and Jordan, SIAC has explicitly upheld HMG's assessment on this point, for reasons which have been spelt out in the judgments. SIAC took a different view in the Libyan cases, where it did not accept HMG's assessment on the facts. SIAC accepted HMG's evidence that the reliability of the assurances obtained from the Libyans depended on whether compliance would be in the interests of the regime. SIAC accepted that the Libyan authorities had entered the MOU in good faith, saw it as in their interests to comply, and would give genuine instructions that deportees were to be treated in accordance with it. It also took the view that the Libyans would probably continue to comply with the MOU. It considered that this was a question of how far the authorities saw it as in their self-interest to comply. Given the pragmatism of their leader and the way in which the Libyan authorities have in the past taken unexpected changes of course, in SIAC's view there is a real risk that the position could change, such that it might not always be considered in the authorities' interests to comply—particularly if, for example, there were felt to be a terrorist threat to Colonel Qadhafi's life. Hence SIAC found that the two Libyan appellants could face a real risk of treatment in breach of Article 3 following their return.Footnote 25 HMG does, of course, take this assessment by SIAC very seriously and, while appealing SIAC's decision, is also looking carefully at ways in which it might improve the position.
F. Criticism No 4: Bilateral Assurances Concluded Outside the System of Multilateral Human Rights Treaties Threaten to Weaken that System and to Retard its Progress
HMG considers that its bilateral arrangements for assurances reinforce States' multilateral obligations. Bilateral negotiations on assurances, such as those in which HMG has engaged for DWA purposes, focus attention very directly on the international legal obligations of the States concerned and discussions on assurances have raised the profile of these obligations in HMG's bilateral relationships. The assurances themselves are largely drafted on the basis of international instruments such as the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Convention Against Torture. In addition, HMG has used negotiations on assurances to pursue multilateral issues, such as raising accession to the Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture.
In practice, HMG's bilateral arrangements have not led to a weakening of commitment to the multilateral human rights system on the part of partner States; if anything, the contrary is true. For example, when Manfred Nowak, UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, visited Jordan in the summer of 2006, he expressed appreciation to the Jordanian Government for the full cooperation it extended to himFootnote 26 and noted that the Government extended an invitation to him promptly after he made his visit request.Footnote 27 Moreover, as Mr Nowak noted in his report, the Jordanian Government responded constructively to his criticisms.Footnote 28 In particular the Jordanian Government closed Al Jafr prison, a primary focus of Mr Nowak's criticisms, in December 2006.
The involvement of monitoring bodies means that HMG is engaging with NGOs on the ground in the countries concerned, providing valuable capacity building and training on detection and reporting of torture. For example in Jordan to date the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has funded three training events for human rights experts, organized by the monitoring body, on practical issues such as detection of torture. This training benefits not only the body’s monitoring role but also the experts’ work more generally. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office has now also committed funding to a further project to train judges, prosecutors and parliamentarians to develop their understanding and awareness of torture cases, which will contribute to the general prevention of torture and mistreatment in Jordan. Hence HMG is addressing the long-term issues that underlie the need for the process of seeking assurances.
All this activity reinforces not detracts from the multilateral system. Practical engagement on the ground gives the UK a real opportunity to bring about change. It complements and has potential to have a greater practical impact than written criticism from NGOs, UN Treaty Monitoring Bodies, international institutions and Governments. HMG considers that expansion of this activity, including through the involvement of other States, would further promote human rights standards internationally.
G. Criticism No 5: Assurances will not Affect the Behaviour of Out-of-Control Security Forces
If the security forces of a country, or elements of them, are not fully within the control of the Government, assurances given by that Government may not be effective to control the behaviour of those forces. This is a critical point, and will be a matter for careful assessment. The key issue, however, is that the effectiveness of assurances given falls to be assessed by reference to the specific circumstances under consideration. HMG does not consider that the safety of assurances should be addressed by way of some generic formula, either affirming their effectiveness or calling it into question.
HMG has taken the view that the problem of rogue forces or guards does not arise as regards Algeria, Jordan or Libya. SIAC has agreed with HMG's assessments on this point after considering the issue carefully in closed as well as open proceedings. For example, in respect of Jordan SIAC found that the King's involvement in the arrangements would act as a real deterrent to abuses by officers of the General Intelligence Directorate (GID), the body that would be responsible for Abu Qatada's detention; that the involvement of the GID at a high level in the negotiations and their acceptance of the MOU and monitoring arrangements would assist; and that in general the command structure of the GID is ‘quite good’.Footnote 29
H. Criticism No 6: It is Impossible to Verify Compliance with Assurances because Torture Takes Place in Secret Using Methods that are Hard to Detect. The Monitoring Body will not be Sufficiently Independent, and/or will be Unable to Detect Abuses Because Individuals will not be able to Speak Out for Fear of Having their Complaints Reported Back to the State and then Further Abuses Inflicted on Them
On the basis of a careful assessment, HMG considers that the partner governments with which it has negotiated assurances will observe those assurances in light of their position at the heart of the bilateral relationship, rather than merely because they consider breaches would be detected.
However, there can of course be a risk of bad faith, either on the part of the authorities at a later stage or on the part of rogue security forces. If there is a breach, then save in Algeria where there are different arrangements in place for keeping in touch with deportees and their families following return, HMG would rely primarily on the monitoring body for detection, in addition to other NGO scrutiny which I mention below. And, as discussed above, HMG has put resources and training into ensuring that the monitoring bodies will be able to be effective. The monitoring body is allowed to visit detainees frequently, without notice and in private. If an individual does not feel able to speak out in those circumstances, HMG judges that the capacity-building work it is engaging in with monitors would help detection nevertheless. If a monitor has any concerns, he or she can arrange a prompt medical examination of the detainee, and failure to permit the examination would itself give HMG concern that an assurance had been breached. In addition monitors have the ability to keep in contact with next of kin as well as the individual himself; sometimes the next of kin may feel able to speak more freely.
In addition, an authority considering breaching assurances may be dissuaded by the risk that their ill-treatment would be revealed despite any threats they may impose. Often when NGOs have specifically reported that individuals are inhibited from speaking out because of concern of risk to themselves or their families, they have simultaneously reported substantial numbers of instances of ill-treatment of named people.
Nevertheless, it is possible that a detainee would feel inhibited from speaking to a monitor. But the question, again, is whether that chilling effect would itself operate to place the individual at real risk, bearing in mind all the other operative factors. That is the way in which SIAC has approached the question, concluding in respect of Jordan that it would not.Footnote 30
The independence of the monitoring body is the second point which damaged HMG's case on the facts of the Libyan cases. In evidence HMG accepted that the appointed monitoring body, the Qadhafi Development Foundation or QDF, is—as its name suggests—not wholly independent of the Libyan authorities. HMG's witness gave evidence that his confidence that the assurances would be adhered to came 90 per cent from his assessment of how Colonel Qadhafi thought and acted, and only 10 per cent from the monitoring function performed by the QDF.Footnote 31 SIAC agreed with this assessment, in that it agreed that the QDF would be effective if a rogue guard or interrogator were to disobey instructions as to how an individual should be treated.Footnote 32 But SIAC concluded that if breaches of assurances were to occur with the permission or acquiescence of Colonel Qadhafi and the security organizations, the QDF would not be able to perform its monitoring role as it is not sufficiently independent of the Libyan State.Footnote 33
I. Criticism No 7: Any breach of Assurance is Likely to Pass Unreported or Unremedied because it is in Neither State's Interest to Find a Breach
It is not in the UK's interest for breaches of assurances to be hidden. This criticism misunderstands the UK's interest in the DWA process. As explained at the outset of this paper, UK policy is not to deport where there is a real risk of ill-treatment. Knowing how previous deportees have been treated helps HMG to assess that risk.
It is clear from the terms of reference agreed with the monitoring bodies that they should provide ‘regular frank reports’ to the UK and that they should contact the UK immediately if their observations so warrant. The more independent the monitoring body, the more HMG can rely on them to report breaches and not to hide them, regardless of whatever perception they may have of HMG's underlying interests.
In addition, the very careful scrutiny which Special Rapporteurs, NGOs and others will give to these deportations means that not only are abuses in these cases unlikely but that any abuses that may occur are likely to be detected sooner rather than later, even if notice of them comes to HMG in less direct ways, including through rumour. This is a valuable additional safeguard.
J. Criticism No 8: DWA Creates a Two-Tier System for Individuals in Custody Overseas
It is not the case that by insisting on compliance with human rights obligations in respect of certain individuals, the UK is condoning breaches in respect of others. HMG repeatedly makes clear, including in negotiations for assurances, its condemnation of human rights abuses, particularly torture and other ill-treatment. As I have discussed, in HMG's view negotiation of assurances leads to renewed commitment to and compliance with multilateral international human rights regimes. British interlocutors with the governments concerned believe firmly that the UK's DWA policy is having a positive effect: these governments are having to look more closely at the way people in detention are being treated than ever before, and are increasingly addressing detention issues.
In addition, as SIAC pointed out in its judgment in Abu Qatada, the argument that individual assurances undermine the goal of improving human rights for all indicates an appreciation that such assurances will have some effect.Footnote 34
K. Criticism No 9: In their Enthusiasm for Deportations and DWA Policy, HMG is No Longer Able to Assess Objectively Whether Someone Would be Safe on Return. That Flaw Affects all HMG's Evidence and Assessments
The fact that SIAC took a different view from HMG on whether AS and DD could safely return to Libya demonstrates, as discussed above, the independent scrutiny the courts apply in DWA cases. The fact that SIAC has not adopted the same view as HMG as regards Libya is a good indication that its judgments as regards Jordan and Algeria are similarly independent. That is not to say that SIAC does not, and should not, give due respect to FCO expertise in assessing what is happening in foreign countries, without deferring to FCO views.
It is clearly not in HMG's interest to lose cases. Hence HMG is anxious not to be over-zealous in its own assessments. DWA policy is not something that is pursued only by officials in the counter-terrorism departments of HMG, whether the Home Office or Foreign Office. Human rights teams, legal advisers and others are all intimately involved in shaping the policy and working to ensure that the arrangements that are eventually adopted are capable of being effective and meet the UK's international obligations.
And SIAC has not found that HMG has been over-zealous in its assessments. On the contrary, in the Libyan cases it found the HMG witness on safety of return (who is the retired Ambassador to Libya) to be ‘forthright, completely honest, realistic, with a commitment to truth and fairness, and to the upholding of the UK's international human rights obligations’.Footnote 35
L. Conclusion
I have four concluding points. First, the protection of human rights is an indispensable part of the British counter-terrorism effort. The UK is firmly of the view that a good human rights record is an important element of the fight against radicalization.
Secondly, the British Government agrees with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights that, in the long term, the solution to these issues is to put an end to torture and other ill-treatment in all States. The British Government remains strongly committed to that objective.
Thirdly, in the meantime, HMG's efforts to reduce the risk of torture for certain individuals are not inconsistent with that objective but complementary to it. As I have attempted to illustrate, they deserve to be assessed for effectiveness on their merits, as SIAC is doing.
As my fourth and final point, I should add that these are immensely difficult issues. The threat posed by the individuals in question is real and severe. There are no easy answers. Many in the human rights community readily accept that HMG cannot simply sit on its hands in the face of the threat. If a DWA policy in some form or other is rejected, it would be useful for those who reject it to come forward with realistic suggestions as to how the problem would be better addressed.
On 2 November 2007 SIAC dismissed the three appeals remitted to it by the Court of Appeal (Y. BB and U v Secretary of State for the Home Department SC/32/36/39/2005). On the same date, it dismissed the appeal against deportation of a second Jordanian national (VV v Secretary of State for the Home Department, SC/59/2006). On 23 November 2007, it dismissed the appeal of another Algerian national (PP v Secretary of State for the Home Department, SC/54/2006).
