Aguinis et al.’s (Reference Aguinis, Ramani, Campbell, Bernal-Turnes, Drewry and Edgerton2017) analysis of the “most frequently cited sources, articles, and authors in industrial-organizational psychology textbooks” is a commendable piece of scholarship. Certainly, they have applied themselves to an important question and articulated a meaningful set of answers. We have no doubt too that for many readers the insights and answers they provide will be informative, compelling, and even reassuring—if only because they reinforce a view of the world with which they are familiar and by which they are comforted, even if that familiarity and comfort are framed in terms of a set of knotty professional concerns (Morton, Haslam, Postmes, & Ryan, Reference Morton, Haslam, Postmes and Ryan2006).
While there is much about Aguinis et al.’s (Reference Aguinis, Ramani, Campbell, Bernal-Turnes, Drewry and Edgerton2017) focal article to debate in its own terms (e.g., by questioning their methodology and analytic strategy), in this brief rejoinder we want to draw attention to a broader set of concerns that serve to question the value both of their efforts and of their capacity to inform debate in the field of industrial-organizational (I-O) psychology. These concerns relate to questions of identity, and more particularly to the self-categorical lens (the theory of “us”) through which the researchers view the field they survey (Peters, Daniels, Hodgkinson, & Haslam, Reference Peters, Daniels, Hodgkinson and Haslam2014).
The core point here is that while Aguinis et al. (Reference Aguinis, Ramani, Campbell, Bernal-Turnes, Drewry and Edgerton2017) purport to offer insights that are relevant to the field of I-O psychology as a whole, the imagination of their project is limited by the narrowness of the identities underpinning it. This is most obvious in the way that the field of I-O psychology is defined and investigated as an almost wholly North American pursuit—written about in North American textbooks and journals, researched and taught by North American researchers who are employed by North American universities and members of North American professional societies, and whose impact is gauged by North American metrics. The fact that information about these activities was accessed via a North American Web site (Amazon.com) and that those who were invited to comment on the article were editors of North American journals serves only to compound their project's identity-infused myopia. At the same time, we recognize that the authors’ confidence in the value of their contribution has been reinforced by the fact that the identity in question is one that is widely shared and, partly as a result of this, is one that connotes both power and authority.
When we look closely at Aguinis et al.’s (Reference Aguinis, Ramani, Campbell, Bernal-Turnes, Drewry and Edgerton2017) article, it is clear, then, that a range of more or less abstract identity assumptions not only informs their scholarship, but also limits it in particular ways. These assumptions are summarized in Table 1
, and it is interesting to speculate that the existence of the blind spots that they create becomes more obvious to an increasingly narrower set of readers the further down this table one reads. Thus we would expect that although many readers and reviewers might question the authors’ reliance on secondary textbooks as a source of information, their reliance on the expertise of U.S. academics might be more apparent to those who (like us) are European or Australasian.
Table 1. Identity-Related Assumptions That Inform Aguinis et al.’s Review
Yet having been alerted to this issue, one is reasonably entitled to ask whether it matters for the subject at hand. Our own answer is that it does, for at least two reasons.
First, the issues that Aguinis et al. (Reference Aguinis, Ramani, Campbell, Bernal-Turnes, Drewry and Edgerton2017) discuss are ones that have been addressed at some length by scholars from other parts of the world (see, e.g., Anderson, Reference Anderson2007; Anderson, Herriot, & Hodgkinson, Reference Anderson, Herriot and Hodgkinson2001; Gelade, Reference Gelade2006a, Reference Gelade2006b; Hodgkinson, Reference Hodgkinson2006; Hodgkinson, Herriot, & Anderson, Reference Hodgkinson, Herriot and Anderson2001; Hodgkinson & Rousseau, Reference Hodgkinson and Rousseau2009; Hodgkinson & Starkey, Reference Hodgkinson and Starkey2011; Kieser & Leiner, Reference Kieser and Leiner2009, Reference Kieser and Leiner2011; Romme et al., Reference Romme, Avenier, Denyer, Hodgkinson, Pandza, Starkey and Worren2015; Starkey, Hatchuel, & Tempest, Reference Starkey, Hatchuel and Tempest2009; Starkey & Madden, Reference Starkey and Madan2001; Symon, Reference Symon2006; Tranfield & Starkey, 2008; Van Aken, Reference Van Aken2004; Vicari, Reference Vicari2013; Wall, Reference Wall2006). As those scholars have all had interesting things to say about these issues, in the interests of scholarship it would have been useful to have seen their contributions incorporated into the framing of Aguinis et al.’s study and in their interpretation of its findings.
Second, these issues of identity and bias are ones that are themselves of profound interest to I-O psychologists (e.g., Haslam, Reference Haslam2001; Haslam & Ellemers, Reference Haslam, Ellemers, Hodgkinson and Ford2005; van Knippenberg, De Dreu, & Homan, Reference van Knippenberg, De Dreu and Homan2004; Ryan & Ford, Reference Ryan and Ford2010). It is, therefore, somewhat ironic that at the same time that we tell the world about the importance of identity concerns for organizational psychology, we are inured to their impact on our own professional activity.
To be more specific about this point, across a diverse array of professional fields and scholarly disciplines, researchers have long contested the territorial boundaries of their domains and debated the ultimate purpose(s) of the knowledge production process (see, e.g., Abbott, Reference Abbott1988; Becher & Trowler, Reference Becher and Trowler2001; Whitley, Reference Whitley2000). The ongoing debates in I-O psychology and related fields of management and organization studies concerning the academic–practitioner divide are similarly constituted (see, e.g., Anderson et al., Reference Anderson, Herriot and Hodgkinson2001; Briner & Rousseau, Reference Briner and Rousseau2011a, Reference Briner and Rousseau2011b; Gelade, Reference Gelade2006a, Reference Gelade2006b; Hodgkinson, Reference Hodgkinson and Rousseau2012; Hornung, Reference Hornung and Rousseau2012; Morrell, Learmonth, & Heracleous, Reference Morrell, Learmonth and Heracleous2015; Rousseau, Reference Rousseau and Rousseau2012; Rousseau & Gunia, Reference Rousseau and Gunia2016; Tranfield & Starkey, 1988). At the heart of all of these debates, we suggest, is a series of fundamental identity dynamics, which, despite their potency, often lie beyond the realm of conscious awareness (see, e.g., Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, Reference Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann and Banaji2009; Jost et al., Reference Jost, Rudman, Blair, Carney, Dasgupta, Glaser and Hardin2009), epitomized by the blind spots we have identified in Aguinis et al.’s (Reference Aguinis, Ramani, Campbell, Bernal-Turnes, Drewry and Edgerton2017) analysis. One important antidote to this unfortunate state of affairs is to continually raise awareness of these dynamics, with a view to fostering more inclusive and pluralistic conceptions both of the nature of a given scholarly community or profession and of what it means to be a member of it. This, we suggest, will ultimately be to the mutual benefit of all stakeholders within society at large.
In conclusion, then, we applaud Aguinis et al. (Reference Aguinis, Ramani, Campbell, Bernal-Turnes, Drewry and Edgerton2017, p. 508) for observing that “overall, it seems that pluralistic definitions of scholarly impact and the assessment of contributions to practice and teaching remain an afterthought.” At the same time, however, we would note that there are important forms of pluralism to which their own endeavor is oblivious and by which it is consequently hamstrung. Indeed, it is disappointing that although other researchers have drawn attention to the relevance of issues of identity for the I-O psychology profession and expressed a desire to address and overcome the problems these create (e.g., Hodgkinson, Reference Hodgkinson2013; Peters et al., Reference Peters, Daniels, Hodgkinson and Haslam2014; Ryan & Ford, Reference Ryan and Ford2010), in Aguinis et al.’s own enterprise they do not even achieve the status of an afterthought.
Aguinis et al.’s (Reference Aguinis, Ramani, Campbell, Bernal-Turnes, Drewry and Edgerton2017) analysis of the “most frequently cited sources, articles, and authors in industrial-organizational psychology textbooks” is a commendable piece of scholarship. Certainly, they have applied themselves to an important question and articulated a meaningful set of answers. We have no doubt too that for many readers the insights and answers they provide will be informative, compelling, and even reassuring—if only because they reinforce a view of the world with which they are familiar and by which they are comforted, even if that familiarity and comfort are framed in terms of a set of knotty professional concerns (Morton, Haslam, Postmes, & Ryan, Reference Morton, Haslam, Postmes and Ryan2006).
While there is much about Aguinis et al.’s (Reference Aguinis, Ramani, Campbell, Bernal-Turnes, Drewry and Edgerton2017) focal article to debate in its own terms (e.g., by questioning their methodology and analytic strategy), in this brief rejoinder we want to draw attention to a broader set of concerns that serve to question the value both of their efforts and of their capacity to inform debate in the field of industrial-organizational (I-O) psychology. These concerns relate to questions of identity, and more particularly to the self-categorical lens (the theory of “us”) through which the researchers view the field they survey (Peters, Daniels, Hodgkinson, & Haslam, Reference Peters, Daniels, Hodgkinson and Haslam2014).
The core point here is that while Aguinis et al. (Reference Aguinis, Ramani, Campbell, Bernal-Turnes, Drewry and Edgerton2017) purport to offer insights that are relevant to the field of I-O psychology as a whole, the imagination of their project is limited by the narrowness of the identities underpinning it. This is most obvious in the way that the field of I-O psychology is defined and investigated as an almost wholly North American pursuit—written about in North American textbooks and journals, researched and taught by North American researchers who are employed by North American universities and members of North American professional societies, and whose impact is gauged by North American metrics. The fact that information about these activities was accessed via a North American Web site (Amazon.com) and that those who were invited to comment on the article were editors of North American journals serves only to compound their project's identity-infused myopia. At the same time, we recognize that the authors’ confidence in the value of their contribution has been reinforced by the fact that the identity in question is one that is widely shared and, partly as a result of this, is one that connotes both power and authority.
When we look closely at Aguinis et al.’s (Reference Aguinis, Ramani, Campbell, Bernal-Turnes, Drewry and Edgerton2017) article, it is clear, then, that a range of more or less abstract identity assumptions not only informs their scholarship, but also limits it in particular ways. These assumptions are summarized in Table 1 , and it is interesting to speculate that the existence of the blind spots that they create becomes more obvious to an increasingly narrower set of readers the further down this table one reads. Thus we would expect that although many readers and reviewers might question the authors’ reliance on secondary textbooks as a source of information, their reliance on the expertise of U.S. academics might be more apparent to those who (like us) are European or Australasian.
Table 1. Identity-Related Assumptions That Inform Aguinis et al.’s Review
Note: The table organized so that higher-order identity concerns (associated with less exclusive self-categorizations) are at the top.
Yet having been alerted to this issue, one is reasonably entitled to ask whether it matters for the subject at hand. Our own answer is that it does, for at least two reasons.
First, the issues that Aguinis et al. (Reference Aguinis, Ramani, Campbell, Bernal-Turnes, Drewry and Edgerton2017) discuss are ones that have been addressed at some length by scholars from other parts of the world (see, e.g., Anderson, Reference Anderson2007; Anderson, Herriot, & Hodgkinson, Reference Anderson, Herriot and Hodgkinson2001; Gelade, Reference Gelade2006a, Reference Gelade2006b; Hodgkinson, Reference Hodgkinson2006; Hodgkinson, Herriot, & Anderson, Reference Hodgkinson, Herriot and Anderson2001; Hodgkinson & Rousseau, Reference Hodgkinson and Rousseau2009; Hodgkinson & Starkey, Reference Hodgkinson and Starkey2011; Kieser & Leiner, Reference Kieser and Leiner2009, Reference Kieser and Leiner2011; Romme et al., Reference Romme, Avenier, Denyer, Hodgkinson, Pandza, Starkey and Worren2015; Starkey, Hatchuel, & Tempest, Reference Starkey, Hatchuel and Tempest2009; Starkey & Madden, Reference Starkey and Madan2001; Symon, Reference Symon2006; Tranfield & Starkey, 2008; Van Aken, Reference Van Aken2004; Vicari, Reference Vicari2013; Wall, Reference Wall2006). As those scholars have all had interesting things to say about these issues, in the interests of scholarship it would have been useful to have seen their contributions incorporated into the framing of Aguinis et al.’s study and in their interpretation of its findings.
Second, these issues of identity and bias are ones that are themselves of profound interest to I-O psychologists (e.g., Haslam, Reference Haslam2001; Haslam & Ellemers, Reference Haslam, Ellemers, Hodgkinson and Ford2005; van Knippenberg, De Dreu, & Homan, Reference van Knippenberg, De Dreu and Homan2004; Ryan & Ford, Reference Ryan and Ford2010). It is, therefore, somewhat ironic that at the same time that we tell the world about the importance of identity concerns for organizational psychology, we are inured to their impact on our own professional activity.
To be more specific about this point, across a diverse array of professional fields and scholarly disciplines, researchers have long contested the territorial boundaries of their domains and debated the ultimate purpose(s) of the knowledge production process (see, e.g., Abbott, Reference Abbott1988; Becher & Trowler, Reference Becher and Trowler2001; Whitley, Reference Whitley2000). The ongoing debates in I-O psychology and related fields of management and organization studies concerning the academic–practitioner divide are similarly constituted (see, e.g., Anderson et al., Reference Anderson, Herriot and Hodgkinson2001; Briner & Rousseau, Reference Briner and Rousseau2011a, Reference Briner and Rousseau2011b; Gelade, Reference Gelade2006a, Reference Gelade2006b; Hodgkinson, Reference Hodgkinson and Rousseau2012; Hornung, Reference Hornung and Rousseau2012; Morrell, Learmonth, & Heracleous, Reference Morrell, Learmonth and Heracleous2015; Rousseau, Reference Rousseau and Rousseau2012; Rousseau & Gunia, Reference Rousseau and Gunia2016; Tranfield & Starkey, 1988). At the heart of all of these debates, we suggest, is a series of fundamental identity dynamics, which, despite their potency, often lie beyond the realm of conscious awareness (see, e.g., Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, Reference Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann and Banaji2009; Jost et al., Reference Jost, Rudman, Blair, Carney, Dasgupta, Glaser and Hardin2009), epitomized by the blind spots we have identified in Aguinis et al.’s (Reference Aguinis, Ramani, Campbell, Bernal-Turnes, Drewry and Edgerton2017) analysis. One important antidote to this unfortunate state of affairs is to continually raise awareness of these dynamics, with a view to fostering more inclusive and pluralistic conceptions both of the nature of a given scholarly community or profession and of what it means to be a member of it. This, we suggest, will ultimately be to the mutual benefit of all stakeholders within society at large.
In conclusion, then, we applaud Aguinis et al. (Reference Aguinis, Ramani, Campbell, Bernal-Turnes, Drewry and Edgerton2017, p. 508) for observing that “overall, it seems that pluralistic definitions of scholarly impact and the assessment of contributions to practice and teaching remain an afterthought.” At the same time, however, we would note that there are important forms of pluralism to which their own endeavor is oblivious and by which it is consequently hamstrung. Indeed, it is disappointing that although other researchers have drawn attention to the relevance of issues of identity for the I-O psychology profession and expressed a desire to address and overcome the problems these create (e.g., Hodgkinson, Reference Hodgkinson2013; Peters et al., Reference Peters, Daniels, Hodgkinson and Haslam2014; Ryan & Ford, Reference Ryan and Ford2010), in Aguinis et al.’s own enterprise they do not even achieve the status of an afterthought.