The stated thesis in Sacred Language, Sacred World is that scriptural language, tradition, and reason are “one thing viewed three ways,” rather than three separate things (1). Broggi argues that we do not use tradition to reason about Scripture as if the methods of using tradition, reasoning, and reading are independent of each other. Rather, all three rely on prior commitments that form our “world,” and changing anything about the way we understand tradition, reason, or Scripture will alter the whole world. The practical import of this claim is that in any disagreement about the way Scripture is read, the argument is not really about Scripture or tradition or reason. Rather, the disagreement lies in differing prior commitments. Two groups who live in different worlds or hold different prior commitments (such as Protestants and Roman Catholics) cannot expect to read the Bible or anything else in the same way.

Broggi's claim is in some ways obvious. Of course an African community, such as the Kimbanguists, with no knowledge of the Christian tradition is not going to read the Bible in light of the Christian tradition (although it remains surprising that they are interested in reading it at all!). Broggi's conclusion is a bit more radical and challenging than just that, though. First, regarding practical encounters, Broggi argues that Christians, in this case, cannot claim to be the only correct or proper interpreters of the Bible. Their interpretation is not more pure or authentic than a Kimbanguist interpretation, and it comes out of a world of prior commitments in just the same way. Second, regarding the field of hermeneutics, Broggi argues that Martin Heidegger's distinction between philosophy and theology, and therefore philosophical and theological hermeneutics, is untenable. Heidegger's basic argument is that philosophy looks for the pre-Christian principles that explain specific cases, whereas theology applies Christian principles to specific cases. However, Broggi, relying heavily on Heidegger's own work and on that of Hans-Georg Gadamer to a lesser extent, argues that both the upward philosophical movement and the downward theological movement take place within a world already made up of prior commitments. Furthermore, the unidirectional nature of these fields is not apparent in practice.

Broggi's defense of his thesis is compelling and well argued. Where he takes a novel approach to Heidegger or Gadamer, he offers his reading carefully and with direct reference to the text in English and German. For example, his interpretation of Gadamer's “fusion of horizons” reclaims the puzzling and paradoxical nature of a “fusion” (i.e., is it unity, plurality, or both?), and while one may not agree with his conclusion (Broggi says it's both), one can hardly call it unfounded.

The real strength of Broggi's work lies in the examples and illustrations that serve to clarify both concepts and what is at stake in his arguments. The whole text refers throughout to the Kimbanguists in the Congo, who read the Bible without reference to the Christian tradition, but smaller examples are also sprinkled throughout that highlight again and again how one's world determines one's interpretation of not only the Bible, but all things.

The text is best suited for graduate students and scholars who already have a background in hermeneutics. Since the focus is narrow, it is not a good first introduction to Heidegger's Being and Time or Gadamer's Truth and Method. Familiarity with each text beforehand will aid comprehension and is expected by the author. Nevertheless, one need not be an expert; the explanations are quite clear and never rushed.