It is a rare treat to read a book with a title that so clearly captures the very purpose of the book. This book with this title does just that. For those whose eyes glaze over at the mention of Bernard Lonergan, John Dadosky is not one of those writers who muddies the waters by the use of Lonerganian language and a convoluted style. Dadosky explains things. Whether you agree with his conclusions or not, he is clear.
Right away, in the preface, he tells us why he is writing: “to propose an intellectual framework for recovering beauty in the West” (xi). Dadosky bases his research in Thomas Aquinas and Lonergan, convinced that others who have worked with the aesthetics of Thomas have not made the turn to the subject, perhaps fearing a Kantian influence. Calling himself a meta-physician, Dadosky sets out to “clarify and articulate a philosophy of beauty within Lonergan's philosophy of intentional consciousness” (xii).
Dadosky sketches out his approach, convinced of Lonergan's distinction from Kant, and equally convinced that “the eclipse of beauty ultimately leads to the diminishment of meaning, and with this, our very existence is inevitably threatened” (4). In light of these convictions he states: “I will attempt to establish a philosophy of beauty from a transposed Thomistic perspective that has critically engaged the philosophical turn to the subject and can respond to the legacy of doubt and skepticism left in its wake” (6). Rejecting the legacy of the postmodern dismissal of objective beauty as being merely “in the eye of the beholder,” Dadosky challenges that “there remains a need for a philosophical basis on which we can articulate judgments of beauty, just as we do when we make judgments of fact and judgments of value” (14). Thus the justification for the Lonergan approach.
With this clear and focused overture, Dadosky then delivers an opera of characters, taking from each what serves his purpose, and clarifying why each goes just so far and no further in serving his project of recovery. But keeping in mind that some of his readers might be traumatized at the very mention of Lonergan, Dadosky not only sketches Aquinas’ approach to beauty to set a context; he sketches Lonergan's cognitional theory to convince readers it will be the necessary tool for the recovery. Then we are introduced to Friedrich Nietzsche, René Girard, and Søren Kierkegaard, to Hans Urs von Balthasar, Richard Shusterman, and Christopher Alexander. He leaves no aspect of their theories unexamined, all to clear the way for his presentation of Lonergan's levels of consciousness to provide judgments of beauty. For this reviewer, the fourth chapter, “Recovering Beauty in the Subject,” is the climax of the book, as it is the clearest presentation of the author's point as he tries to realize his purpose.
Why should we read this book? Perhaps for no other reason than to widen our horizons to realize that Lonergan was much more than a talking head. Yes, cognitional theory was his interest, but there is more than cognition here. A second reason might be to expand our awareness of the Aquinas/Lonergan connection. It is important to know how far Thomas goes, and how Lonergan takes him further. Classical Thomism needs to be convinced that the turn to the subject can be done without being locked in the subjectivity it dreads. It is only with the turn, Dadosky tells us, that we can responsibly reach the responsible objectivity we seek.
Because of the book's philosophical depth, its best use in the classroom would be with graduate students, although the fourth chapter might be useful for bright undergraduates who have been introduced to general empirical methods. The book is a refreshing “both/and” interface, offering us the richness of the interdisciplinary approach so needed in philosophy today.
