“Yet remembrance is always a form of forgetting (…) distilled from history and memory, twisted by ideology and political contestation, and embedded in heritage tours, museums public rituals, textbooks and various artifacts of mass culture – distorts and suppresses as much as it reveals.” Footnote 1
Introduction Footnote 2
Haylä Sellassé ruled Ethiopia for most of the twentieth century as a direct descendant of the Hebrew King Solomon. He is generally defined as an Amhara. What is rarely acknowledged is that at the very least one of his grandfathers was Oromo and his mother was Gurage. His wife was also an Oromo. In December 1994, after his successful overthrow of Haile Maryam Mengistu’s Marxist regime, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi reorganized modern Ethiopia’s provinces into ethnic administrative regions, replacing some of Shäwa and most of Wällo, Bägémder, and Gojjam with the Amhara regional state and combining Wälläga, Arsi, Illubabor, Bale, and Sidamo into the Oromia regional state. These new regions split some historic provinces, combined others, and explicitly argued that Ethiopia’s government is best organized along primordial ethnic lines. This ideology fuels an argument and has been a result of scholarship that understands Ethiopia as primarily an ethnic state. Twentieth and twenty-first century scholarship has assumed that since ethnicity has been a central theme during the last several decades, it must have been so in the nineteenth century. Footnote 3 Previous iterations of highland states in Ethiopia have been linked by hoe agriculture, Semitic languages, Abrahamic religions, and hierarchal political structures, but have all had significant ethnic diversity and change. Footnote 4 Due to its diversity as well as its lack of a colonial experience, Ethiopia is an interesting case to test the view of colonial creation versus a primordial view of African identities. Footnote 5 To rationalize an ethnic state, there needs to be a historic antecedent to the static ethnic boundaries of present-day Ethiopia. Accompanying these ethnic reimaginings, two versions of Ethiopia’s history were created by scholars largely in the twentieth century and informed by travel narratives of earlier centuries. Footnote 6 However, to use Hall’s words presented at the beginning of this essay, “remembering” ethnicity “distorts” and “suppresses” shared historic experiences at the local level. In essence, remembering Haylä Sellassé as an Amhara ignores his descent from other ethnic groups as well as denies his multi-ethnic provincial Shäwan identity.
The first reimagining tells the story of the offspring of the union of Solomon and Maksheda (Sheba), who brought back Judaism (and reportedly the Ark of the Covenant) Footnote 7 and statehood to the highlands of the Horn of Africa. Footnote 8 Their descendants (the Amhara and the Tigrinyan) have static primordial identities as the permanent leaders of Ethiopia (a name chosen due to its reference in the Old Testament) and God’s chosen people. Footnote 9 Thus, Ethiopian history for the last three thousand years has related solely the actions of these people in the highlands, while the histories of all other groups are ignored due to the fact that they are less civilized and “wholly” African. In addition, the impetus for advancements in the civilizations in the highlands is rooted in Middle Eastern or European influences. Footnote 10 The second reimagining is a response to the focus on literate Christians of the highlands and questions the existence of this state and its civilization and details the histories of Oromo, Gurage, and Omotic groups. They argue that the “three thousand years myth” is a product of Ethiopians (the Amhara and the Tigrinyan), the uncivilized, ethnocentric allies of European colonizers, who used their perceived ethnic superiority as motivation and European firearms as the means to carve out an empire from other ethnicities in the Horn of Africa during the “Scramble for Africa” in the late nineteenth century. Footnote 11 In sum, ethnic identities are created in order to make meaning of a literate Christian state in sub-Saharan Africa or to evidence twenty-first century ethno-national conflict. These identities obscure not only a basic understanding of the Horn of Africa, but also the fundamental moments in its complex and long history. Footnote 12
In this essay, I argue that in the historiography of Ethiopia, ethnicity is defined in a fixed primordial manner, especially in regards to the northern highlands, and creates an inaccurate and – especially with regard to the nineteenth century – an ahistorical way of viewing Ethiopia. Footnote 13 Local identities and the historic experiences that inform fluid notions of identity are larger factors in Ethiopian history, due to the fact that these identities are less ambiguous than ethnic ones, and local identities give scholars key insights into the making of Ethiopian history that twentieth and twenty-first century notions of ethnicity obscure. In other words, identities that reflect the specific local experiences of Gojjam, Wällo, Shäwa, or Gondar are significantly better lenses into Ethiopian history than the fixed ethnic lens of Amhara, Oromo, or Tigrinyan. Thus, fixed notions of ethnic identity presented in the historiography of nineteenth-century Ethiopia do not reflect the reality, because identities are too fluid, ethnic categories are too contested, and Ethiopia is too heterogeneous for a static ethnic lens to illuminate the major events in this century.
Underpinning an ethnic version of Ethiopia’s history are the beliefs that certain ethnicities cannot become Ethiopian, ethnic identities do not change, and the conflicts of the late nineteenth century are primarily ethnic. Footnote 14 While some scholars argue for fluid notions of identity, their studies are underutilized in the construction of Ethiopian history. Footnote 15 The indigenous primary source material presents a different picture, one where conflicts transcend ethnicity, identities are fluid, and the highland state has incorporated a variety of ethnic groups. Two events in nineteenth-century Ethiopian history, the Council of Boru Méda and the Battle of Embabo, clearly indicate the centrality of local identities informed by shared historic experience in the conflicts and negotiations in the making of modern Ethiopia that resulted in shifts in ethnic and national identities in multiple directions and is reflected in the experiences, practices, and beliefs of the populations of what becomes modern Ethiopia. Footnote 16
Ethnic Historiography
In Ethiopian studies, identity is contested, but rarely discussed in academic circles. When it is discussed, generally it is in Ethiopian studies conferences or regional journals. The International Conferences of Ethiopian Studies (ICES) are major events in the study of Ethiopia; as such, they set the tone for Ethiopian studies for the next three years. Footnote 17 Due to the fact that Ethiopia was not colonized, and the study of Ethiopia is decentered, this is a rare setting for the meeting of American, European, and Ethiopian-based Ethiopianists. The conference proceedings are the backbone of the Ethiopia Studies canon and also the setting for a great deal of discussion on identities. There was little consensus among late-twentieth-century scholars on what defined an Amhara or an Oromo, and this ambiguity has had a great impact on the histories written on Ethiopia. Debates centered on not only the nature of these identities (political, biological, cultural, or social) but also on the substance within these containers. In terms of the Amhara, there is disagreement on whether they are rooted in Yemen or in highland Ethiopia, but some agreement on the defining qualities of the group. With the Oromo, there is some question as to the origins of the group (southern Ethiopia or northern Kenya) and little consensus on defining qualities. Footnote 18 Generally, the Amhara are understood among scholars as a fluid social class, but this complexity is not reflected in how this category is used in the writing of Ethiopian history. Footnote 19 Thus, it is clear that “Amhara” culture is a key lens, but due to its association with the state and its spread across Ethiopia, it is difficult to delineate Amhara-descended people from those who practice Amhara culture. Also, generally, scholarly attention has focused on assimilation into a static Amhara culture at the expense of the ways in which the other cultures have impacted “Amhara” culture. Footnote 20
A number of scholars and politicians have attempted to sketch out what an Amhara is, but there are considerable divergences on the nature of this identity. Some argue that it is a cultural identity; however, much of the scholarship indicates that it is solely a class-based identity, devoid of ethnicity. Footnote 21 In essence, those in political power became Amhara. Footnote 22 Most importantly, it can it be used effectively as a lens to order Ethiopian history? Footnote 23 In the primary literature there is only mention of it as a place name, located in the former province of Wällo. The province was once called Amhara, but was renamed after the Oromo clan who conquered it. Early conceptions of Ethiopia gloss over these differences not only to connect Amhara wherever they are found to each other but also to connect them to the historic Aksumite empire of the First Millennium. Footnote 24 In other words, to use Amhara as a way to frame Ethiopian history, one must ignore the significant differences between Amhara groups as well as the differences in ancient, premodern and modern Ethiopia.
On the Oromo there is a similar lack of clarity, but in the process of writing the Oromo into Ethiopian history, a common history of the Oromo was a necessity. Footnote 25 The process of making such a history makes use of the traditional Oromo organizing system, the gada system, the traditional Oromo religion, waaqeffannaa, or the traditional Oromo culture, orumumma. Footnote 26 These concepts are used as the foundation of a political nation, which was conquered by non-Oromo Ethiopians. In this reconstruction, similar to that of the Amhara, differences, development changes, and internal discrimination are deemphasized to create a nation that, “[i]n fact, Oromo is one of the most numerous nations in Africa, which enjoys a homogeneous culture and shows a common language, history and descent and once shared political, religious and legal institutions.” Footnote 27 Thus, they argue that the Oromo are historically similar and are linked biologically and culturally, and are therefore a nation. Footnote 28 Dominant in the literature on the Oromo are scholars who transfer twenty-first-century political identities to the identities of nineteenth-century Oromo political actors. Footnote 29 These political identities possess a singular culture and are unified under the Oromo nation. Thus, all Oromo who were a part of the highland state that converted to Islam or Christianity are not Oromo; they are ones who have lost an Oromo identity.
John Wright states, describing a similar case of views of Zulu identity: “Zulu identity was increasingly reasserted as a natural expression of a powerful and long-established group consciousness.” Footnote 30 Unlike studies on the Oromo, in later paragraphs he argues this view does not take into consideration academic literature on ethnicity, the historic processes that produce identity or the contemporary uses of identity. Footnote 31 In the collection Being and Becoming Oromo, the Europeans and Americans focused on the differences, while the Oromo scholars emphasized the sameness of Oromo. Footnote 32 Later presentations of the Oromo reproduce this sameness. Beside these methodological issues, the centrality of ethnicity obscures both the provincial and cultural dynamics of Ethiopian history. For example, in the nineteenth century, the Zämäna Mäsefent and the conquest of Southern territories both are infused in the historiography with a fixed concept of ethnicity. After the eighteenth century, generally, one finds the Amhara and the Oromo on both sides of conflicts. Footnote 33 However, the historiography emphasizes inter-ethnic conflict – creating the view that Ethiopian history is defined by conflict between ethnic groups rather than within them.
The Zämäna Mäsefent or the Age of Princes is a period where provincial authority triumphed over central authority. In terms of the rationale behind this trend, historians of the late twentieth century offered ethnicity. Footnote 34 Also, due to the presentist nature of Ethiopian studies, much of the work on the nineteenth century is not challenged and is reproduced to produce ethnic twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Footnote 35 Mordecai Abir writes, “The Galla Footnote 36 who invaded Ethiopia were deeply disunited, had no ideology, and were only seeking a better land to settle in.” Footnote 37 This view defines the Zämäna Mäsefent as primarily ethnic, with a decline of the state due to ethnic hatred of the Oromo and their inability to create or use a unifying system like Christianity. Footnote 38 This state was resurrected by Kasa (renamed Téwodros (r. 1855–1868), whose rise was a result of God and the unity of the Amhara. Footnote 39 These ethnic views of the Zämäna Mäsefent are reflected and unchallenged by later historians. For example, Teshale Tibebu writes: “For the Ge’ez civilization to emerge from the night of the Zämäna Mäsefent, the light of the 85 year ‘intruder’ (the Yäjju Oromo ruling house at Debra Tabor) had to be extinguished;” here centralization cannot occur if there are Oromo in charge in “the very heart of Amharaland.” Footnote 40 This view was partly corrected by interventions by Ethiopian historians Shiferaw Bekele and Bahru Zewde, who argue that the various regional powers worked to control the central state and not destroy it and Téwodros’s rise had little to do with Amhara unity or God. Footnote 41 Unfortunately, the ethnic categories of Oromo and Amhara are not problematized and the nuanced work of historians like Shiferaw and Crummey is not reflected in the twentieth- and twenty-first-century literature.
Donald Levine initially furthered the claim of a unity of Ethiopian experience predicated upon pan-Ethiopian cultural practices, historic interactions, and a response to outsiders. Footnote 42 His call for a syncretic “greater” Ethiopia has not had a significant response. In terms of Ethiopian historiography, this has two results. One, internal dynamics with the regional centers, such as negotiations and acculturations with the diverse provinces of Gojjam, Wällo, Bägémder, and Shäwa are ignored, resulting in either people becoming “Oromocized” or “Amharicized.” Footnote 43 They simply become Amhara or Oromo provinces, when all of them, and their leadership, have significant populations of both of these ethnic groups, reflecting syncretism, not assimilation. Also, the changes during the nineteenth century that occurred in the provinces of Gojjam and Shäwa are argued to be simply the ethnic conquest of Oromo lands by Amhara, ignoring the Oromo on both sides of the conquest.
This view is continued in more recent versions of Menilek’s (r. 1888–1913) conquest of territories South and West of Shäwa. In many ethno-national texts, the term Amhara is used interchangeably with Abyssinian and, later Ethiopian. Footnote 44 Thus, Menilek’s conquest, led by and possessed a significant amount of Shäwan Amhara and Oromo soldiers, becomes an Amhara conquest of the Oromo. Footnote 45 Although there are more Oromo-centered texts, an ethnic view of Menilek’s Southern conquests is also found in texts that focus on non-Oromo groups. For example, Teshale’s Amhara social history views the conquest as the expansion of Ge’ez civilization. While on page 45, Teshale defines Amhara and “Galla” as terms of power and not ethnicity, he predicates modern statehood on the demise of the Oromo. Footnote 46 This ideology is furthered by a series of works that craft a unified Oromo nation that was conquered by the Amhara king Menilek in the late nineteenth century. Footnote 47 By defining the moment in terms of ethnicity, it presents both warring entities as ethnic, static, and eternally in conflict. For example, Donald Levine’s extraordinary work Greater Ethiopia, which attempts to meld the various ethnicities into one unit, still employs ethnicity. He writes, describing why Ethiopia was able to defend itself against colonial aggression: “[T]his process was disrupted but then revitalized by the Galla, who both stimulated and participated in the national resurgence and provided a certain amount of social cement to connect the many people at the periphery of the empire.” Footnote 48 While Levine correctly observes the situation in terms of defense of Ethiopia, the fact that he uses ethnicity obscures the changes among the Oromo and the cultural shifts in the state, as well as replicating historic views of the Oromo as enemies of the state and at best replicators of an “Amhara” system. These definitions make cultural exchanges unimaginable, identity shifts inconceivable, and conflict over anything other than ethnicity impossible.
Menilek’s southern conquests claimed lands beyond the centuries old frontiers to the south, west, and east into the Oromo Gibe states as well as the states of other southern groups. Recently, scholars have put an ethnic rationale behind the conquest. Footnote 49 In this task, the Oromo groups are simplified and homogenized, as are the Amhara, who are unified to systematically oppress the Oromo. Here, the various meanings of the term “Amhara” are especially important. While it is invoked in both indigenous and foreign sources, this term could mean a näftäñña (literally “one with a firearm”) a Christian, a northerner, or one who speaks Amharic. None of these definitions points to a specific ethnic group. In essence, while many of the scholars successfully condemn the ethnocentric views of many past historians, they do not challenge the ethnic categories of Oromo, Amhara or Tigrinyan. Adding to this ethnic view, they argue that European intervention is key, as the sole reason why the Ethiopians (solely the Amhara and the Tigrinyan) were able to conquer the Oromo. Footnote 50 Once conquered, the Ethiopians treated the Oromo as second-class citizens. Footnote 51 Mohammed Hassen writes:
Menelik’s unbridled ambition to exploit “the green and lush Oromo lands and their boundless commodities (gold, civet, ivory, and coffee) and [their] prosperous market” was the primary motive for his empire-building venture, which resulted in one-sided mass killing of the Oromo. And the Abyssinian soldiers were uninhibited in their killing because the Oromo were different from them in terms of language, custom, culture, way of life, and political philosophy. Footnote 52
This passage argues that Abyssinians cannot include the Oromo; that the two are different in every way; and that Menilek’s conquest was ethnic in nature. It concludes that the ultimate goal was to destroy Oromo culture. Footnote 53 What is not acknowledged is that the näftäñña were commonly Oromo themselves or that subsequent Shäwan centralization impacted all ethnicities, including the Amhara. Footnote 54 Those who cannot be ignored are written off as traitors or crazy in order to give evidence as this conquest as wholly an Amhara one. Footnote 55 This view gives the image of Ethiopia as an ethnic nation and suggests that if one is not “Amhara,” one cannot be Ethiopian. This distortion ignores the Agaw, Oromo, and Muslim contributions to the state and makes them impossible. For example, it cannot recognize that Oromo groups led Ethiopia during the Zämäna Masefent or that the bulk of the “Abyssinian” soldiers at Adwa were at least partially Oromo, because it would produce a multi-ethnic Ethiopia. Footnote 56 This presentation would force one to admit that the conquest was not solely ethnic; that these identities are fluid; and that the Oromo, Muslims, and other non-“Abyssinians” have contributed to Ethiopian history and its syncretic culture. Footnote 57
The Council of Boru Méda
While the Zämäna Mäsefent and the conquest of the Southern territories are pivotal moments in the ethnic (re)telling of Ethiopia’s histories, in the creation of modern Ethiopia, the Council of Boru Méda and the Battle of Embabo play more central roles in Ethiopia’s history and illuminate the importance of culture and place in conceptions of Ethiopian phenomenon. Historically, a major issue in Ethiopian politics is conflict over religion, not solely between religious groups but also within religions. Footnote 58 Ethiopian Christianity has a dynamic tradition of internal developments. These developments reflect historic experiences at the local level as well as pre-Christian highland traditions. Footnote 59 These religious schisms spilled over into politics due to the lack of primogeniture and the ways in which leaders made themselves legitimate. Rival claimants would implement a different orthodox view to rationalize rebellion against the status quo, and in return they would lavishly support the churches that created these views. Ostensibly there was a unity, at least among orthodox Christians, but under the surface, the conflict and localization that defined the Zämäna Mäsefent outlasted and was strengthened by Téwodros’s harsh rule in the mid-nineteenth century. It is in this context that Yohannes IV (r. 1871–1888) called for the Council of Boru Méda, to unify Ethiopia politically through one orthodox Christian sect.
As many Ethiopianists have noted, the Ethiopia that Emperor Yohannes IV desired was one without the various Christian sects that had been the bane of unity and stability at least since the seventeenth century. Footnote 60 In terms of rebellion, a challenger could simply invoke one of the competing sects of Christianity or Islam to rationalize their efforts. In historically Muslim Wällo, Yohannes IV planned to stem conversions to Islam, while in Shäwa he wanted to destroy the Sost Ledat Footnote 61 sect that played a significant role in the religious scene. Lasting for two months, the Council was designed to settle doctrinal conflicts in the Christian areas by designating one national religious sect of Christianity for all the population to follow. This edict included Muslims, members of the Jewish faith, traditionalists, and adherents to other denominations of Christianity. According to Menelik’s chronicler, the edict issued at the Council’s conclusion declared:
We are your apostles. All this used to be Christian land until Grañ ruined and misled it. Now let all, whether Muslim or Galla [pagan] believe on the name of Jesus Christ! Be baptized! If you wish to live in peace preserving your belongings become Christians. (…) Thereby you will govern in this world and inherit the one to come. Footnote 62
This edict did not threaten natural death, rather a social death of sorts. Most Ethiopians measured their wealth in terms of land, and to lose this land would cost unconverted Muslims dearly. Second, it stated that the converted would govern in this world, which simultaneously endears those who convert to the central state and severs independent sources of legitimacy, such as Islam or competing sects of Christianity. Therefore, the two Imams of Wällo, Abba Wa’taw and Mohammad Ali, whose legitimacy had been evidenced by descent and Islam, were baptized and refashioned into Däjamach (Däj) (a military title below Ras) Haylä Maryam Menilek and Däj Mikaél Yohannes. Footnote 63 When a non-Christian was baptized he also received a godparent. Haylä Maryam (Abba Wat’aw) was granted Menilek as a godparent, while Mikaél (Mohammed Ali) became Yohannes IV’s godson. Footnote 64 This strategy reconnected Muslim- and Oromo-descended, but Amharic-speaking Wällo princes to the central state, religiously, politically, and familiarly. Footnote 65 In addition, it tied Menilek II and Yohannes IV to those rulers and to Wällo in general. With this connection in mind, Yohannes established the city of Dessé as the capital of Wällo, and Menilek more fully invested in his previously established city of Wära Ilu, also in Wällo. Finally, it also rendered ineffective the largely Shäwan Sost Lidat sect, which curtailed the religious rationale for a potential rebellion by Menilek.
After the Council of Boru Méda, the seeds of modern Ethiopia, began to sprout through a continuation of some of Téwodros’s modernizing policies and a re-evaluation of some of his unproductive ones. Footnote 66 Yohannes fostered a beneficial relationship with the church, provincial leaders, and the population, and was able to defend the country against all foreign invaders. Footnote 67 Wällo was central in this strategy, which began as Yohannes enticed Wälloyé leaders to submit to him and convert to Christianity. Menilek’s chronicler states:
King Menilek, having announced to all the people of Wällo, spoke to them in a friendly way in these terms: “Now, by baptism and by communion, you became similar to me, you will govern this terrestrial world, and, by the mercy of Jesus Christ, you will be worthy of kingdom of the heavens. Use all of your strength for Christianity.” Footnote 68
In this passage, the chronicler states that the Wällo elite became “similar” to Menilek and as such would govern in Ethiopia. Politically, Wällo was still split. Menilek’s rights to Wällo were recognized through his vassal Haylä Maryam, but Däj Mikaél was a vassal of Yohannes. In the years after the Council, Mikaél continued to attach himself to Yohannes. He accompanied Yohannes on a few campaigns and was rewarded for his loyalty and accomplishments with the title of Ras (a title just below that of king) in Gondär several months later. Footnote 69 This council created a unified Christian community, but also brought in the Wällo nobility completely into the Ethiopia’s patronage system, and not just as clients or members, but as patrons, under the direct authority of the Nägus (King) or As’e’ (Emperor). For Wällo, it unified the elite under two nobles, both converted Christians and godsons of Yohannes and Menilek. While it was a religious council, its significance lies in its political restructuring. Footnote 70 Once a symbol of disunity, Wällo became a center of a united country as evidenced by many important nineteenth-century events in Wällo, including the aforementioned Council of Boru Méda, the Treaty of Wuch’ale, Footnote 71 and the meeting of the provincial armies that fought at Adwa, in Wära Ilu.
With the problem of Wällo worked out, the Shäwan challenge was also resolved by the Council of Boru Méda. At this time, Yohannes was still significantly better armed than Menilek, and after some initial negotiations Menilek submitted to Yohannes bearing a stone and Yohannes crowned him Nägus of Shäwa on 16 March 1878. Footnote 72 Gäbra Sellassé writes that Yohannes in his edict stated, “I am now reconciled with my brother, Negus Menilek,” and continues:
The 18 of Magabit, As’é [Yohannes] gave his crown to As’é Menilek Footnote 73 (…) we are one and we reign under the same crown, it is necessary to agree that this crown did not bring hopelessness to King Menilek. In addition to the glory and honor since it [the crown] came down divinely and without interruption from Menilek I to Menilek II, besides, it seems that As’é Yohannes did not have anything else to give him that was worthy of him, because the king’s house overflowed with horse, mules, gold and money. King Menilek having given abundantly all these things to As’é Yohannes, the army and the people said that this one [Yohannes] not having anything to give had made him [Menilek] present his [Yohannes’s] crown. Finally, it was a gesture that appeared to mean: one day it is you that will take my crown. Footnote 74
While chronicles are generally vehicles of legitimacy, the chronicler gives an accurate rendering of this event. Menilek ended Shäwan independence and schemes on becoming emperor in exchange for the ascension as emperor of either his son-in-law or himself upon the death of Yohannes. Later, Yohannes made Ras Adal of Gojjam, Nägus Täklä Haymanot Footnote 75 and gave him the right to make two Rases. Menilek was allowed to keep part of Wällo, but Ras Mikael (Mohammad Ali) remained in charge of the other part and reported directly to Yohannes. Menilek then named two Rases, his uncle Dargé and Gobäna. Footnote 76 In addition to Menilek’s submission, Yohannes empowered the nobles of Wällo and Gojjam, endearing them to him, which further cemented his authority throughout the empire. In sum, the Council of Boru Méda, constructed a single Christian interpretation, set up the imperial succession for Menilek II, created two Kings (Näguses), multiple Rases, and the political hierarchy that existed well into the twentieth century. This council produced a national culture that produced a path for all ethnicities to become a part of the state as well as marginalizing those of all ethnicities that did not follow Yohannes’s preferred sect of Christianity. This council also legitimized provincial authority throughout Ethiopia, including the multi-ethnic ruling classes of Bägémder, Gojjam, Wällo, and Shäwa. Therefore, the provincialism of Zämäna Mäsefent ended, not with the iron fist of Téwodros, but with national, political, and religious institutions that recognized the multi-ethnic ruling class and unified them through religious conversion. This moment transcends fixed primordial notions of ethnicity. An enduring ethnic lens obscures this fact.
The Battle of Embabo
In many facets, the consequences of the Battle of Embabo crystalized many of the outcomes of the Council of Boru Méda. Ethiopia’s boundaries have always been fluid, and expansion into the frontier has been a major avenue for provincial powers to increase their authority at the center. Footnote 77 In Shäwa, during the 1860s and 1870s, Menilek was expanding the Shäwan state in the north through his base in Wära Illu and his Wällo allies, Wärqitu and her step son, Mohammed Ali. He also began to grow his base beyond his Mänzé Footnote 78 roots to the south and the west, attempting to solidify a Shäwan base for further expansion. In this task, he relied upon Shäwan allies with whom his grandfather had relations, including many Mächa and Tulama Oromo who largely comprised and led his armies. Footnote 79 As they began to move west, they came into conflict with a Gojjamé force, which were doing a similar thing from a Gojjamé base using neighboring peoples as a springboard into the west. Footnote 80 As earlier argued, ethnicity is at the center of understanding Menilek’s conquest, but the expansions of Täkla Haymanot and Menilek were both predicated upon alliances that transcended ethnic lines. The situation of two provincial armies in conflict over delineating frontiers created an avenue to crystalize Yohannes’s political structure.
This event was the Battle of Embabo in 1882, between Ras Gobana and Nägus Täklä Haymanot, the vassals of Menilek and Yohannes, over the agriculturally rich Omotic-speaking province of Kafa. The conflict began with a theft of tribute. Menilek’s leading general Ras Gobana’s forces met with those of Ras Däräso, Täklä Haymanot’s general, who just returned from obtaining tribute from neighboring areas. Footnote 81 Gobana used his reputation and the size of his army to threaten Däräso into giving this tribute to him. Däräso, emptyhanded, returned to Täklä Haymanot, who understood the significance of this act in terms of the potential Kaffa conquest, and instructed Däräso to confront Gobäna. Täklä Haymanot would not get involved unless another Nägus was involved. Nägus Menilek, however, did get involved, precipitating the conflict that ended with a Shäwan victory and the capture of Täklä Haymanot. After Täklä Haymanot was captured, Yohannes interceded, freed him, and punished Menilek by taking Wällo. Footnote 82 Part of the province was given to Yohannes’s young son Araya Sellassé (1870–1888) already promised in marriage to Menelik’s daughter Zäwditu (1876–1930). The other part was still administered by Yohannes’s godson, Ras Mikael. His elevation as leader of Wällo was questioned by Menilek who said:
Soon again, when you said, “I have taken Wollo [Wällo] and wish to be its Apostle,” I said that I would only be sorry if you were to give it to Ras Mikael, while I would be pleased to hand over the province to Your Majesty. When it was given to Ras Araya, I told myself it had gone into the family [Menilek’s daughter was married to him], as the saying goes, “When the calf milks the cow it only returns to the stomach,” and was therefore pleased. However, soon you gave it to Ras Mikael Footnote 83 while I had requested Your Majesty not to do so. I am only saddened by the fact that the love which binds us together grew cooler rather than warmer as time went by. Footnote 84
Here, Menilek clearly understood that without Wällo, he could not contend with Yohannes for supremacy of Ethiopia, even with thousands of firearms from France and Italy. His letter outlines not only the importance of Wällo, but also the significance of Ras Mikaél governing it. In that, Mikaél was not just one of Yohannes’s vassals, but rather a man who needed to be respected as the sole leader of a politically, economically, and militarily important province.
The battle of Embabo restructured Ethiopia in profound ways. First, Yohannes took direct control of Wällo, which increased his strength and, more importantly, he took this Northern province from Menilek. At this point, Menilek continued to conquer to the South, West and East, but played a limited role in events in the North. While in the Ethiopian political structure, Täklä Haymanot and Menilek were equals, Menilek had significantly more wealth, firearms and territories. In addition, his victory at Embabo swayed the balance of power in the western Oromo territories bringing most of Wälläga, Illubabor and Jimma under Menilek’s control. Menilek’s general, Ras Gobäna continually pushed West past the lands of the Gurage and the Mäch’a into the Gibe States, and obtained tribute from many of these territories. The Gojjamé defeat at Embabo, checked their progress and Gobäna claimed the Wällägan territories under the Gojjamé Nägus’ control. Bahru writes: “It ensured Menilek a steady source of revenue to strengthen his political and military position in his ultimate bid for the throne. In short, the Battle of Embabo made Menilek the only serious candidate for the succession to Emperor Yohannes IV.” Footnote 85 This would only be serious when Yohannes passed away, but it was foreshadowed at Boru Méda.
While taking away Wällo pushed Menilek away from Yohannes, how did Yohannes endear Menilek to the state? The Shäwans, independent throughout most of the nineteenth century and located in southern part of the empire, were cut off from many developments in the north. One of the developments was the extensive intermarriage between the Northern houses. Footnote 86 In Shäwa, there were marital connections between Shäwan groups that resulted in cultural, social, and political alliances between the various groups in the province. Footnote 87 Initially, Menilek forwarded his imperial claims by conquering Wällo, which, again, he lost due to his actions at Embabo. However, after the consequences of the Battle of Embabo, Yohannes solved this problem by marrying a highly born Northerner, T’aytu Be’tul to Menilek II as a Northern spy. Footnote 88
This political marriage renewed ties to the North, but contracted Menilek II’s power in this region of Ethiopia. First, T’aytu had earlier marriages that attached her to the previous emperors. She was highly born on both her mother’s and father’s side, and her Northern roots gave Menilek instant legitimacy in these areas. Footnote 89 Her former secretary eloquently expressed her role in the success of Menilek’s Ethiopia, when he wrote:
The kingdom of Abba Danaw [Menilek’s horse name “Justice”] from when Taytu entered it was large and it became wider, it was rich and it became richer, it became more prosperous. Wayzero Bafana lived rebelling and striving to demolish and discredit the kingdom of Menilek. Instead Taytu Bet’ul lived and she will [continue to] live sustaining him with her suggestions and strengthen him with her own strength. Footnote 90
The importance of marriage alliances was also seen in the marriages between Menilek’s and Yohannes’s children, and after the death of Yohannes’ son, between Menilek’s relatives and regional elites. Footnote 91 Thus, the Battle of Embabo crystallized Menilek II as the successor to Yohannes; relegated him to the southern territories, unifying the northern territories under one leader; and made Wällo the center of this modern state. In the West and South, Täkla Haymanot’s allies became Menilek’s as he pushed further south and west, and with these changes to his territories, the center of his kingdom became increasingly Southern, literally and figuratively. Footnote 92 These measures tied the patrons of all Ethiopian territories to each other and maintained a political structure that centralized authority under the emperor, planned for a fluid transition upon Yohannes’s death, and ensured that loyalty between nobles was due to opportunity to increase their authority within the state. These events created the modern multi-ethnic Ethiopia that was able to defend itself at Adwa.
Conclusions
The concept of ethnicity is a hindrance to understanding Ethiopia, due to inconsistencies in defining ethnic groups within Ethiopia, the lack of evidence of fixed ethnic identities, and ethnic conflict during the nineteenth century. The quest to infuse Ethiopia’s history with ethnicity obscures the significant events and motivations in Ethiopia’s history. Frameworks that take into consideration local dynamics, such as shared historic experiences that produced syncretic beliefs, practices, and identities are more productive in understanding and presenting Ethiopian history. This is due to the fact that, in Ethiopia, identities are fluid, conflict transcends ethnicity, and Ethiopia possesses a syncretic culture. While different groups have led states in the highlands, there are many things that link them. These elements include hoe agriculture, extensive intermarriage, the Ethiopian Orthodox church, and the use of Amharic for political expression. Footnote 93 These are central components of the state, not fixed notions of ethnicity. Clear definitions of what defines these ethnicities are lacking, and to ascribe historic change strictly to ethnic interactions obscures not only the motivations of the state and its actors, but also the events that created the modern state. Donald Wright argues for other possibilities, including family, class, or provincial identities in precolonial Africa. Footnote 94 These other types of identities free understandings of political actors from ethnic motivations and also correspond more directly to the historical realities of nineteenth century Ethiopia. Thus a local lens utilized to understand Ethiopian phenomenon is a significantly more illuminating path to understanding a multi-ethnic Ethiopia past, present, and, hopefully, future.
Brian J. Yates received his PhD from the University of Illinois in 2009 and is presently an assistant professor of history at St. Joseph’s University in Philadelphia. Yates has published work in Journal of Oromo Studies, The International Journal of Ethiopian Studies, North East African Studies, The Journal of Black Studies, and African Identities. His work has focused on the ethnic and national identities of Ethiopia and the cultural practices that have produced them. He is presently working on a manuscript entitled The Other Häbäsha: The Oromo and the Creation of Modern Ethiopia, 1855–1913. E-mail: byates@sju.edu
