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‘BUILDING IN THE DEEP’: NOTES ON A METAPHOR FOR MENTAL ACITIVITY AND THE METAPHORICAL CONCEPT OF MIND IN EARLY GREEK EPIC*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 September 2016

Fabian Horn
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The verb βυσσο-δομεύω (Sc. 30 = Hes. Frg. 195.37 M.–W.), separated by Glenn Most in his translation as ‘planning in the depth’, appears to be composed of a noun βυσσός (‘depth’) and a verbal root *δέμ- (‘[to] construct’), thus literally meaning ‘(to) build in the deep’. There is no instance in our extant texts where this compound verb is employed literally in reference to an act of construction, and to the best of our knowledge it is exclusively used metaphorically in early epic diction to describe a mental process (see also Hom. Od. 4.676; 8.273; 9.316; 17.66, 465, 491; 20.184).

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Research Article
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Greece & Rome , Volume 63 , Issue 2 , October 2016 , pp. 163 - 174
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Copyright © The Classical Association 2016 

At the beginning of the Pseudo-Hesiodic Shield of Heracles, Zeus seduces Alcmene, the mortal woman who will give birth to Heracles, the hero of the poem. Zeus's decision to approach Alcmene and his plan to do so are described with the following lines:

ὦρτο δ’ ἀπ’ Οὐλύμποιο δόλον ϕρεσὶ βυσσοδομεύων,
ἱμείρων ϕιλότητος ἐυζώνοιο γυναικός,
ἐννύχιος·…
He rushed from Olympus, planning deception in the depth of his soul,
desiring the love of a fine-girdled woman,
by night.
([Hes.] Sc. 30–2)Footnote 1

The verb βυσσο-δομεύω (Sc. 30 = Hes. Frg. 195.37 M.–W.), separated by Glenn Most in his translation as ‘planning in the depth’, appears to be composed of a noun βυσσός (‘depth’) and a verbal root *δέμ- (‘[to] construct’),Footnote 2 thus literally meaning ‘(to) build in the deep’.Footnote 3 There is no instance in our extant texts where this compound verb is employed literally in reference to an act of construction, and to the best of our knowledge it is exclusively used metaphorically in early epic diction to describe a mental process (see also Hom. Od. 4.676; 8.273; 9.316; 17.66, 465, 491; 20.184).Footnote 4

The methodological problem of positing metaphorical usage – that is, deviation from literal usage when no instance of literal usage is attestedFootnote 5 – is precluded by the fact that, as a compound, the literal, ‘ordinary’ meaning can be ascertained etymologically through the basic senses of its two constituents, whose literal meanings are undisputed. As a result, since compounds may reasonably be supposed to reflect the meanings of their elements, the basic meaning of βυσσο-δομεύω must be assumed to be ‘(to) build in the deep’, even though there are no extant instances of this ‘normal’ usage (if there ever were any).Footnote 6 The contextual sense of the verb in Sc. 30 as referring to a mental process is deviant from this posited basic meaning, but can be understood in comparison with it, which is a criterion for metaphor identification.Footnote 7 Judging from its transparent etymology, βυσσοδομεύω must be interpreted as a metaphor and its usage (as well as the conceptualizations upon which this usage is based) can be examined accordingly.

The verb is always used transitively and, based on the contexts in which it appears, it seems as if it had predominantly negative connotations.Footnote 8 From the repeated occurrences in early Greek epic poetry, we can conclude that the phrasing of the collocation (ἐνὶ) ϕρεσὶ βυσσοδομεύων is formulaic, conventional, and probably non-deliberate,Footnote 9 with comparatively low metaphoricity.Footnote 10 While the assessment of the literary value of the metaphor and its metaphoricity are beyond the scope of this study, in the following discussion I will demonstrate the complex cognitive processes and preconceptions involved in understanding this seemingly simple verb and the richness of the metaphorical notions underlying its constituents.

The phrase (ἐνὶ ϕρεσὶ) βυσσοδομεύων belongs to the wealth of metaphorical expressions that the ancient Greeks employed to denote intellectual activity, a field which is abstract and difficult to describe literally and where it is accordingly natural to resort to metaphors.Footnote 11 It has been an insight of recent studies in the theory of metaphor, especially from the field of cognitive linguistics, that metaphor is not an aberrant way of using language or the mere substitution of a literal phrase, but a common and essential process of human thought and cognition by which we can think, speak, and make sense of our environment and our existence. The human conceptual system relies on metaphors:

Metaphor is for most people a device of the poetic imagination and the rhetorical flourish – a matter of extraordinary rather than ordinary language. Moreover, metaphor is typically viewed as characteristic of language alone, a matter of words rather than thought or action. For this reason, most people think they can get along perfectly well without metaphor. We have found, on the contrary, that metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature.Footnote 12

Furthermore, it has been proposed that metaphors cannot fully be explained and interpreted in isolation, but need to be examined in context with other, similar metaphors: each individual textual metaphor has a linguistic form, but may be an instantiation of an underlying conceptualization shared by other individual linguistic metaphors. These underlying conceptualizations are called ‘conceptual metaphors’ in cognitive linguistics and consist of a (usually more concrete) ‘source domain’ being mapped onto an (abstract) ‘target domain’.Footnote 13 The focus of cognitive linguistic metaphor research is the detection and explanation of conventional instantiations of conceptual metaphors (which often have only low metaphoricity and were often rejected by traditional approaches to metaphor as ‘dead’ metaphors), and thus this approach has been opted for in order to explore the phrase (ἐνὶ ϕρεσὶ) βυσσοδομεύων.

Cognitive linguists have argued that metaphor is a fundamental and indispensable pattern of human thought and language, and occurs particularly often in cases where the target concept is abstract and thus difficult to comprehend literally and concretely.Footnote 14 From a phenomenological point of view, the concept of ‘thought’ and the domain of thinking are not perceptual, and, as a result, are difficult to imagine: in the absence of any possibility to determine objectively or subjectively how and where ‘thinking’ happens there emerge intersubjective, culturally specific ideas of mental activity and cognitive processes.Footnote 15 Before detailed anatomical and neurological knowledge became accessible, what goes on when human beings think and where it happens was a matter of interpretation.

We now know that thinking happens through neurons in the brain and the vertebrate spinal cord transmitting electrochemical signals, and our folk notion also locates mental activity in head, but for the ancient Greeks the brain (ἐγκέϕαλος, ‘that which is in the κεϕαλή’) played no role in cognitive processes. The ϕρένες (‘mind’) and also the θυμός (‘spirit’), the ultimately untranslatable ‘mental organs’ where thought is often located in Greek epic diction, are commonly assigned to the upper part of the body and thus one can have ‘thoughts in the chest’ (e.g. Il. 24.40–1: νόημα … ἐνὶ στήθεσσι).Footnote 16 One way to imagine contemplation and decision-making is through a conversation with one's θυμός or κραδίη (‘heart’) (see the θυμός-speeches in Il. 11.401–13, 17.90–107, 21.552–72, and 22.98–131, and Odysseus’ κραδίη-speech in Od. 20.17–21):Footnote 17 ‘speaking to one's θυμός’, as well as the synonymous variation ‘speaking to one's κραδίη’, is a metaphor for deliberation, whereby the internal and invisible act of thinking is concretized as speaking, albeit in the form of a (silent) inner discussion. However, there is not one metaphorical model of how thinking is conceptualized in Ancient Greek, but rather metaphors can be drawn from different perceptual concepts to describe the fundamental but non-perceptual concept of thinking. Thus, it is necessary to collect and examine the evidence of other metaphors used in Ancient Greek to imagine mental activity and the bodily processes involved in thinking.

To return to the case with which the discussion originated, the bipartite compound βυσσο-δομεύω affords two starting points, since it requires investigation if and how both its constituents might be linked figuratively to ideas about thinking and planning. First, it has been noted that the first part of the compound, βυσσός (‘depth’), literally refers to the depth of the sea,Footnote 18 which underscores the metaphoricity of the verb: it would be absurd to attempt a literal interpretation of the collocation δόλον ϕρεσὶ βυσσοδομεύων as ‘building a ruse in the depth (of the sea) in/with (?) one's lungs’.Footnote 19 Rather, the whole phrase requires an interpretation which accounts for its metaphorical character, and the notion of depth must be understood more immediately in conjunction with the dative locative ϕρεσί, denoting the metaphorical space (‘mind’) in whose depth the thought process is being located.Footnote 20 The exact identification and location of the ϕρένες where human cognitive functions are often said to happen in Ancient Greek epic diction has been a matter of debate. However, from the point of view of the cognitive linguistic approach the question to be asked is rather whether they can or even need to be located, since they are regularly used in a non-biological, figurative way as the ‘space’ or ‘location’ in the human body where thinking ‘takes place’: presumably, the association originated as a metonymical relationship with the ϕρένες denoting the seat of thought through contiguous association, but the original bodily meaning as an organ in the torso (see Il. 16.481, 504; Od. 9.301) has largely receded behind the figurative meaning in contexts referring to mental processes.Footnote 21

In any case, the notion of ‘depth’ in reference to a physical organ in the body does not produce good literal sense and thus needs to be taken metaphorically in reference to an abstract space, the ‘mind’, in terms of either the intensity of the thought process or its secrecy. Both of these readings of the notion of depth in reference to thinking are ultimately based on the common conceptual metaphor seeing is knowing:Footnote 22 something which cannot be seen or understood ‘at first glance’ is not merely ‘superficial’Footnote 23 but either possesses a certain ‘profundity’ or is hidden from sight and thus secret. In the case of [Hes.] Sc. 30–2, the notion of the secrecy of Zeus's planning is also compounded by the fact that he moves in the night, and thus unseen and, by metaphorical extension, unknown (Sc. 32: ἐννύχιος). The image of ‘deep thought’ or ‘pondering in the depth of one's mind’ appears to be common in early Greek poetry and several examples from other archaic poets are readily available (see Solon Frg. 33.1 West; Thgn. 1051–2; Pind. Pyth. 2.79–80, Nem. 7.1; Aesch. Cho. 651, Sept. 593, Supp. 407–9, 956, 1057–8).Footnote 24

After the discussion of βυσσός as the metaphorical location of thought, we turn to the second constituent of the verb, *δομεύω, whose basic meaning as an o-grade formation from the verbal root *δέμ- (‘[to] build’, ‘[to] construct’) is uncontroversial. Clearly, the usage of a verb with the basic meaning ‘(to) build’ in reference to a mental process requires additional explanation in the wider context of early Greek epic poetry and language use.Footnote 25 As has been stated initially, even though it is possible to refer to the act of thinking literally (with verbs such as ϕρονέω/ϕροντίζωFootnote 26 or μερμηρίζωFootnote 27 ), the abstract domain of thought and mental activity is a concept where one is likely to find metaphors drawn from more physical domains.

The metaphorical transfer of a verb denoting physical movement or activity to describe the more abstract process of thought is not an isolated instance, and is indeed to be expected: examples for verbs originally describing physical actions being used metaphorically for mental activity include ὁρμαίνω (literally ‘[to] turn over’, ‘[to] revolve’)Footnote 28 (e.g. Il. 1.193, 10.507, 11.411, 14.20, 17.106, 18.15, 21.64, 21.137, 22.131; Od. 4.120, 5.365, 5.424, 6.118, 18.345) and (ἐμ-)βάλλω (ἐνὶ ϕρεσί) (literally ‘[to] throw’, ‘[to] cast around’ [in one's mind])Footnote 29 (e.g. Il. 1.297, 4.39, 5.259, 9.611, 10.447, 23.313; Od. 11.454, 16.281, 16.299, 17.548). Again, the metaphorical space in which thoughts are contemplated by being moved about is denoted as either ϕρήν/ϕρένες or θυμός. The objects which are metaphorically moved in thinking are plans or thoughts (see Il. 23.313: μῆτιν ἐμβάλλεο θυμῷ), but are often not explicitly stated. Similarly, μῆτις (‘thought’, ‘plan’) can be traced back to a root with the basic meaning ‘(to) measure’,Footnote 30 and the verb derived from μῆτις, μητιάομαι, is used exclusively metaphorically for processes of thinking (‘measuring thoughts’, ‘measure mentally’). These examples are barely recognizable as metaphors because of their conventionality and low metaphoricity,Footnote 31 but they demonstrate the basic principle of using vocabulary for concrete actions metaphorically, more particularly the acts of moving or measuring physical objects as metaphors for contemplating, ‘moving thoughts in the mind’ and ‘measure mentally’, both of which presuppose the conceptual ontological metaphors the mind is a container and thoughts are objects.Footnote 32 By the same token, a difficult decision between two options can be imagined as ‘splitting (a thought) in two’ (Il. 14.20–1: ὅρμαινε δαϊζόμενος κατὰ θυμὸν / διχθάδι’).Footnote 33

The conceptualization of ‘moving thoughts’ seems to be employed when a person is thinking about possible, preconceived courses of action, while for the more creative process of contriving ideas and devising plans verbs that literally denote craftsmanship and physical creativity are used (thinking is crafting Footnote 34 ). Complex thoughts are conceptualized as intricate physical objects which need to be crafted – for example, the case of the verbs ὑϕαίνω (literally ‘[to] weave’)Footnote 35 or ῥάπτω (literally ‘[to] stitch’),Footnote 36 from the domain of textile manufacture, which often function as metaphors for complex mental processes in epic diction (ὑϕαίνω: Il. 3.212, 6.187, 7.324, 9.93; Od. 4.739, 5.356, 9.422, 13.303, 13.386; Sc. 28; ῥάπτω: Il. 18.367; Od. 3.118; 16.379, 421–2, 423). Concerning the choice of craft, weaving is an appropriate metaphor for the cognitive effort of devising a plan: just like different and originally distinct threads are interwoven in an orderly manner to form a complex texture, planning consists of combining thoughts to form a coherent scheme. Penelope's ploy of pretending to weave a shroud for Laertes in order to postpone her impending second wedding (Od. 2.93–106, 19.137–51) is probably an artful play on this conventional metaphorical usage of ὑϕαίνω, which combines the literal performance of the craft with its figurative meaning of deceit. Similarly, stitching is an apt metaphor for the mental effort of combining disparate thoughts or ideas into a meaningful and coherent composition – a metaphor which is also employed to denote the craft of the poet, who composes a new song out of pre-existing formulaic phrases and is thus famously called ῥαψ-ῳδός, literally ‘stitcher of song’ (Hes. fr. 357.2 M.–W.; see also Pind. Nem. 2.1–2: Ὁμηρίδαι / ῥαπτῶν ἐπέων…ἀοιδοί [‘Homeridae, the singers of stitched verses’]).Footnote 37

So far, examples for the use of verbs denoting physical actions as source domain for mental activity have been verbs referring to setting in motion in general (ὁρμαίνω, βάλλω) or to textile crafts (ὑϕαίνω,Footnote 38 ῥάπτω). Regarding the conceptualiziation (complex) thinking is crafting, early Greek epic diction obviously favours textile metaphors,Footnote 39 but the compound βυσσο-δομεύω, with which the discussion originated, draws on a different, but comparable sphere of physical construction and manufacture. The basic meaning of its second constituent, δέμω (with the derivative forms δομάω, *δομέω, and *δομεύω) usually refers to construction with clay and bricks, such as the building of houses (Od. 6.9; see also the compound οἰκο-δομέω, ‘[to] build a house’), walls (Il. 7.436, 9.349, 14.32), or whole cities (Il. 21.446). In this regard, the conceptualization is familiar to us, for, in modern languages, words from the source domain of construction are also used metaphorically in reference to thought processes and particularly to presenting arguments. A complex and elaborate conceptual metaphor based on this primary notion that is often cited in cognitive linguistic studies of metaphor is theories are buildings.Footnote 40

To conclude, upon closer inspection the verb βυσσο-δομεύω reveals intensive and complex use of metaphorical notions which are still familiar and thus present no problems of comprehension for modern recipients of ancient epic poetry. It brings together two otherwise unrelated conventional metaphorical conceptualizations: first, the notion of mind as a space, in which depth indicates ‘profundity’ or secrecy of thought, that is, ‘deep thoughts’ (note how English employs the same metaphorical conception); and second, the conceptual metaphor of thought processes as physical acts of construction (thinking is crafting). Both notions are familiar and conventional and, as a result, the metaphor which results from the combination of the two conceptualizations is easily accessible and understandable.Footnote 41 However, what makes the compound βυσσοδομεύω especially intriguing and deserving of close examination is the fact that the combination of the two metaphorical notions distinguished above produces a verb which must necessarily be comprehended and interpreted as a metaphor, since its literal meaning, ‘(to) construct in the depth (of the sea)’, has no sensible application to the early Greek living environment (hence the lack of extant instances of literal, ‘ordinary’ usage). In its form as a poetic, epic compound, the metaphor βυσσοδομεύω is certainly extravagant (compared to other simplex verbs denoting crafts used metaphorically for mental processes, such as ὁρμαίνω, ὑϕαίνω, or ῥάπτω). However, its etymology is semantically transparent and the resulting metaphoricity attests to the natural and vibrant use of metaphorical language in reference to mental activity in our earliest sources of Ancient Greek literature.Footnote 42

Thus, this particularly salient (and inevitably metaphorical) example of a metaphor for mental activity in epic diction serves to demonstrate that Homeric Greek and early Greek epic poetry were already using a fully developed metaphorical model of the mind.Footnote 43 Metaphor is, and has always been, a necessary and indispensable part of human thought and cognition. The metaphoricity of many expressions regarding ideas about the mind in Ancient Greek, some of which have been quoted above as parallels, but which are less conspicuous than βυσσοδομεύω, needs to be recognized and may be helpful in order to explain how words can have the meanings they do and account for certain phrases in philological and literary studies of ancient texts.Footnote 44

Footnotes

*

I owe a debt of gratitude to the anonymous G&R referee for providing helpful comments and suggestions. All remaining mistakes are, of course, my own.

References

1 The Greek text is quoted from the OCT edition by Solmsen, F. (ed.), Hesiodi opera, third edition (Oxford, 1990)Google Scholar; the English translation follows the Loeb edition of Most, G. W. (ed.), Hesiod II. The Shield. Catalogue of Women. Other Fragments (Cambridge, MA, 2007)Google Scholar.

2 The root appears here in o-grade, the corresponding simple verb being δέμω, whose basic meaning is ‘(to) build’, ‘(to) join together’. See Rix, H., LIV. Lexikon der indogermanischen Verben. Die Wurzeln und ihre Primärstammbildungen (Wiesbaden, 2001), 114–15Google Scholar, s.v. *demh2-.

3 See Beekes, R. S. P., Etymological Dictionary of Greek (Leiden and Boston, MA, 2010), 247 Google Scholar, s.v. βυθός: ‘βυσσοδομεύω “build in the deep > brood over (in the deep of one's soul), ponder deeply”’. This etymology is rejected by Stanford, W. B., The Odyssey of Homer. Vol. 1. Books I–XII, second edition (London, 1959), 358 Google Scholar, ad Od. 9.316: ‘βυσσοδομεύων = “brooding deeply”. The first part may be from βυσσός = “depth [of the sea]”, but the second is hardly conn. w. δομέω “build’” as L.-S.-J. take it.’ However, he does not offer an alternative explanation and no other etymologies have ever been suggested.

By way of explanation, the commentary of Russo, C. F., Hesiodi Scutum, second edition (Florence, 1968), 80 Google Scholar, ad loc., merely offers a Latin translation, ‘profunda mente struens’, which employs the same metaphorical conceptualizations.

4 See also LfgrE ii.105, s.v. βυσσοδομεύω.

5 On the general problem of literal lexicography of ancient languages and metaphor, see Silk, M. S., Interaction in Poetic Imagery. With Special Reference to Early Greek Poetry (Cambridge, 1974), 33–56 and 82–3Google Scholar; Silk, M. S., ‘LSJ and the Problem of Poetic Archaism: From Meaning to Iconyms’, CQ 33 (1983), 303–30, esp. 309–13Google Scholar.

6 See also LSJ, s.v. βυσσοδομεύω, which offers this literal sense but fails to mark the contextual sense as metaphorical: ‘build in the deep: hence, brood over a thing in the depth of one's soul, ponder deeply’.

7 For a procedure and criteria to determine metaphor through the difference between basic and contextual meaning, see PragglejazGroup, ‘MIP: A Method for Identifying Metaphorically Used Words in Discourse’, Metaphor and Symbol 22 (2007), 1–39 Google Scholar, further developed in Steen, J. G., Dorst, A. G., Herrmann, B. J., Kaal, A. A., Krennmayr, T., and Pasma, T., A Method for Linguistic Metaphor Identification. From MIP to MIPVU (Amsterdam and Philadelphia, PA, 2010), esp. 1–42Google Scholar.

8 The direct object in Sc. 30 is δόλον (‘deception’); in the passages from the Odyssey it is usually κακά (‘evil [deeds]’).

9 The term ‘conventional’ metaphor is employed in this context to denote a common, and probably even idiomatic, instance of figurative language which nevertheless still retains its metaphoric character and is not fully lexicalized. For the use of the categories conventional/novel and deliberate/non-deliberate, see Steen, J. G., ‘The Paradox of Metaphor: Why We Need a Three-dimensional Model of Metaphor’, Metaphor and Symbol 23 (2008), 213–41Google Scholar; Steen, J. G., ‘The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor: Now New and Improved!’, Review of Cognitive Linguistics 9 (2011), 38–43 Google Scholar. Contrary to earlier theories of metaphor, cognitive metaphor theory holds that deliberate usage is not a requirement for the identification of metaphor.

However, the general value of deliberateness as a category for metaphor classification has been questioned (e.g. by R. Gibbs, W. Jr., ‘Are “Deliberate” Metaphors Really Deliberate? A question of Human Consciousness and Action’, Metaphor and the Social World 1 [2011], 26–52 Google Scholar) and it needs to be stressed that repeated occurrence and formulaic character of a phrase in epic poetry do not necessarily make all its appearances non-deliberate or poetically ineffective. See, for example, Vivante, P., The Epithets in Homer. A Study in Poetic Values (New Haven, CT, 1982), vii–x, 151–91Google Scholar; or Silk, M. S., Homer, The Iliad, second edition (Cambridge, 2004), 14–23 Google Scholar.

10 For a theoretical approach to the notion of distinguishing varying degrees of metaphoricity (as opposed to applying the obsolete ‘dead’/‘alive’ distinction), see Hanks, P., ‘Metaphoricity is Gradable’, in Stefanowitsch, A. and Gries, S. T. (eds.), Corpus-based Approaches to Metaphor and Metonymy (Berlin, 2006), 17–35 Google Scholar; or Müller, C., Metaphors. Dead and Alive, Sleeping and Waking. A Cognitive Approach to Metaphors in Language Use (Chicago, IL, 2008), esp. 178–209Google Scholar. Müller defines metaphoricity as a continuum, starting with expressions whose original metaphorical character is entirely obscured by semantic opacity and poetic novel metaphors, with high metaphoricity forming the other end of the spectrum.

11 See already Snell, B., Die Entdeckung des Geistes. Studien zur Entstehung des europäischen Denkens bei den Griechen, 9th edition (Göttingen, 2009), 183 Google Scholar: ‘für alles Geistige [sind] die verbalen Metaphern ursprünglich und notwendig. Im Griechischen bildet sich die “abstrakte” Auffassung alles Geistigen und Seelischen vor unsern Augen, so daß wir die Entwicklung dieser metaphorischen Bezeichnungen genau verfolgen können.’ (‘For everything regarding the mind, verbal metaphors are natural and necessary. In Greek, the “abstract” view of everything regarding the mind and soul forms in front of our eyes so that we can minutely follow the development of these metaphorical designations.’) The seminal work which established metaphor as a common and indispensable process of language and thought and gave rise to conceptual metaphor theory in cognitive linguistics was G. Lakoff and M. Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Amsterdam and Philadelphia, PA, 1980).

Note, however, the dismissive view of metaphors for mental and psychological activity in Homeric poetry expressed by Clarke, M., Flesh and Spirit in the Songs of Homer. A Study of Words and Myths (Oxford, 1999), 109 Google Scholar: ‘there is no metaphor, no transference or extension, no extraneous imagery which we can separate off from what thought and emotion are literally conceived to be’. In this, he is implicitly followed by Long, A. A., Greek Models of Mind and Self (Cambridge, MA, 2015), esp. 15–50Google Scholar, even though Long later recognizes the use of metaphors as models of mind in Plato (see esp. 136–7).

12 Lakoff and Johnson (n. 11), 3. See also e.g. Gibbs, R. W. Jr., The Poetics of Mind (Cambridge, 1994)Google Scholar, esp. 120–264: Gibbs, W. R. Jr., ‘Why Many Concepts are Metaphorical’, Cognition 61 (1996), 309–19Google Scholar. The importance of metaphor for the intellectual engagement with new, unfamiliar, or ‘difficult’ ideas through terms drawn from familiar and well-defined conceptual frameworks has also been stressed by metaphor theorists coming from disciplines other than cognitive linguistics. See, for example, Blumenberg, H., ‘Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie’, Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte 6 (1960), 7–142 Google Scholar; Jones, R. S., Physics as Metaphor (Minneapolis, MN, 1982)Google Scholar; Stambovsky, P., ‘Metaphor and Historical Understanding’, History and Theory 27 (1988), 125–34Google Scholar; Haverkamp, A. and Mende, D. (eds.), Metaphorologie. Zur Praxis von Theorie (Frankfurt, 2009)Google Scholar. The status of metaphor as a universal, pervasive, and necessary cultural mechanism is also established in Geary, J., I Is an Other. The Secret Life of Metaphor and How It Shapes the Way We See the World (New York, 2011)Google Scholar.

13 For the general cognitive linguistic theory of conceptual metaphors and its terminology, see Lakoff and Johnson (n. 11); Lakoff, G. and Turner, M., More Than Cool Reason. A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor (Chicago/London, 1989)Google Scholar; Lakoff, G., ‘The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor’, in Ortony, A. (ed.), Metaphor and Thought, second edition (Cambridge, 1993), 202–51Google Scholar; Grady, J. E., ‘Metaphor’, in Geeraerts, D. and Cuyckens, H. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics (Oxford, 2007), 188–213 Google Scholar.

14 See esp. Johnson, M., The Body in the Mind. The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason (Chicago, IL, and London, 1987)Google Scholar.

15 Currently, the most extensive theoretical discussion of the interdependence of metaphor and culture is Kövecses, Z., Metaphor in Culture. Universality and Variation (Cambridge, 2005)Google Scholar; however, the scope of this study is predominantly synchronic, and the diachronic aspects of metaphor universality and variation are only touched upon. For metaphors for thinking in different modern languages see the issue of Cognitive Linguistics 14, nos. 2–3 (2003) devoted to this topic, particularly Goddard, C., ‘Thinking Across Languages and Cultures: Six Dimensions of Variation’, Cognitive Linguistics 14 (2003), 109–40Google Scholar.

16 Several identifications for the ϕρήν/ϕρένες have been proposed, among them the diaphragm, the spleen, the lungs, or parts of the heart; see also LfgrE iv.1015–18, s.v. ϕρένες, ϕρήν.

17 On θυμός-speeches see Pelliccia, H., Mind, Body, and Speech in Homer and Pindar (Göttingen, 1995), 120–3CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

18 See Stanford (n. 3), 358, ad Od. 9.316; Clarke (n. 11), 88, n. 67. The word is not particularly common, but the meaning is undisputed; see also Il. 24.80 and Hdt. 2.28, 96, where βυσσός occurs with the meaning ‘depth/bottom of a body of water’. On the ‘trustworthiness’ of Homeric and Herodotean occurrences to establish meaning, see Silk (n. 5 [1974]), esp. 43–5.

19 For the literal reading of ϕρένες and their identification with the lungs, see esp. Onians, R. B., The Origins of European Thought about the Body, the Mind, the Soul, the World, Time, and Fate, second edition (Cambridge, 1953), 23–8 (accepted by Clarke [n. 11], 75)Google Scholar.

20 See the explanation offered by Russo, J., Fernándet-Galiano, M., and Heubeck, A., A Commentary on Homer's Odyssey. Vol. III. Books XVII–XXIV (Oxford, 1992)Google Scholar, 24 ad Od. 17.66: ‘βυσσοδόμευον: a most interesting word, used seven times in the Odyssey…, never in the Iliad, and in Hesiod only at Scut. 30. The meaning, “to meditate secretly”, is derived by combining the etymological sense, “to build in the deep”, with the idea of mental space, here specified by ϕρεσί but normally not verbally expressed.’

There is considerable fluidity in the epic vocabulary regarding mental activity, and words such as ϕρήν/ϕρένες or θυμός may metonymically refer to the location of thought processes in the body as well as to the agent of thought: see e.g. Clarke (n. 11), 61–126.

21 From the usage of seemingly bodily terms in Homeric diction arise so many difficulties and inconsistencies that one is forced to conclude that in many cases they are used figuratively and have lost their original bodily reference (or it has become secondary to the metonymical/metaphorical meaning – on the relation between metonymy and metaphor see also Kövecses, Z., ‘The Metaphor–Metonymy Relationship: Correlation Metaphors are Based on Metonymy’, Metaphor and Symbol 28 [2013], 75–88 Google Scholar). On the general lack of specificity and semantic difference of words denoting psychological or physiological functions (such as θυμός, ϕρένες, κῆρ [‘heart’], ἦτορ [‘heart’]) in Homer, see also Jahn, T., Zum Wortfeld ‘Seele-Geist’ in der Sprache Homers (Munich, 1987), esp. 182–211Google Scholar.

22 Note the convention of cognitive linguistics to distinguish between linguistic or textual and conceptual metaphors and to print conceptual metaphors (the abstract conceptualizations underlying individual linguistic metaphors) – as opposed to textual metaphors – in small capitals. This particular conceptual metaphor is very common and in Ancient Greek appears lexicalized in the verb οἶδα, lit. ‘(to) have seen’, i.e. ‘(to) know’ (see Sweetser, E., From Etymology to Pragmatics. Metaphorical and Cultural Aspects of Semantic Structure [Cambridge, 1990], 23–48 Google Scholar). See also Snell (n. 11), 183–4, for more examples and Sansone, D., Aeschylean Metaphors for Intellectual Activity (Stuttgart, 1975), 22–5Google Scholar, for examples from Aeschylus. On the basis of this conceptualization, something which is hidden from sight is also unknown and secret.

23 The idea of ‘depth/superficiality of thought’ is also generally associated with the verticality schema; on the verticality schema (also called the up–down schema) see Johnson (n. 14), esp. xiv: already in epic diction, a mind prone to unimportant and inconsequential thoughts is described metaphorically as ‘light’ (Il. 10.226; 23.590: λεπτὴ μῆτις, ‘not sinking to great depths of mind’). Note, however, that the Hellenistic βαρύ-ϕρων (‘heavy-minded’) does not only refer to important, ‘weighty’ thoughts (Theoc. 25.110), but usually to a mindset which is ‘aggravating’ to others (Lyc. 464; Ap. Rhod. Argon. 4.731; Mel. Anth. Pal. 12.141.6; also later Opp. Hal. 4.174; Nonnus Dion. 5.327, 27.266). The metaphor of ‘quick’ or ‘slow’ thought which appears in connection with the ‘light mind’ (Il. 10.226, 23.590) draws on other another complex of metaphorical conceptualizations.

24 See also the parallels cited in Steiner, D., Homer Odyssey Books XVII and XVIII (Cambridge, 2010)Google Scholar, 86, ad Od. 17.66. The question of ‘depth’ of organs of cognition and thought is also discussed by Sansone (n. 22), 22–5, with reference to the Aeschylean examples of this conceptualization.

25 For metaphor identification, see the literature cited in n. 7 above.

26 The verbs ϕρονέω and ϕροντίζω are both derived from ϕρήν (lit. probably ‘midriff’), which was imagined to be the seat of mental activity: see Frisk, H., Griechisches etymologisches Wörterbuch, 2 vols. (Heidelberg, 1960–1970)Google Scholar, ii.1041–3, s.v. ϕρήν; or Beekes (n. 3), 1590–1, s.v. ϕρήν. However, even though ϕρήν retains traces of a reference to a bodily organ, its derivations, such as ϕροντίς, ϕρόνημα, ϕρονέω, and ϕροντίζω seem to have lost this primary bodily frame of reference and refer exclusively to the domain of the ‘mind’.

27 It seems as if the primary reference of μερμηρίζω is to the process of thought: see Frisk (n. 26), ii.210, s.v. μέρμερος. For locations of the thought process, see also the formulae στήθεσσιν λασίοισι διάνδιχα μερμήριξεν (‘in his shaggy breast he pondered two ways’; Il. 1.189) and μερμήριξε κατὰ ϕρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν (‘he pondered in his mind and spirit’; Il. 5.671, 8.169; Od. 24.235).

28 The verb ὁρμαίνω is usually explained as a denominative of ὁρμή (‘rush’, ‘forceful motion’): see Frisk (n. 26), ii.419–20, s.v. ὁρμή; Beekes (n. 3), 1104–5, s.v. ὁρμή. Latin shows the same metaphorical conceptualization in the conventional usage of cogitare (< co-agitare) as a compound of agitare, ‘(to) set in motion’ (also used as simplex in Plaut. Truc. 451; Ter. Phorm. 615; Prop. 1.7.5; Liv. 6.2.1, 7.35.3, 21.41.16, 21.22.7; Ov. Ep. 17.54; Sen. Ep. 94.26; Tac. Ann. 2.12, 6.9) for mental processes. Other verbs which originally denoted physical movement but are also applied to thinking and contemplation include versare, ‘(to) turn about’ (e.g. Plaut. Trin. 224; Prop. 2.4.16; Hor. Ars P. 39; Verg. Aen. 4.563, 10.285, 11.551; Liv. 3.34.4; Sen. Dial. 3.17.5, Ep. 94.26; Tac. Hist. 2.78); volvere, ‘(to) turn over’ (e.g. Catull. 64.250; Sall. Cat. 32.1, Iug. 6.2; Liv. 26.7.3, 42.5.1; Verg. Aen. 3.102; Tac. Ann. 1.64, 14.53; Stat. Silv. 2.2.113); and volutare, frq. of volvere (e.g. Plaut. Capt. 781, Mil. 196; Cic. Rep. 1.28; Verg. Ecl. 9.37, Aen. 6.157; Liv. 34.36.4; Ov. Met. 1.389; Sen. Ep. 24.15; Tac. Ann. 1.36, 4.12).

29 Compare the metaphorical use of Latin iactare in the sense of ‘(to) consider’, ‘(to) discuss publicly’ (e.g. Cic. Cael. 35, Mil. 7; Caes. B Gall. 1.18.3; Liv. 2.13.3, 44.34.2; Verg. Aen. 1.227; Ov. Am. 3.1.21; Sen. Ep. 87.38; Tac. Ann. 15.24; Quint. Inst. 1.2.2, 6.3.4).

30 See also Frisk (n. 26), ii.232–4, s.v. μῆτις; Beekes (n. 3), 948–9, s.v. μῆτις. Latin metiri, while being used metaphorically for ‘measurement’ (i.e. estimation or appraisal of immaterial entities), never acquired the same universal application to all kind of mental processes.

31 The verbs are commonly treated as mere synonyms and their metaphorical content is usually not discussed: see, for example, the study of Pelliccia (n. 17).

32 On the containment schema, see Johnson (n. 14), esp. 21–23, 30–40. On reification and personification as ontological metaphors, see Lakoff and Johnson (n. 13), 26–35. See also Jäkel, O., ‘The Metaphorical Concept of Mind: “Mental Activity is Manipulation”’, in Taylor, J. R. and MacLaury, R. (eds.), Language and the Cognitive Construal of the World (Berlin and New York, 1995), 198–9Google Scholar, who notes initially that ‘this domain [i.e. of mental activity] is conceptualized metaphorically in terms of the physical manipulation of solid objects’ (197).

33 On the basic meaning of δαΐζω, ‘(to) rip apart’, see LfgrE ii.196–7, s.v. δαΐζω; Frisk (n. 26), 340, s.v. δαΐζω; Beekes (n. 3), 297, s.v. δαΐζω. Note, however, that the medio-passive participle δαϊζόμενος does not necessarily take the plan or the decision which could be swayed both ways as its direct object, but that the phrase could also be interpreted as a passive form and correspond literally to our modern notion of ‘being torn between two options’.

34 For the notion of ‘mental craftsmanship’, see also Jäkel (n. 32), 210–11.

35 For the basic meaning, see the etymologies given in Frisk (n. 26), ii.976–7, s.v. ὑϕαίνω, and Beekes (n. 3), 1540, s.v. ὑϕαίνω. Direct objects of ὑϕαίνω, ‘(to) weave’, include μύθους καὶ μήδεα (‘words and plans’; Il. 3.212), δόλον (‘deception’; Il. 6.187; Od. 5.356), μῆτιν (‘a plan’; Il. 7.324, 9.93; Od. 4.739, 13.303, 13.386; Sc. 27), and δόλους καὶ μῆτιν (‘deceptions and a plan’; Od. 9.422). The metaphor also occurs in later Greek poetry: see Ar. Lys. 630; Callim. Aet. fr. 26.5.

36 For the basic meaning, see the etymologies given in Frisk (n. 26), ii.643, s.v. ῥάπτω, and Beekes (n. 3), 1275–6, s.v. ῥάπτω. As direct objects of ῥάπτω, ‘(to) stitch’, appear κακά (‘evils’; Il. 18.367; Od. 3.118 16.423), ϕόνον αἰπύν (‘sudden murder’; Od. 16.379), and θάνατόν τε μόρον τε (‘death and doom’; Od. 16.421–2). Judging from these contexts, it seems as if both verbs predominantly carried connotations of insidiousness and deceit when applied to mental processes. See also LfgrE iv.6, s.v. ῥάπτω: ‘pej. (Übles) planen, anzetteln’; iv.774, s.v. ὑϕαίνω: ‘übertr. ersinnen, erfinden, spez. List.’

37 Not only ῥάπτω but also ὑϕαίνω are used to refer to the (mental) process of composing songs and poetry: see e.g. Pind. Nem. 4.44; fr. 179; Bacchyl. 5.9–10, 19.8.

38 Note that ὑϕαίνω is not confined to textile manufacture, but is also occasionally used as a metaphor for building: see Aesch. PV 450–1; Pl. Cri. 116b3–4; Callim. Hymn 2.57; Tryph. 536; Nonnus, Par. 2.98.

39 See also the use of πλέκω (‘[to] plait’), its compounds and derivations for mental processes (usually for devising evil means and stratagems) in later Greek literature: e.g. Thgn. 1.215, 1.226, 1.1386; Aesch. Cho. 220; Eur. Ion, 826, 1280; Eur. Andr. 995; Ar. Vesp. 644.

40 See e.g. Lakoff and Johnson (n. 11), passim; Kövecses, Z., Metaphor. A Practical Introduction, second edition (Oxford, 2010)Google Scholar, passim. More specifically and extensively, see Grady, J., ‘Theories are Buildings Revisited’, Cognitive Linguistics 8 (1997), 267–90Google Scholar.

41 The observation that even metaphors which are felt to be highly poetic are only novel elaborations grounded in common and everyday conceptual metaphorical metaphors is also the main point of the argument presented in Lakoff and Turner (n. 13), esp. 57–139.

42 Note that even Clarke (n. 11), 87–8, grudgingly admits that βυσσοδομεύω must be a metaphor, even though his whole argument rests on the assumption that Homeric Greek did not employ metaphors for mental and emotional activity (see esp. the quote in n. 11 above).

43 On the notion of a metaphorical concept of mind and its prevalence, at least in Modern English, see Jäkel (n. 32), esp. 225–6. Metaphor in Greek epic poetry has not received much attention, and the very idea of metaphor in early Greek literature has been questioned: before Clarke's (n. 11) claim that Homeric Greek did not use metaphors for thought and emotion, Stanford, W. B., Greek Metaphor. Studies in Theory and Practice (Oxford, 1936), 122–7Google Scholar, disregarded Homeric metaphor on the basis of his hypothesis that Homeric diction was not developed enough to allow imaginative figurative language for the sake of clarity. See also Snell (n. 11), who claimed that Homeric poetry shows evidence of only a primitive state of consciousness and a development of metaphorical language. However, many aspects of Snell's position have been disproved in the last decades: see Burkert, W., ‘Mikroskopie der Geistesgeschichte. Bruno Snells “Entdeckung des Geistes” im kritischen Rückblick’, Philologus 148 (2004), 168–82Google Scholar.

44 See, for example, the recent, very insightful study of Long (n. 11), who proposes ‘linguistic and conceptual attempts to identify and understand the threads of our emotional, reflective, and purposive life, in order for us to make sense of living in the world’ (4), but never avails himself of the notion that phrases referring to the body, the mind, and self in (Homeric) Greek might be metaphorical, despite many conclusions which point to metaphorical usage (see esp. 26–7, 32–7, 47–8).