A growing body of research on civil resistance – also referred to as non-violent struggle (Sharp Reference Sharp2005) – has analysed the role of ‘external third-party interveners’, foreign activists, organizations and transnational advocacy networks who intervene in and support a local resistance campaign. They have been shown to help campaigns in their goals (Dudouet Reference Dudouet2006, Reference Dudouet and Schock2015; Dudouet and Clark Reference Dudouet and Clark2009; Hunter and Lakey Reference Hunter and Lakey2003; Keck and Sikkink Reference Keck and Sikkink1998; Mahony and Eguren Reference Mahony and Eguren1997; Moser-Puangsuwan and Weber Reference Moser-Puangsuwan and Weber2000; Pallister-Wilkins Reference Pallister-Wilkins2009; Rigby Reference Rigby1995; Schirch Reference Schirch2006; Seitz Reference Seitz2003). They are particularly useful in cases where the resisters do not have leverage to challenge the opponent (Coy Reference Coy2012; Rigby Reference Rigby1995).Footnote 1 Others argue that they hinder resistance efforts because of asymmetrical power dynamics, colonial attitudes and ‘saviour’ complexes (Mahrouse Reference Mahrouse2014; Meyer Reference Meyer2019). What this debate suggests is that studies should look not only at how civil resistance can challenge an opponent, but also who is engaged in civil resistance campaigns.
While external third-party interveners have been documented and analysed, less attention has been given to ‘internal third-party interveners’. This refers to activists and organizations that are internal to the conflictual situation, as members of the population that are either directly or indirectly complicit in upholding and perpetuating a system of oppression. They are part of the dominant population, which confers to them power, rights and privileges not available to the local resisters. At the same time, they are dissenting from the dominant population and refusing to cooperate with the system of oppression. They differ from external third-party interveners due to their position as part of the dominant population, their strategic value in civil resistance campaigns, their access to resources and their relationship to and with the local resisters. As such, an understanding of the role of internal third-party interveners cannot be subsumed under an analysis of external third-party interveners; they must be explored as distinct actors engaged in civil resistance campaigns.
The efforts of external and internal third-party interveners are not mutually exclusive and indeed can be used in conjunction to support a local resistance campaign. However, this study will show that internal third-party resisters are best placed to assist local resisters precisely because of their position as members of the dominant population. Drawing on the literature on civil resistance, this article will show that because internal third-party interveners are closer to the centres of power than both local resisters and external third-party interveners, their non-cooperation has greater potential to reduce the power of the rulers. Second, building on studies on external third-party intervention, I will show that internal third-party interveners can exploit certain rights, benefits and privileges associated with being members of the dominant population in order to give practical assistance to a local campaign.
In addition to these theoretical claims, an analysis of Israeli-Jewish activists who engage directly in Palestinian resistance against the Israeli military occupation will show that the physical presence of Israeli Jews – who, as members of the ruling population, are internal third-party interveners – was needed to ensure the Palestinians could maintain their resistance efforts and presence on the land, despite the repression they faced. Furthermore, the knowledge and skills of the Israelis were needed to help the Palestinians achieve some of their goals, at least in the short term. It should be noted that this study does not consider the more moderate peace activists, who play different roles and have been explored elsewhere (Fleischmann Reference Fleischmann2019; Hermann Reference Hermann2009).
Israeli-Jewish involvement in direct action alongside Palestinians has helped in three areas. First, their physical presence helped to sustain non-violent demonstrations in the West Bank by limiting repression by the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). Second, through accompanying Palestinians on their agricultural tasks, the Israeli Jews ensured the Palestinians could bring in the olive harvest and herd their sheep, despite Jewish settler harassment. Third, the knowledge and skills of the Israeli activists in gaining media attention and in the legal arena have helped shift some of the practices and policies of the Israeli army, police and Civil Administration in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Although the Israeli military occupation remains, the success of the resistance efforts can be understood through the concept of sumud – steadfast perseverance – in the face of increasing Israeli control. Sumud is a ‘unique Palestinian national concept that contains different aspects of resistance and self-preservation against Israeli oppression’ (Zatari Reference Zatari2018).
While external third-party interveners in Palestine have provided some similar assistance, this study found that they are unable to do so to the same extent as the Israeli-Jewish activists. This article does not assume nor conclude that internal third-party interveners are the key to the success of a resistance campaign and it also highlights ways in which the Israeli-Jewish activists have hindered resistance campaigns in Palestine, particularly where they dominated the struggle.
These conclusions were drawn from three case studies of civil resistance campaigns in the context of Israel and Palestine: the struggle against the Wall in Bil'in, which began in 2005; countering displacement and harassment of Palestinians in Area C of the West Bank, which began in 2001; and stopping housing evictions of Palestinians in Sheikh Jarrah, which began in 2009. Although these campaigns emerged, peaked and declined at different points, they are all still active at the time of writing and operate in the context of increasingly entrenched occupation. Combined, these three campaigns have responded to the key issues affecting the Palestinians since the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000. Given the differences in location of the campaigns, tactics utilized and the involvement of different individuals, a combined analysis of these campaigns provides a broad overview of the role of Israeli-Jewish activists who have physically joined the Palestinian resistance. They are also some of the more well-documented anti-occupation campaigns, enabling a wide range of data sources to be collected.
The case of Israel/Palestine is particularly useful because it provides examples where internal third-party interveners have both helped the local resisters and where they have hindered the campaign. Furthermore, there has been both sustained Israeli-Jewish and foreign intervention in Palestinian resistance efforts. While acknowledging the specificities of this case, the findings would be relevant to any context in which there are members of a dominant population trying to support the resistance of those who are dominated.
Data for this study have been gathered from a range of sources. Eleven interviews were conducted with activists during a trip to Israel and Palestine during a one-month period in December 2017 to January 2018 (Table 1). Six Israelis and five Palestinians were interviewed. These individuals were identified from campaign websites, as well as the author's previous connections from earlier fieldwork. For each campaign, the aim was to interview activists with different roles and different levels of experience. Thus, two core members or leaders were interviewed, plus a third periphery activist. Two additional activists who were involved in more than one campaign were also interviewed. All the core activists and leaders interviewed had been involved in the campaigns since they emerged, thus giving an overview of the whole trajectory of each campaign. Given that a limited number of activists were interviewed and that they were asked to draw from memory, other sources of data were consulted to corroborate findings. I was present at different campaign activities throughout 2010 and for six months in 2013 and during the month in 2017 to 2018. This study also draws from media reports from English-language newspapers reporting from Israel and Palestine – Haaretz, YNet, the Jerusalem Post, +972mag, Ma'an News Agency and the Electronic Intifada; publications from human rights organizations – Rabbis for Human Rights (RHR), B'Tselem and the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI); from the websites of organizations operating in the region; and additional interviews with Israelis and Palestinians from Just Vision and those conducted by Maxine Kaufman-Lacusta (Reference Kaufman-Lacusta2010). These sources have enabled a reflection on the campaigns from the time they emerged through to the latest period of fieldwork.
Table 1. Interviews Conducted by Author, December 2017 to January 2018
This article will first provide a theoretical discussion of the relative usefulness of external and internal third-party intervention in local resistance campaigns. It will briefly outline the three campaigns before drawing from across the campaigns to identify the concrete ways in which Israeli-Jewish activists have both helped and hindered Palestinian resistance. This will be followed by some concluding remarks.
The theoretical role of internal third-party interveners
Civil resistance is understood as the ‘application of unarmed civilian power using nonviolent methods’ (Chenoweth and Cunningham Reference Chenoweth and Cunningham2013) and has been employed in a range of circumstances to pursue a variety of goals (Ackerman and DuVall Reference Ackerman and DuVall2000; Carter Reference Carter2012; Roberts and Garton Ash Reference Roberts and Garton Ash2010; Schock Reference Schock2005; Stephan and Chenoweth Reference Stephan and Chenoweth2008). The commonality shared between cases is the presence of a group of civilians who ‘deliberately [and] necessarily’ work outside institutionalized and regular channels to challenge more powerful groups and do so without using violent means (Chenoweth and Stephan Reference Chenoweth and Stephan2011; Shock Reference Schock2005: 705).
The strategic value of civil resistance is derived from the ‘power’ that the resisters yield vis-à-vis the state (Sharp Reference Sharp1973). Since power ‘is not intrinsic to the rulers [but] comes from outside them’ (Sharp Reference Sharp1973: 10), ‘every ruler, from the most despotic to the most democratic, cannot rule without the consent or compliance of a sizeable fraction of the populace’ (Summy Reference Summy1994: 7). Furthermore, the power of the ruler is not monolithic, but derived from dispersed sources within society, rendering political power fragile (Sharp Reference Sharp2005: 27–28). It therefore follows that reducing the amount of power that the many parts of a society confer on the state is a means to challenge it (Schock Reference Schock2005: 38). Specifically, by the withdrawal of ‘the consent or acquiescence of the people’ (Ackerman and DuVall Reference Ackerman and DuVall2000: 505), the population ‘can control and even destroy the power of [the] opponent’ (Sharp Reference Sharp1973: 4). It must be acknowledged that not all resisters are acting as claim-bearers against the state, but are contesting power from all angles (Pallister-Wilkins Reference Pallister-Wilkins2009). Therefore, state-centric approaches to the power of civil resistance are not always applicable. However, the logic of withdrawal of consent still holds for other forms of power.
One of the factors that influence the outcome is the extent to which the targets of resistance require the cooperation of the resisters, referred to as ‘dependency’ (Summy Reference Summy1994). Should the acquiescence of the people not be required in order to maintain power, then non-violent action will not succeed in reducing such power. Howard Clark (Reference Clark2000: 57) notes this to have been the case in Kosovo in the 1990s. Similarly, studies have shown that cooperation of Palestinians under Israeli military occupation is not required by the Israeli government (Rigby Reference Rigby1991; Schock Reference Schock2005: 159–161).
Under such conditions, where local resisters have little leverage in challenging structures and relations of power, third-party actors should be mobilized as intermediaries between the oppressed and the oppressor (Schock Reference Schock2005; Stephan and Mundy Reference Stephan and Mundy2006). According to Johan Galtung's (Reference Galtung1989) ‘Great Chain of Nonviolence Hypothesis’, those closer to the centres of power will have greater leverage to challenge the authorities than those further away. It therefore follows that if internal third-party interveners withdraw their consent to the policies and practices of the state and remove their own complicity in upholding structures of domination, they would reduce the power of the rulers, thus helping local resisters in their attempts to overcome oppression.
Security forces of the regime are often cited as a significant intermediary for the success of a civil resistance campaign. Their defection and shift in loyalties increase the likelihood of overthrowing the rulers (Chenoweth and Stephan Reference Chenoweth and Stephan2011; Haas and Lesch Reference Haas and Lesch2013; Nepstad Reference Nepstad2011; Stephan and Chenoweth Reference Stephan and Chenoweth2008). Galtung warns that such intermediaries may pick up ‘the fruit of the struggle’, whereby the oppressors do not yield to the oppressed but to those in between. The consequence is that while the regime has ‘capitulated’ to some extent and the in-betweeners have gained legitimacy through struggle, ‘objectively very much remains the same, the oppressed having lost the game to somebody else, the “intermediaries”’ (Galtung Reference Galtung1989: 32). Given this potential consequence, the dynamics of internal third-party intervention beyond military defection should be explored.
External third-party actors have been shown to be useful in a local resistance campaign by engaging in capacity building, boosting resources and providing technical assistance to civil resistance movements (Dudouet Reference Dudouet and Schock2015: 179). Arguably, internal third-party interveners can assist in ways that external third-party interveners cannot. For example, they may have knowledge of the legal system or access to lawyers, which they can exploit for the benefit of the campaign. They may speak the language of the ruling forces and have held significant positions within the regime before they decided to dissent. They may also have physical access to spaces that foreigners do not, as well as other rights and privileges associated with being a member of the dominant population.
One of the more documented roles of external third-party interveners is their importance in accompanying resisters in their campaigns. In such cases international volunteers use their physical presence to deter government from using violence against resisters (Burrowes Reference Burrowes, Moser-Puangsuwan and Weber2000; Coy Reference Coy2012; Dudouet Reference Dudouet and Schock2015; Mahony and Eguren Reference Mahony and Eguren1997; Schirch Reference Schirch2006). Studies have shown that when international activists physically accompany the resisters, the adversary is less likely to respond violently, due to the higher political costs of a foreign citizen being harmed or killed (Coy Reference Coy2012; Rigby Reference Rigby1995; Weber Reference Weber1993). However, it has been shown that if the interveners are partisan and clearly favour ‘one side’, then their deterrence is not as strong, since they may be perceived as a threat that justifies a violent response (Coy Reference Coy2012). In line with this argument, there have been cases where international activists have been killed by regime forces, but minimal outrage followed (Mahrouse Reference Mahrouse2014). The likely outrage if an internal third-party intervener is harmed or killed by their own security forces could conceivably be the greatest of these three groups and therefore their physical presence in civil resistance campaigns is significant.
A number of studies have documented and analysed the non-violent resistance efforts of the Palestinians (Darweish and Rigby Reference Darweish and Rigby2015; Hallward Reference Hallward2009, Reference Hallward2011; Hallward and Norman Reference Hallward and Norman2011; Johansson and Vinthagen Reference Johansson and Vinthagen2015; Kaufman-Lacusta Reference Kaufman-Lacusta2010; Norman Reference Norman2010; Rigby Reference Rigby1991). These will provide useful additional information on the case studies chosen for this study, particularly Maia Carter Hallward's (Reference Hallward2009) analysis of the joint action in Bil'in, where she identifies the strategic value of the ‘joint struggle’. Some of her conclusions are reflected in this study. The in-depth interviews conducted by Kaufman-Lacusta (Reference Kaufman-Lacusta2010) with Israelis and Palestinians engaged in anti-occupation activism will also be useful. This article goes further than these existing studies by specifically analysing Israeli involvement across multiple campaigns and by comparing their efforts with those of external third-party interveners. It is to these campaigns that the next section will turn.
Resistance campaigns in Palestine
The struggle against the Wall in Bil'in
The Palestinian village of Bil'in began to resist Israeli plans to construct the Wall in February 2005 as the proposed route, east of the 1967 armistice line, would cut them off from their farmland (B'Tselem 2017a). The village became a particular focus and training ground for Israelis wanting to join the struggle against the Wall (Kaufman-Lacusta Reference Kaufman-Lacusta2010: 205; Shalif Reference Shalif2018) and a model for other villages (Hallward and Norman Reference Hallward and Norman2011). The campaign is centred on non-violent creative protest.Footnote 2 The Israeli army has responded violently to these protests. Two Palestinians have been killed in the Bil'in demonstrations and many more injured from tear gas, tear gas canisters, skunk water and rubber bullets. At its peak, around 450 Israelis joined the weekly demonstrations. However, in recent years, numbers are around 10 Israelis, with more for special events, such as Land Day or the anniversary of the building of the Wall (Shalif Reference Shalif2018).
Countering displacement and harassment of Palestinians in Area C
Area C refers to around 60% of the West Bank, where Israel has almost exclusive control of, among others, law enforcement, planning and construction. As a result of Israeli policies, the Palestinians have difficulty in getting planning permission and structures that do not have a permit are demolished. These measures, along with settler harassment, have meant that the long-term presence of Palestinians on this land is threatened.Footnote 3
Since the early 2000s, Israeli activists have been called upon to accompany Palestinian shepherds in the South Hebron hills so that they could herd their sheep despite settler violence or military declarations that it is a ‘Closed Firing Zone’.Footnote 4 In addition, activists assist Palestinians in rebuilding demolished homes, harvesting olives and returning to land from which they have been expelled. Such non-violent interventions, which can also be defined as ‘everyday resistance’ (Scott Reference Scott1985), began after a Palestinian was shot while conducting the harvest (Kaufman-Lacusta Reference Kaufman-Lacusta2010: 26).
Stopping house evictions of Palestinians in Sheikh Jarrah
Between 2009 and 2011, the largest involvement of Israelis ‘in solidarity’ with Palestinians in non-violent protest against policies of the occupation emerged in the East Jerusalem neighbourhood of Sheikh Jarrah. Beginning in 2008, Palestinian families were evicted from their homes in Sheikh Jarrah and replaced by Jewish settlers who claimed ownership from before 1948. Local Palestinians began to protest the evictions and were joined by a group of Israelis who staged a sit-in with the Palestinian families to stop them being evicted. The efforts in this neighbourhood caught the attention of other Israelis, and the movement grew to weekly demonstrations and a 5,000-strong protest in March 2010. In addition, a legal campaign was launched using Israeli lawyers. As a result, the evictions were halted for almost eight years in total.Footnote 5
Drawing from across these campaigns, three practical ways in which the Israelis helped the Palestinians can be identified: their physical presence helped sustain demonstrations by limiting the repression of the IDF; accompanying them on their agricultural tasks enabled Palestinians to harvest olives and herd sheep; and the use of knowledge and skills changed the policies and practices of the Israeli army and Civil Administration.
The role of Israeli-Jewish interveners
Helping to sustain demonstrations
An analysis of the campaigns against the Wall in Bil'in and against housing evictions in Sheikh Jarrah shows that Israeli-Jewish activists have helped to sustain the weekly demonstrations. Their physical presence at demonstrations limited repression by the Israeli army, giving courage to the Palestinians to be more confrontational and enabling them to continue their resistance efforts despite unfavourable conditions. Even though the occupation remains, the ability to continue to resist is seen as a success.
In the Bil'in demonstrations, the Israeli army have used crowd-control measures, such as firing rubber-coated bullets and tear gas. The use of live ammunition is also allowed in some circumstances (ACRI 2011: 5–7). When Israeli Jews were present, activists witnessed the Israeli army being more restrained towards the protesters (Darweish and Rigby Reference Darweish and Rigby2015; Hallward Reference Hallward2009; IA1 2018; Kaufman-Lacusta Reference Kaufman-Lacusta2010; PA1 2018; Shalif Reference Shalif2018; Snitz Reference Snitz2009; Yacovobitch Reference Yacovobitch2018). A veteran Israeli activist described how she stood next to two Palestinian children at a demonstration in the West Bank and realized that ‘just because of me these kids weren't shot’ (Golan in Kaufman-Lacusta Reference Kaufman-Lacusta2010: 25). After the killing of an Israeli activist in a demonstration against the Wall in 2003, the army stopped using live ammunition when Israelis were present, as confirmed by Lieutenant Colonel Tzachi Segev, who commanded the army unit that dispersed the Bil'in demonstrations when they first emerged (Segev in Rapaport Reference Rapaport2005).
Arguably, the presence of international activists should also deter the army from using ammunition. However, foreign nationals have been injured and killed in demonstrations against the Wall (Coy Reference Coy2012; Mahrouse Reference Mahrouse2014). An Israeli activist explained that the IDF became less concerned about withholding fire when foreign nationals were present, but the presence of Israelis was still a deterrent. She explains, ‘an Israeli soldier knows that if he kills an Israeli, he'll be held accountable. He knows he can't do that’ (Golan in Kaufman-Lacusta Reference Kaufman-Lacusta2010: 149). In Bil'in this has meant that Palestinians can continue demonstrating with less fear of being killed when Israeli-Jewish activists join them.
Israeli activists were also helpful in assisting Palestinians who were at risk of arrest. Not only do they speak the same language, but the Israeli activists may have served in the IDF themselves, which gives them some ability to bargain with the soldiers. Furthermore, Israelis are less likely to be arrested than Palestinians and if they are, will be detained only for a few hours and treated humanely (Awad Reference Awad2007) – unlike Palestinians, who may be subject to administrative detention without trial (B'Tselem 2017b; Vexler Reference Vexler2012). As described by one Israeli activist, ‘we got arrested and detained, we had our cell phones on us and they [Israeli soldiers] gave us food. As far as being detained goes it was pretty easy, and then they brought in this Palestinian who was blindfolded, handcuffed, had been arrested for 20 hours and had slept on the floor’ (Strober Reference Strober2017). In Sheikh Jarrah, a Palestinian resident explained that the Palestinians have a lot to lose should they be arrested and rely on Israelis to help prevent this (PA2 2018). Furthermore, the Palestinian leader of the community explained that if he did get arrested, he knew that his Israeli friends would continue to try to stop the evictions (Abu Diab Reference Abu2018).
The reduced level of risk and better level of treatment afforded to the Israeli activists enabled them to ‘create some buffer space between the soldiers and the Palestinians’ (Awad Reference Awad2018) so that the presence of Israeli activists emboldened the Palestinians to maintain their resistance efforts (Yacovobitch Reference Yacovobitch2018). Meron Rapaport (2005) confirmed that ‘the very knowledge that Israelis will be present at a demonstration makes it easier for the Palestinians to decide to confront the soldiers, as it is likely that the troops will use less force when they see Israelis among the demonstrators’. Saleh Abu Diab (Reference Abu2018) also explained that Israeli support gave him energy and encouragement to keep going despite the continuation of evictions in the neighbourhood. Overall, it is believed that, ‘in order to make a difference, it really works in everybody's interest to have Israelis participate’ (Kantorowicz in Kaufman-Lacusta Reference Kaufman-Lacusta2010: 146).
Accompanying agricultural tasks in Area C
In addition to reducing the likelihood of lethal repression, an analysis of the campaign to counter the displacement of Palestinians in Area C shows that Israeli activists acted as barriers against intimidation and violence from Israeli settlers and negotiated with the army on the ground, so that the Palestinians were able to maintain access to their land. In particular, Israeli involvement enabled Palestinians to harvest their olives and herd their sheep, where they would have otherwise been deterred by settlers blocking access (Kaufman-Lacusta Reference Kaufman-Lacusta2010: 144; ‘Muna A’ Reference Muna2016; Assaf Reference Assaf2018). A Palestinian from a village near Nablus explained that the Israeli activists ‘prevent settlers from harming us’ (Ali in Rasgon Reference Rasgon2016). Their presence is especially needed because the Israeli army have been shown to ‘stand idly by’ when Israeli extremists attacked Palestinians (Hareuveni Reference Hareuveni2015; RHR 2018). In 2017 Rabbis for Human Rights identified that in 26 out of 34 cases, the intervention of the Israeli organization allowed the Palestinians to harvest their olives by securing access to the land. Farmers from eight villages were able to access their land after significant periods of restricted access and in 10 cases, the intervention of Israelis helped prevent attacks on Palestinians (RHR 2017).
Some internationals activists have played a similar accompanying role (Burrowes Reference Burrowes, Moser-Puangsuwan and Weber2000; Coy Reference Coy2012; Dudouet Reference Dudouet and Schock2015; Mahony and Eguren Reference Mahony and Eguren1997; Schirch Reference Schirch2006), particularly volunteers from the Christian Peacemaker Team, the Ecumenical Accompaniment Programme in Palestine and the International Solidarity Movement (ISM), who spend long periods in Palestine. However, a number of activists from these groups were deported as a result of their work (ISM 2013, 2014; Kaufman-Lacusta Reference Kaufman-Lacusta2010: 148, 301; YNet 2008). Deportation laws in Israel changed in the mid-2000s to make deporting foreigners much easier (Golan in Kaufman-Lacusta Reference Kaufman-Lacusta2010: 148). In addition, in 2017 the Israeli parliament approved a bill to refuse entry to foreign nationals if they publicly expressed support for a boycott of Israel (ACRI 2017). Since this ruling, a number of foreign activists have been detained on arrival in Israel (ACRI 2016), thus reducing the ability of internationals to join Palestinian resistance. Given the potential for international activists to be deported and barred from re-entry, their assistance as accompaniers cannot be guaranteed in the same way as the Israeli activists.
Furthermore, there is something particularly significant about internal third-party interveners standing side by side with local resisters. A representative of the Popular Committee of Bil'in described the Israelis as ‘real partners – awake with us late at night, in confronting daily invasions of village homes by the army’ (Mansour Reference Mansour2007). ‘The relationship between occupier and occupied’ is thus transformed (Bilu in Israel Social TV 2017), shifting the perception of Israelis as only soldiers or settlers (Morrar Reference Morrar2009). The significance of this should not be underestimated.
Knowledge and skills to challenge Israeli policies
In addition to assistance derived from physical presence, the Israeli activists have developed and have access to useful knowledge and skills to support the campaigns. Legal action initiated by Israeli activists on behalf of the Palestinians has been successful in changing the actions and policies of the Israeli Civil Administration. A report by B'Tselem on Israel's land policies in the West Bank highlights a positive development whereby the Israeli Civil Administration will accept objections from Israeli non-governmental organizations (NGOs) on behalf of the Palestinian residents (B'Tselem 2013: 16). In 2006 Israeli NGO Bimkom submitted objections to the Israeli High Court of Justice against master building plans that were drawn up for villages in Area C of the West Bank. Some of these objections were accepted (B'Tselem 2013: 14). Rabbis for Human Rights and ACRI have also successfully petitioned the Israeli High Court of Justice. Some of their successes include interventions to ‘allow critical road access for isolated Palestinian villages in the South Hebron Hills’ and ‘preventing and reversing land take-overs’ (RHR n.d.).
Expertise in legal processes and legitimacy in the eyes of the Civil Administration and High Court of Justice are required for these legal claims to be submitted, something that the Israeli activists and NGOs exhibit. While there are some Palestinian lawyers who support the campaigns, it is understood that, ‘as a Palestinian, it is almost impossible to work through the Israeli system and to achieve something’ (‘Muna A’ Reference Muna2016). Hallward (Reference Hallward2009: 552) also found that a significant strategic advantage of Israeli activists is that they are able to access the Israeli court system. In addition, there was a period when Palestinians were barred from entering the Jerusalem District Court to observe certain legal proceedings. The same rule was not applied to Jews and therefore, Israeli activists could attend the hearings to lend their support and ensure a fair trial (ACRI 2019).
Advocating on behalf of the Palestinians, particularly through gaining media attention, has also helped Palestinian campaigns. Israeli activists have identified the increased likelihood that the international community and Israeli society will listen to them rather than to Palestinians. As one Israeli activist remarked, ‘one of the biggest privileges we have is getting information out there easily. People are more interested, unfortunately, in hearing me say it than they are from the villagers saying it’ (Strober Reference Strober2017). This was first acknowledged when two Israelis went to the Palestinian town of Beit Jala, which was being shelled by Israelis early in the Al-Aqsa Intifada. The presence of the Israelis became the focal point of the Israeli media and drew attention to the situation (Golan in Kaufman-Lacusta Reference Kaufman-Lacusta2010: 146). Non-violence trainer Husan Jubran also confirmed that the presence of Israelis at Palestinian demonstrations against the Wall drew the media (Jubran in Kaufman-Lacusta Reference Kaufman-Lacusta2010: 174).
In Sheikh Jarrah, the involvement of Israeli Jews was seen as crucial in spreading the word and gaining the attention of the media. This in turn led to a temporary halt in evictions (Ziv Reference Ziv2018). As one commentator noted, ‘discrimination and dispossession systematically pervade all aspects of life in East Jerusalem. What makes Sheikh Jarrah unique is the fact that soon after the forced evictions of Palestinian families from their homes, it became clear that many Israelis are simply not going to let this one slide’ (Inbar Reference Inbar2010).
Not all agree that Israelis should act as a mouthpiece for the Palestinians. A Palestinian activist noted, ‘we should not allow anyone to speak on behalf of us’ (Khalifa Reference Khalifa2017). However, the difficulty is that ‘a Palestinian can say exactly the same thing and people will listen to me much more because, oh the Israeli is saying it’ (Vardi Reference Vardi2017). The reason was explained by a Palestinian activist, whereby ‘criticism of the occupation by its own people is more powerful than criticism by someone who lives under it, whose opinion is pre-determined’ (Morrar Reference Morrar2006). While international activists also have a privileged voice (Mahrouse Reference Mahrouse2014), Morrar explained that the voices of Israeli dissidents are even more important. She notes that ‘when [an American] hears from a fellow American talking about the situation [in Palestine], his views may change. When he hears eyewitness accounts from an Israeli, it has an even greater effect’ (Morrar Reference Morrar2006).
A new campaign initiated and led by a Jewish organization based in the US in summer 2017 highlights why external third-party interveners, particularly temporary ones, are less helpful to the Palestinians. The aim of the campaign was to enable two Palestinian families to return to their homes in the village of Sarura, from which they had been evicted 20 years earlier. According to one of the Palestinian activists, the American group ‘wanted to do a big action, to rebuild someplace, with attempts to link it to Standing Rock in people's consciousness’ (Awad Reference Awad2018).Footnote 6 In some ways this campaign was successful; they helped the Palestinians return to and maintain a presence on the land. However, the Israeli military destroyed the camp and activists were detained.
The ways in which this campaign was initiated, as well as the goals of the organizers, explain why any success in returning to the land was short-lived. The group of international activists had limited experience in the region, specific dates they could travel and a certain vision of what they wanted to achieve, which meant the campaign was not sustainable. Furthermore, a lack of awareness of the culture of the villagers led to situations that offended the Palestinians (Strober Reference Strober2017). As Awad, director of the Holy Land Trust, explained, ‘Sarura is like a laboratory of non-violence. A group of highly white, privileged people practicing in very good conditions … And eventually, Surura is now neglected again’ (Awad Reference Awad2018).
In order to help the Palestinians gain access to land and avoid eviction orders, certain skills are required, specifically familiarity with the legal processes and an ability to attract media attention. These skills are learned from extensive and long-term experience on the ground. This is something that external third-party activists who join on-site campaigns temporarily cannot achieve.
Hindering campaigns through domination
The previous sections have shown how Israeli Jews have helped Palestinian resistance campaigns. However, their involvement has not always been helpful to or wanted by the Palestinians. Despite the clear benefits of Israeli involvement in the campaign against housing evictions in Sheikh Jarrah, Israeli dominance has been cited as the main reason why it dissipated (Khalifa Reference Khalifa2017). As the movement grew to include more Israelis, an Israeli-only organizing committee was set up, members of which did not attend the joint Palestinian–Israeli planning committee (Dana Reference Dana2010). The movement fell into the trap noted by Budour Yousef Hassan (Reference Hassan2011), whereby ‘there is a great risk of groups hijacking the growing grassroots movement of Palestinian popular resistance under the cloak of solidarity and coexistence’. Specifically, there were strategic differences between the Israeli-only committee, who wanted to create a broader anti-occupation campaign, and the joint Palestinian–Israeli committee, who wanted to focus on the evictions in Sheikh Jarrah. A Palestinian Jerusalemite explained that ‘most of the Palestinians were marching for the sake of their threatened homes in East Jerusalem neighbourhoods, therefore serving short-term aims to put a stop to the ethnic cleansing of Arab Jerusalemites, and not to call for an independent state in the West Bank and Gaza’ (Abukhater Reference Abukhater2011). Similarly, there was a period in Bil'in at the start of the demonstrations when the Israelis took over the resistance efforts and as a result the villagers stopped participating (Kamphoefner in Kaufman-Lacusta Reference Kaufman-Lacusta2010: 168).
In studies of external third-party intervention, it has been shown that colonial attitudes and saviour complexes often accompany intervention (Indigenous Action Media 2014; Mahrouse Reference Mahrouse2014; Meyer Reference Meyer2019). Gada Mahrouse (Reference Mahrouse2014: 43) finds that when white privilege is used to bring awareness to a non-violent movement, it has the effect of ‘reinforcing the very racist systems that it seeks to disrupt’ and imposes another relationship of domination. This transpires through activists using their ‘white and First World privilege’ to speak on behalf of the local resisters, obtain information for them and in receiving more attention when harmed. In order to avoid these issues, the concept of ‘local ownership’ is emphasized. The local activists must lead the resistance strategies and activities, with the third-party actors ‘assisting’ them, rather than directing them (Dudouet Reference Dudouet, Fischer, Gießmann and Schmelzle2008).
In awareness of this, both Palestinian and Israeli-Jewish activists are clear that the Israelis should never be the ones to lead the struggle. As it was explained: ‘we have such a unique role here, it's not about leading – it is not my place to lead – because I am not Palestinian and I am not the one facing occupation’ (Strober Reference Strober2017). Another Israeli activist explained, ‘it is not up to me to dictate for the oppressed their means of struggle. My choice is whether to stand by those who struggle and speak up for their rights’ (Barkan in Negra Reference Negra2012). The Palestinian activists confirmed this view. Alsaafin (Reference Alsaafin2012) was clear that ‘Israeli activists must never take a decision-making or leadership role in the Palestinian struggle, but instead must remain on the periphery’, and scholar of Palestinian popular resistance, Marwan Darweish, noted that ‘it is essential that the Palestinian side has more control over the planning, thinking and activities of these projects’ (Israel Social TV 2017). Therefore, a careful consideration of the dynamics between the interveners and the local resisters is needed.
Concluding remarks
An analysis of the three case studies has shown concrete ways the Israeli-Jewish activists have helped Palestinian resistance campaigns. While long-term goals of Palestinian liberation and an end to the occupation have not been achieved, Israeli activists have helped Palestinians to achieve short-term aims that are linked to their belief in sumud: sustaining resistance in the face of Israeli repression and maintaining a presence on the land. In each of the campaigns, Israeli-Jewish involvement was needed and often more useful than the involvement of foreign activists, particularly those who join campaigns temporarily.
The physical presence of Israeli activists has been shown to enable Palestinians to maintain their resistance efforts, despite repression from the Israeli army or harassment from Jewish settlers. The fact that Israeli-Jewish activists and Palestinian activists were treated differently meant that having Israeli Jews at the demonstrations enabled the Palestinians to be more confrontational and maintain their struggle and to gain access to their land to harvest their olives and herd their sheep. Some international activists who have been in Palestine a long time have provided similar assistance. However, they have not had a similar impact on reducing the level of force used by the Israeli army, and in recent years there has been an increased likelihood they would be deported or barred from entering Israel; thus, they could not provide the same level of assistance as the Israeli activists. Furthermore, the knowledge and skills the Israeli activists had in exploiting the legal system and in advocacy was particularly useful in changing the policies and practices of the Israeli army and Civil Administration in Area C of the West Bank.
The involvement of Israeli Jews in the campaign against the evictions in Sheikh Jarrah was particularly significant in gaining media attention and thus mobilizing even more Israelis, such that the level of awareness, coupled with legal action, led to a halt in the evictions for almost a decade. However, it was in this campaign that some Israeli Jews took over the struggle, developing different strategic goals to the Palestinians. The disagreements that emerged led to the dissolution of the campaign and the eviction notices were later reinstated.
What has been shown, both theoretically and in the case of Israeli-Jewish activists who join on-site Palestinian resistance campaigns, is that it can be strategically desirable for members of the dominant population to actively assist the dominated in their struggle. Internal third-party interveners should make use of ‘their rewards of being part of an oppressor class’ in order to ‘weaponize their privilege’ (Indigenous Action Media 2014: 6) by joining the oppressed in their campaigns. At the same time, they must minimize their domination, by following the lead of the local resisters and confronting their own role in the structures of oppression.
We already know that mass participation in non-violent resistance can reduce the power of a regime (Stephan and Chenoweth Reference Stephan and Chenoweth2008). This study has shown that civil resistance campaigns, particularly those that are failing to have leverage, benefit from the involvement of members of the ruling population. It therefore follows that efforts should be made to mobilize those from the ruling population to resist their own government and join forces with the oppressed.
Given the limitations of the case of Israel and Palestine, both in terms of the focus on a small sample of campaign case studies and the fact that there has been no success among the broader Palestinian liberation movement, other country case studies should be explored to provide a further understanding of the role of internal third-party interveners as distinct actors in the ‘great chain of non-violence’.
Acknowledgements
This research was supported by the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict, which develops and shares knowledge and educational resources related to civil resistance with activists, educators, scholars, journalists and members of the policy community. I thank Steve Chase for comments on early drafts of this article and the three anonymous reviewers for their helpful feedback.
