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Why real leisure really matters: incentive effects on real effort in the laboratory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Brice Corgnet ,
Roberto Hernán-González  and
Eric Schniter
Brice Corgnet*
Affiliation:
Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, One University Drive, Orange, CA 92866, USA
Roberto Hernán-González*
Affiliation:
Economics Department, University of Granada, Campus Universitario de La Cartuja, 18071 Granada, Spain
Eric Schniter*
Affiliation:
Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, One University Drive, Orange, CA 92866, USA
*
corgnet@chapman.edu
eschniter@gmail.com
roberto.hernangonzalez@gmail.com
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Abstract

On-the-job leisure is a pervasive feature of the modern workplace. We studied its impact on work performance in a laboratory experiment by either allowing or restricting Internet access. We used a 2 × 2 experimental design in which subjects completing real-effort work tasks could earn cash according to either individual- or team-production incentive schemes. Under team pay, production levels were significantly lower when Internet browsing was available than when it was not. Under individual pay, however, no differences in production levels were observed between the treatment in which Internet was available and the treatment in which it was not. In line with standard incentive theory, individual pay outperformed team pay across all periods of the experiment when Internet browsing was available. This was not the case, however, when Internet browsing was unavailable. These results demonstrate that the integration of on-the-job leisure activities into an experimental labor design is crucial for uncovering incentive effects.

Keywords

IncentiveFree ridingInternet accessExperimental method

JEL classification

D23: Organizational Behavior • Transaction Costs • Property Rights M52: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects C92: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 18 , Issue 2 , June 2015 , pp. 284 - 301
Copyright
Copyright © 2014 Economic Science Association

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