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The strategy versus the direct-response method: a first survey of experimental comparisons

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Jordi Brandts  and
Gary Charness
Jordi Brandts*
Affiliation:
Department of Business Economics, U. Autònoma de Barcelona and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica, CSIC, Campus UAB, 08193 Bellaterra, Spain
Gary Charness*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, 3051 North Hall, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA, 93106-9210, USA
*
e-mail: jordi.brandts@uab.es
e-mail: charness@econ.ucsb.edu
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Abstract

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In this paper, we present a first survey of the literature regarding whether the strategy method, in which a responder makes conditional decisions for each possible information set, leads to different experimental results than does the more standard direct-response method, in which the responder learns the action of the first mover and then chooses a response. Of the twenty-nine existing comparisons, sixteen find no difference, while four do find differences, and nine comparisons find mixed evidence. We also find some indications about the underlying determinants of when the two methods lead to different responses. For example, it appears that levels of punishment are substantially lower with the strategy method. In addition, it also appears that difference across these elicitation methods are more likely when people make fewer contingent choices. Finally, in no case do we find that a treatment effect found with the strategy method is not observed with the direct-response method.

Keywords

Strategy methodExperimentsElicitationFraming

JEL classification

C79: Other B49: Other C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior C90: General C92: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 14 , Issue 3 , September 2011 , pp. 375 - 398
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BYCreative Common License - NC
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0), which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
Copyright
Copyright © 2011 The Author(s)

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