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Scheduling with package auctions
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 March 2025
Abstract
In scientific collaborations, technologies have broadened access to scarce scientific and engineering resources. While broader access is often applauded, little attention has been focused on the problem of efficient and equitable resource allocation. This paper presents laboratory experiments designed to compare different allocation mechanisms for access to joint research facilities. Specifically, we study the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction, a simultaneous ascending auction (the Resource Allocation Design, RAD), and a mechanism based on submitted rankings (Knapsack). Experimental results show that RAD and VCG are both more efficient than Knapsack, while Knapsack achieves a more equal distribution of resources than RAD or VCG. The findings highlight the need for systematic exploration of allocation mechanisms within collaboratories.
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- Copyright © Economic Science Association 2010
Footnotes
We thank Elena Katok, Tony Kwasnica, John Ledyard, Jeff MacKie-Mason, and anonymous reviewers for helpful comments, and Sasha Achen and Benjamin Taylor for excellent research assistance. Chen gratefully acknowledges the financial support from the National Science Foundation through grant no. SES-0339587. Any remaining errors are our own.
Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi: 10.1007/s10683-010-9252-6) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.