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Revisiting strategic versus non-strategic cooperation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Ernesto Reuben  and
Sigrid Suetens
Ernesto Reuben*
Affiliation:
Columbia University and IZA, New York, USA
Sigrid Suetens*
Affiliation:
CentER, TILEC, and TIBER, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands
*
ereuben@columbia.edu
s.suetens@uvt.nl
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Abstract

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We propose a novel experimental method that disentangles strategically- and non-strategically-motivated behavior. We apply it to an indefinitely-repeated prisoner's dilemma game to observe simultaneously how the same individual behaves in situations with future interaction and in situations with no future interaction, while controlling for expectations. This method allows us to determine the extent to which strategically-cooperating individuals are responsible for the observed pattern of cooperation in experiments with repeated interaction, including the so-called endgame effect. Our results indicate that the most common motive for cooperation in repeated games is strategic.

Keywords

Repeated gamesCooperationReputation buildingStrong reciprocity

JEL classification

D01: Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles D70: General C92: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 15 , Issue 1 , March 2012 , pp. 24 - 43
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BYCreative Common License - NC
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0), which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s) 2011

Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-011-9285-5) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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