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Recognizing contributors: an experiment on public goods

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Anya Savikhin Samek  and
Roman M. Sheremeta
Anya Savikhin Samek*
Affiliation:
School of Human Ecology, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1300 Linden Drive, Madison, WI 53706, USA
Roman M. Sheremeta
Affiliation:
Weatherhead School of Management, Case Western Reserve University, 11119 Bellflower Road, Cleveland, OH 44106, USA Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, 1 University Drive, Orange, CA 92866, USA
*
asamak@wisc.edu
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Abstract

We experimentally investigate the impact of recognizing contributors on public good contributions. We vary recognizing all, highest or lowest contributors. Consistent with previous studies, recognizing all contributors significantly increases contributions relative to the baseline. Recognizing only the highest contributors does not increase contributions compared to not recognizing contributors, while recognizing only the lowest contributors is as effective as recognizing all contributors. These findings support our conjecture that aversion from shame is a more powerful motivator for giving than anticipation of prestige.

Keywords

Public-goodsInformationExperiments

JEL classification

H41: Public Goods C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior C72: Noncooperative Games
Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 17 , Issue 4 , December 2014 , pp. 673 - 690
Copyright
Copyright © 2014 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

Electronic Supplementary Material The online version of this article (doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-013-9389-1) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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