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Preference submission timing in school choice matching: testing fairness and efficiency in the laboratory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Jaimie W. Lien ,
Jie Zheng  and
Xiaohan Zhong
Jaimie W. Lien*
Affiliation:
Department of Decision Sciences and Managerial Economics, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China
Jie Zheng*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China
Xiaohan Zhong*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China
*
jaimie.lien.tsinghuasem@gmail.com
jie.academic@gmail.com
zhongxh@sem.tsinghua.edu.cn
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Abstract

We investigate the relative merits of the Boston and Serial Dictatorship mechanisms when the timing of students’ preference submission over schools varies within the structure of the mechanism. Despite the well-documented disadvantages of the Boston mechanism Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez (American Economic Review 93:729–747 2003), we hypothesize that a Boston mechanism where students are required to submit their preferences before the realization of their exam scores, can in fact have fairness and efficiency advantages compared to the often favored Serial Dictatorship mechanism. We test these hypotheses in a series of laboratory experiments which vary by the class of mechanism implemented, and the preference submission timing by students, reflective of actual policy changes which have occurred in China. Our experimental findings confirm the efficiency hypothesis straightforwardly, and lend support to the fairness hypothesis when subjects have the chance to learn with experience. The results have important policy implications for school choice mechanism design when students’ relative rankings by schools are initially uncertain.

Keywords

School choice matchingUncertaintyExperimentsCollege admission

JEL classification

C78: Bargaining Theory • Matching Theory D81: Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty C92: Laboratory, Group Behavior I28: Government Policy
Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 19 , Issue 1 , March 2016 , pp. 116 - 150
Copyright
Copyright © 2015 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-015-9430-7) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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