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Observed punishment spillover effects: a laboratory investigation of behavior in a social dilemma

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

David L. Dickinson ,
E. Glenn Dutcher  and
Cortney S. Rodet
David L. Dickinson
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Appalachian State University, Boone, NC 28608-2051, USA
E. Glenn Dutcher*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Finance & Marketing, University of Central Missouri, Warrensburg, MO 64093, USA
Cortney S. Rodet
Affiliation:
Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, Orange, CA 92886, USA
*
glenn.dutcher@gmail.com
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Abstract

Punishment has been shown to be an effective reinforcement mechanism. Intentional or not, punishment will likely generate spillover effects that extend beyond one’s immediate decision environment, and these spillovers are not as well understood. We seek to understand these secondary spillover effects in a controlled lab setting using a standard social dilemma: the voluntary contributions mechanism. We find that spillovers occur when others observe punishment outside their own social dilemma. However, the direction of the spillover effect depends crucially on personal punishment history and whether one is personally exempt from punishment or not.

Keywords

PunishmentPunishment spilloversExperiential punishmentVCMSocial dilemmaExperiment

JEL classification

H40: General K42: Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior C92: Laboratory, Group Behavior J24: Human Capital • Skills • Occupational Choice • Labor Productivity
Type
Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 18 , Issue 1: Special Issue In Honor of Elinor “Lin” Ostrom , March 2015 , pp. 136 - 153
Copyright
Copyright © 2014 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-014-9399-7) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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Appendix A: Experimental Instructions Game Order ACB
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