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A new experimental mechanism to investigate polarized demands for public goods: the effects of censoring
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 March 2025
Abstract
Many social dilemmas involve deciding among alternative public goods, and include cases where part of the population may dislike a particular option. In such cases, an agent may want to spend resources to oppose or reduce the provision of the option they don’t like. We propose the generalized voluntary contributions mechanism (GVCM), which allows allocating resources to increase or decrease the level of public good. Our main treatment variables include two versions of the GVCM (uncensored, or censored at positive provision). We study performance of GVCM for various compositions of the polarized preferences. We find that uncensoring the mechanism does not impose net efficiency costs and leads to more diversity in the provision of the public good. The nature of efficiency loss is more complex compared to standard VCM and is not driven by free riding.
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- Original Paper
- Information
- Experimental Economics , Volume 22 , Issue 3: Special Issue in Honor of Charles R. Plott , September 2019 , pp. 585 - 609
- Copyright
- Copyright © 2018 Economic Science Association
Footnotes
Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-018-9593-0) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.