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Introduction to the Symposium in Experimental Economics in memory of John Van Huyck

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Yan Chen*
Affiliation:
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA
Catherine Eckel
Affiliation:
Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, USA

Abstract

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Type
Original Paper
Copyright
Copyright © 2018 Economic Science Association

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