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Introduction to Issue of Experimental Economics in Honor of Raymond C. Battalio

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

John H. Kagel  and
John B. Van Huyck
John H. Kagel*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Ohio State University, 410 Arps Hall, 1945 North High Street, Columbus, OH 43210-1172, USA
John B. Van Huyck
Affiliation:
Texas A&M University, 4228 TAMU, College Station, TX 77843, USA
*
e-mail: kagel.4@osu.edu
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Abstract

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Type
Obituary
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 10 , Issue 3: Special issue of Experimental Economics in honor of Raymond C. Battalio: Coordination Games , September 2007 , pp. 201 - 204
Copyright
Copyright © 2007 Economic Science Association

References

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