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The Impact of Exchange Context on the Activation of Equity in Ultimatum Games

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Elizabeth Hoffman ,
Kevin McCabe  and
Vernon Smith
Elizabeth Hoffman
Affiliation:
Provost and Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs, University of Illinois at Chicago
Kevin McCabe
Affiliation:
Department of Economics and Economic Science Laboratory, University of Arizona
Vernon Smith
Affiliation:
Department of Economics and Economic Science Laboratory, University of Arizona
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Abstract

In this paper we report the results of additional exchange ultimatum game experiments conducted at the same time as the exchange ultimatum game experiments reported in Hoffman et al. (Games and Economic Behavior, 7(3), pp. 346-380, 1994). In these additional experiments, we use instructions to change an impersonal exchange situation to a personal exchange situation. To do this, we prompt sellers to consider what choices their buyers will make. Game theory would predict that thinking about the situation would lead sellers to make smaller offers to buyers. In contrast, we find a significant increase in seller offers to buyers. This result suggests that encouraging sellers to thinking about buyer choices focuses their attention on the strategic interaction with humans who think they way they do in personal exchange situations, and who may punish them for unacceptable behavior, and not on the logic of the game theoretic structure of the problem.

Keywords

ultimatum gamesequity theoryexperimental methods

JEL classification

C78: Bargaining Theory • Matching Theory C92: Laboratory, Group Behavior B40: General
Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 3 , Issue 1 , June 2000 , pp. 5 - 9
Copyright
Copyright © 2000 Economic Science Association

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References

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