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Framing and free riding: emotional responses and punishment in social dilemma games

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Robin P. Cubitt ,
Michalis Drouvelis  and
Simon Gächter
Robin P. Cubitt*
Affiliation:
School of Economics, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, Sir Clive Granger Building, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD, UK
Michalis Drouvelis*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham B15 2TT, UK
Simon Gächter*
Affiliation:
School of Economics, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, Sir Clive Granger Building, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD, UK CESifo, Munich, Germany IZA, Bonn, Germany
*
e-mail: robin.cubitt@nottingham.ac.uk
e-mail: m.drouvelis@bham.ac.uk
e-mail: simon.gaechter@nottingham.ac.uk
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Abstract

In this paper, we report an experimental investigation of the effect of framing on social preferences, as revealed in a one-shot linear public goods game. We use two types of indicator to measure social preferences: self-reported emotional responses; and, as a behavioural indicator of disapproval, punishment. Our findings are that, for a given pattern of contributions, neither type of indicator depends on the Give versus Take framing that we manipulate. To this extent, they suggest that the social preferences we observe are robust to framing effects.

Keywords

Framing effectsPunishmentEmotionsPublic goods experiments

JEL classification

D01: Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles H41: Public Goods C92: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 14 , Issue 2 , May 2011 , pp. 254 - 272
Copyright
Copyright © Economic Science Association 2010

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Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi: 10.1007/s10683-010-9266-0) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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