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Equilibrium selection in similar repeated games: experimental evidence on the role of precedents
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 March 2025
Abstract
We report on an experiment examining behavior and equilibrium selection in two similar, infinitely repeated games, Stag Hunt and Prisoner’s Dilemma under anonymous random matching. We are interested in the role that historical precedents may play for equilibrium selection between these two repeated games. We find that a precedent for efficient play in the repeated Stag Hunt game does not carry over to the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game despite the possibility that efficient play can be sustained as an equilibrium of the indefinitely repeated game. Similarly, a precedent for inefficient play in the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game does not extend to the repeated Stag Hunt game. We conclude that equilibrium selection between similar repeated games may have less to do with historical precedents and might instead depend more on strategic considerations associated with the different payoffs of these similar repeated games.
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- Type
- Original Paper
- Information
- Experimental Economics , Volume 21 , Issue 3: Special Issue in Honor of John Van Huyck , September 2018 , pp. 573 - 600
- Copyright
- Copyright © 2017 Economic Science Association
Footnotes
Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-017-9531-6) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.
For helpful comments and suggestions we thank an anonymous referee and participants at the Workshop in Memory of John Van Huyck held at SMU in October 2015. Dietmar Fehr gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) through CRC 1029.