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Coordination and cooperation in asymmetric commons dilemmas

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Marco A. Janssen ,
John M. Anderies  and
Sanket R. Joshi
Marco A. Janssen*
Affiliation:
School of Human Evolution and Social Change, Center for the Study of Institutional Diversity, Arizona State University, PO Box 872402, Tempe, AZ 85287-2402, USA
John M. Anderies
Affiliation:
School of Human Evolution and Social Change, Center for the Study of Institutional Diversity, Arizona State University, PO Box 872402, Tempe, AZ 85287-2402, USA School of Human Evolution and Social Change, Center for the Study of Institutional Diversity, School of Sustainability, Arizona State University, PO Box 872402, Tempe, AZ 85287-2402, USA
Sanket R. Joshi
Affiliation:
Center for the Study of Institutional Diversity, School of Computing and Informatics, Arizona State University, PO Box 872402, Tempe, AZ 85287-2402, USA
*
e-mail: Marco.Janssen@asu.edu
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Abstract

In this paper we discuss laboratory experiments that address the problem of self-governance in an asymmetric commons dilemma. Small-scale irrigation systems that provide food for hundreds of millions of people around the world are probably the most common example of such dilemmas. Here, we formulate an abstract dilemma in which subjects make both a decision about investment in the provision of infrastructure associated with the use of a resource and about how much to extract from the common-pool resource made available by this infrastructure. The impact of inherent asymmetry in irrigation systems on the provision of a resource and the impact of communication on the capacity of the group to solve the two-level commons dilemma of cooperation and coordination based on the analysis of the experimental data are discussed.

Keywords

Common-pool resourcesAsymmetryIrrigationFairnessReal-time experiment

JEL classification

Q57: Ecological Economics: Ecosystem Services • Biodiversity Conservation • Bioeconomics • Industrial Ecology Q25: Water C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior C92: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 14 , Issue 4 , November 2011 , pp. 547 - 566
Copyright
Copyright © 2011 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi: 10.1007/s10683-011-9281-9) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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