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Concentration and variability of forecasts in artificial investment games: an online experiment on WeChat

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Xiu Chen*
Affiliation:
Southern University of Science and Technology, Shenzhen, China
Fuhai Hong*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Lingnan University, Tuen Mun, Hong Kong
Xiaojian Zhao*
Affiliation:
Monash University, Clayton, Australia Chinese University of Hong Kong (Shenzhen), Shenzhen, China

Abstract

This paper is the first to use the WeChat platform, one of the largest social networks, to conduct an online experiment of artificial investment games. We investigate how people’s forecasts about the financial market and investment decisions are shaped by whether they can observe others’ forecasts and whether they engage in public or private investment decisions. We find that with forecast sharing, subjects’ forecasts converge but in different directions across groups; consequently, forecast sharing does not lead to better forecasts nor more individually rational investment decisions. Whether or not subjects engage in public investment decisions does not significantly affect forecasts or investment.

Type
Original Paper
Copyright
Copyright © 2019 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-019-09632-z) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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