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A comparison of first price multi-object auctions
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 March 2025
Abstract
We compare simultaneous multi-object English-type ascending price auctions with first price sealed bid auctions in private values environments with multiobject demands. Special attention is paid to the effect of closing rules on ascending auctions’ outcomes. We find that simultaneous ascending auctions with the soft closing rule are the most efficient, while the sealed bid auctions generate the highest revenue. Ascending auctions with the hard closing rule display a significant amount of late bidding, resulting in the lowest among the three institutions revenue and efficiency.
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- Copyright © Economic Science Association 2007
Footnotes
Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-007-9189-6) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.