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Charitable Lottery Structure and Fund Raising: Theory and Evidence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Donald J. Dale
Donald J. Dale*
Affiliation:
Muhlenberg College
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Abstract

Do fixed-prize charitable lotteries generate more net revenue than do revenue-dependent lotteries? I present the results of an experiment designed to test a theoretical prediction of the relationship between the prize structure of a lottery funding a public good and individuals’ participation in the lottery. I find that a fixed-prize lottery configuration induces significantly greater participation and a significantly higher level of public good funding than does a revenue-dependent lottery.

Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 7 , Issue 3 , October 2004 , pp. 217 - 234
Copyright
Copyright © 2004 Economic Science Association

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