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Bargaining and Dilemma Games: From Laboratory Data Towards Theoretical Synthesis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Gary E. Bolton
Gary E. Bolton*
Affiliation:
Department of Management Science and Information Systems, 310 Beam, Penn State University, University Park, PA 16802, USA
*
email: geb3@psu.edu
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Abstract

Bargaining and dilemma games have developed in experimental economics as fairly separate literatures. More than a few analysts are now persuaded that the patterns of behavior in these games are closely related, and considerable effort is being put into a search for models that bridge the gap between the two types of games. I focus on a handful of models that, when taken together, outline the conceptual issues, and provide a sense of the progress that has already been made.

Keywords

bargainingdilemma gamesbounded rationalitylearningmotivation

JEL classification

H41: Public Goods C78: Bargaining Theory • Matching Theory C92: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 1 , Issue 3 , December 1998 , pp. 257 - 281
Copyright
Copyright © 1998 Economic Science Association

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