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Are women expected to be more generous?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Fernando Aguiar ,
Pablo Brañas-Garza ,
Ramón Cobo-Reyes ,
Natalia Jimenez  and
Luis M. Miller
Fernando Aguiar*
Affiliation:
IESA-CSIC, Campo Santo de los Mártires 7, 14004, Córdoba, Spain
Pablo Brañas-Garza*
Affiliation:
Departamento de Teoría Económica, Universidad de Granada, Campus de la Cartuja, 18011, Granada, Spain
Ramón Cobo-Reyes*
Affiliation:
Departamento de Teoría Económica, Universidad de Granada, Campus de la Cartuja, 18011, Granada, Spain
Natalia Jimenez*
Affiliation:
Departamento de Teoría Económica, Universidad de Granada, Campus de la Cartuja, 18011, Granada, Spain
Luis M. Miller*
Affiliation:
IESA-CSIC and Strategic Interaction Group, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Kahlaische Str. 10, 07745, Jena, Germany
*
e-mail: faguiar@iesa.csic.es
e-mail: pbg@ugr.es
e-mail: ramonc@ugr.es
e-mail: natjj@ugr.es
e-mail: miller@econ.mpg.de
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Abstract

This paper analyzes if men and women are expected to behave differently regarding altruism. Since the dictator game provides the most suitable design for studying altruism and generosity in the lab setting, we use a modified version to study the beliefs involved in the game. Our results are substantial: men and women are expected to behave differently. Moreover, while women believe that women are more generous, men consider that women are as generous as men.

Keywords

Dictator gameBeliefsExpectationsGenerosityGender

JEL classification

D64: Altruism • Philanthropy • Intergenerational Transfers C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior J16: Economics of Gender • Non-labor Discrimination
Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 12 , Issue 1 , March 2009 , pp. 93 - 98
Copyright
Copyright © 2008 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

We appreciate comments from Josemari Aizpurua, Shoshana Neuman and participants in seminars at Bar-Ilan University, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Univ. Publica Navarra. Tim Cason and one anonymous referee made substantial comments on the previous draft. Financial support from CICYT (SEJ2007-62081/ECON and SEJ2006-00959/SOCI) and FCEA (SOC2.05/43) is gratefully acknowledge. Martha Gaustad revised the English grammar.

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-008-9199-z) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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