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Are benevolent dictators altruistic in groups? A within-subject design

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Lucy F. Ackert ,
Ann B. Gillette ,
Jorge Martinez-Vazquez  and
Mark Rider
Lucy F. Ackert*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics and Finance, Michael J. Coles College of Business, Kennesaw State University, 1000 Chastain Road, Kennesaw, GA 30144, USA Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 1000 Peachtree Street NE, Atlanta, GA 30309-4470, USA
Ann B. Gillette*
Affiliation:
Kennesaw State University, Kennesaw, GA, USA Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Atlanta, GA, USA
Jorge Martinez-Vazquez*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, 14 Marietta Street, Atlanta, GA, 30303, USA
Mark Rider*
Affiliation:
Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA, USA
*
e-mail: lackert@kennesaw.edu
e-mail: agillet1@kennesaw.edu
e-mail: jorgemartinez@gsu.edu
e-mail: mrider@gsu.edu
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Abstract

We use a within-subject experimental design to investigate whether systematic relationships exist across distinct features of individual preferences: altruism in a two-person context, risk aversion in monetary outcomes, and social preferences in a group context. We find that altruism is related to demographic variables, including years of education, gender, and age. Perhaps most importantly, self allocation in a two-person dictator game is related to social preferences in a group context. Participants who are more generous in a dictator game are more likely to vote against their self-interest in a group tax redistribution game which we interpret to be an expression of social preferences.

Keywords

EquitySocial preferencesOptimal taxation

JEL classification

D63: Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement H21: Efficiency • Optimal Taxation C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior C92: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 14 , Issue 3 , September 2011 , pp. 307 - 321
Copyright
Copyright © 2010 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

The views expressed here are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta or the Federal Reserve System. Financial support of the International Studies Program, Andrew Young School at Georgia State University and the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta is gratefully acknowledged. The authors thank Vid Adrison and Astha Sen for outstanding research assistance. We are also grateful to Glenn Harrison, Tim Cason (the editor), and two anonymous referees for very helpful insights and comments, and to participants of the ESA 2007 and APEE 2008 meetings.

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi: 10.1007/s10683-010-9269-x) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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