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An experimental analysis of team production in networks

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Enrique Fatas ,
Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez  and
Hector Solaz
Enrique Fatas*
Affiliation:
LINEEX, Universidad de Valencia, Valencia, Spain
Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez
Affiliation:
Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica, Universidad de Málaga, Málaga, Spain
Hector Solaz
Affiliation:
LINEEX, Universidad de Valencia, Valencia, Spain
*
e-mail: fatas@uv.es
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Abstract

Experimental and empirical evidence highlights the role of networks on social outcomes. This paper tests the properties of exogenously fixed networks in team production. Subjects make the same decisions in a team work environment under four different organizational networks: the line, the circle, the star, and the complete network. In all the networks, links make information available to neighbors. This design allows us to analyze decisions across networks and a variety of subject types in a standard linear team production game. Contribution levels differ significantly across networks and the star is the most efficient incomplete network. Moreover, our results suggest that subjects act as conditional cooperators with respect to the information received from the network.

Keywords

Team productionNetworksInformation

JEL classification

H41: Public Goods C92: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 13 , Issue 4 , December 2010 , pp. 399 - 411
Copyright
Copyright © Economic Science Association 2010

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Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi: 10.1007/s10683-010-9248-2) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized

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An Experimental Analysis of Team Production in Networks Experimental Instructions (Star Treatment)
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Fatas et al. supplementary material

Fatas et al. supplementary material
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