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An experimental analysis of cooperation and productivity in the trust game
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 March 2025
Abstract
In the standard trust game the surplus is increased by the risk taking first mover while cooperation by the second mover is a one-to-one transfer. This paper reports results from experiments in which the reverse holds; the first mover's risky trust is not productive and the second mover's cooperation is productive. This subtle difference significantly lowers the likelihood of trust but increases the likelihood of cooperation conditional on trust. Evidence is presented that the change in trust is consistent with first movers failing to anticipate the later result. Drawing upon the analogy that the trust game represents a model of exchange, the results suggest that markets should be organized so that the buyer moves first and not the seller as in the original trust game.
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- Copyright © Economic Science Association 2007
Footnotes
Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-007-9186-9) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.