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An Application of the English Clock Market Mechanism to Public Goods Games

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

M. Vittoria Levati  and
Tibor Neugebauer
M. Vittoria Levati*
Affiliation:
Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems, Strategic Interaction Group, Kahlaische Strasse 10, D-07745 Jena, Germany
Tibor Neugebauer*
Affiliation:
Finanzmarkttheorie, Universität Hannover, Königsworther Platz 1, D-30167 Hannover, Germany
*
email: levati@mpiew-jena.mpg.de
email: T.Neugebauer@mbox.vwl.uni-hannover.de
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Abstract

This paper reports an experimental study of the public goods game in which contributions are not submitted all at once but incrementally as coordinated in real time by a clock. Individuals press a button as soon as the clock equals their willingness to contribute. By providing information about the point at which subjects stop further contributions we find evidence for conditionally cooperative behaviour: A subject's decision to stop contributing induces an immediate reaction of the other group members.

Keywords

real time public goodsvoluntary contributionsconditional cooperation

JEL classification

H41: Public Goods D44: Auctions C92: Laboratory, Group Behavior C72: Noncooperative Games
Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 7 , Issue 2 , June 2004 , pp. 153 - 169
Copyright
Copyright © 2004 Economic Science Association

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