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“Si él lo necesita”: Gypsy fairness in Vallecas

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Pablo Brabas-Garza ,
Ramon Cobo-Reyes  and
Almudena Domínguez
Pablo Brabas-Garza*
Affiliation:
Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica, Universidad de Granada Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica, Facultad de CCEE y Empresariales, Universidad de Granada, Campus de Cartuja, E-18071 Granada, Spain
Ramon Cobo-Reyes*
Affiliation:
Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica, Universidad de Granada
Almudena Domínguez
Affiliation:
Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Madrid
*
e-mail: pbg@ugr.es
e-mail: ramonc@ugr.es
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Abstract

“Si él lo necesita” (if he really needs it) was the most common argument given by the subjects who accepted the zero offer in the ultimatum game (strategy method) during experiments conducted among illiterate (adult) gypsies in Vallecas, Madrid. Interestingly the acceptance of the zero offer was not a rare case but, in contrast, was the modal value. This is even more remarkable if we consider that the 97% of the subjects proposed the equal split.

Keywords

GypsiesFairnessSocial welfareStrategy method ultimatum gameBargaining

JEL classification

D63: Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement D64: Altruism • Philanthropy • Intergenerational Transfers C93: Field Experiments J15: Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and Immigrants • Non-labor Discrimination
Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 9 , Issue 3: Special Issue: Behavioral Economics , September 2006 , pp. 253 - 264
Copyright
Copyright © 2006 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9126-0.

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