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Patience and time consistency in collective decisions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Laurent Denant-Boemont ,
Enrico Diecidue  and
Olivier l’Haridon
Laurent Denant-Boemont*
Affiliation:
University Rennes 1 - CREM, Place Hoche Rennes, France
Enrico Diecidue*
Affiliation:
INSEAD, Boulevard de Constance Fontainebleau, France
Olivier l’Haridon*
Affiliation:
University Rennes 1 - CREM, Place Hoche Rennes, France
*
laurent.denant-boemont@univ-rennes1.fr
enrico.diecidue@insead.edu
olivier.lharidon@univ-rennes1.fr
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Abstract

We present experimental evidence regarding individual and group decisions over time. Static and longitudinal methods are combined to test four conditions on time preferences: impatience, stationarity, age independence, and dynamic consistency. Decision making in groups should favor coordination via communication about voting intentions. We find that individuals are neither patient nor consistent, that groups are both patient and highly consistent, and that information exchange between participants helps groups converge to stable decisions. Finally we provide additional evidence showing that our results are driven by the specific role of groups and not by either repeated choices or individual preferences when choosing for other subjects.

Keywords

Time preferencesDynamic consistencyPresent-biasGroup decisions

JEL classification

D90: General‡ C92: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 20 , Issue 1 , March 2017 , pp. 181 - 208
Copyright
Copyright © 2016 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-016-9481-4) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

We thank Aurelien Baillon, Nicolas Houy, Vincent Merlin, Amnon Rapoport, Jeeva Somasundaram, Karine Van Der Straeten, Marie-Claire Villeval, Peter Wakker, the editor of this journal as well as two anonymous referees for helpful comments. We also thank Elven Priour for programming the script and organizing the sessions.

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