Hostname: page-component-7b9c58cd5d-hpxsc Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-03-18T14:48:57.140Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Implications of trust, fear, and reciprocity for modeling economic behavior

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

James C. Cox ,
Klarita Sadiraj  and
Vjollca Sadiraj
James C. Cox*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics and Experimental Economics Center (ExCen), Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA 30302-3992
Klarita Sadiraj*
Affiliation:
Social and Cultural Planning Office of The Netherlands (SCP), PO Box 16164, 2500 BD, The Hague, The Netherlands
Vjollca Sadiraj*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics and Experimental Economics Center (ExCen), Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA 30302-3992
*
e-mail: jccox@gsu.edu
e-mail: K.Sadiraj@scp.nl
e-mail: vsadiraj@gsu.edu
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

This paper reports three experiments with triadic or dyadic designs. The experiments include the moonlighting game in which first-mover actions can elicit positively or negatively reciprocal reactions from second movers. First movers can be motivated by trust in positive reciprocity or fear of negative reciprocity, in addition to unconditional other-regarding preferences. Second movers can be motivated by unconditional other-regarding preferences as well as positive or negative reciprocity. The experimental designs include control treatments that discriminate among actions with alternative motivations. Data from our three experiments and a fourth one are used to explore methodological questions, including the effects on behavioral hypothesis tests of within-subjects vs. across-subjects designs, single-blind vs. double-blind payoffs, random vs. dictator first-mover control treatments, and strategy responses vs. sequential play.

Keywords

ExperimentsTheoryParsimonyTrustFearReciprocityMethodology

JEL classification

D63: Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement D64: Altruism • Philanthropy • Intergenerational Transfers C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior C70: General
Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 11 , Issue 1 , March 2008 , pp. 1 - 24
Copyright
Copyright © 2008 Economic Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9156-7.

References

Abbink, K., Irlenbusch, B., & Renner, E. (2000). The moonlighting game: An empirical study on reciprocity and retribution. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 42, 265–277.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Andreoni, J., & Miller, J. (2002). Giving according to GARP: An experimental test of the rationality of altruism. Econometrica, 70, 737–753.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., & McCabe, K. (1995). Trust, reciprocity, and social history. Games and Economic Behavior, 10, 122–142.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blount, S. (1995). When social outcomes aren't fair: The effect of causal attributions on preferences. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 63, 131–144.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bohnet, I., & Hong, K. (2004). Status and distrust: The relevance of inequality and betrayal aversion. KSG Faculty Research Working Paper Series, John F. Kennedy School of Government, RWP04-041.Google Scholar
Bolton, G., Brandts, J. & Ockenfels, A. (1998). Measuring motivations for the reciprocal responses observed in a simple dilemma game. Experimental Economics, 1, 207–219.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bolton, G.E., & Ockenfels, A. (2000). ERC: A theory of equity, reciprocity and competition. American Economic Review, 90, 166–193.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Charness, G. (2004). Attribution and reciprocity in an experimental labor market. Journal of Labor Economics, 22, 665–688.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Charness, G., & Rabin, M. (2002). Social preferences: Some simple tests and a new model. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117, 817–869.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cox, J. C. (2002). Trust, reciprocity, and other-regarding preferences: Groups vs. individuals and males vs. females. In Zwick, R. & Rapoport, A. (Eds.), Advances in experimental business research, Kluwer Academic Publishers.Google Scholar
Cox, J. C. (2000) Trust & reciprocity: Implications of game triads and social contexts. Discussion Paper, University of Arizona, revised 2003.Google Scholar
Cox, J. C. (2004). How to identify trust and reciprocity. Games and Economic Behavior, 46, 260–281.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cox, J. C., & Deck, C. A. (2005). On the nature of reciprocal motives. Economic Inquiry, 43, 623–635.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cox, J. C., & Deck, C. A. (2006). When are women more generous than men? Economic Inquiry, 44, 587–598.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cox, J. C., Friedman, D., & Gjerstad, S. (in press). A tractable model of reciprocity and fairness. Games and Economic Behavior.Google Scholar
Cox, J. C., Friedman, D., & Sadiraj, V. (2006). Revealed altruism. ExCEN Working Paper Number 2006-09, Georgia State University.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cox, J. C., & Sadiraj, V. (2004). Direct tests of models of social preferences and a new model. Unpublished paper, University of Arizona.Google Scholar
Dufwenberg, M., & Kirchsteiger, G. (2004). A theory of sequential reciprocity. Games and Economic Behavior, 47, 268–298.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Falk, A., Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2000). Testing theories of fairness: Intentions matter. Working Paper No. 65, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich.Google Scholar
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (1999). A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 817–868.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Guttman, J. M. (2000). On the evolutionary stability of preferences for reciprocity. European Journal of Political Economy, 16, 31–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Levine, D. K. (1998). Modeling altruism and spitefulness in experiments. Review of Economic Dynamics, 1, 593–622.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McCabe, K., Rigdon, M., & Smith, V. L. (2003). Positive reciprocity and intentions in trust games. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 52, 267–275.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Offerman, T. (2002). Hurting hurts more than helping helps: The role of the self-serving bias. European Economic Review, 46, 1423–1437.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rabin, M. (1993). Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics. American Economic Review, 83, 1281–1302.Google Scholar
Sobel, J. (2005) Interdependent preferences and reciprocity. Journal of Economic Literature, 43, 392–436.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Supplementary material: File

Cox et al. supplementary material

Cox et al. supplementary material
Download Cox et al. supplementary material(File)
File 451.1 KB