Hostname: page-component-7b9c58cd5d-hpxsc Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-03-16T16:21:08.141Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

For those about to talk we salute you: an experimental study of credible deviations and ACDC

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Adrian de Groot Ruiz ,
Theo Offerman  and
Sander Onderstal
Adrian de Groot Ruiz*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Institute for Management Research, Radboud University Nijmegen, P.O. Box 9108, 6500 HK Nijmegen, The Netherlands
Theo Offerman*
Affiliation:
Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 11, 1018 WB Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Sander Onderstal*
Affiliation:
Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 11, 1018 WB Amsterdam, The Netherlands
*
a.grootruiz@fm.ru.nl
T.J.S.Offerman@uva.nl
onderstal@uva.nl
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

We test the Average Credible Deviation Criterion (ACDC), a stability measure and refinement for cheap talk equilibria introduced in De Groot Ruiz et al. (Equilibrium selection in cheap talk games: ACDC rocks when other criteria remain silent, Working paper, University of Amsterdam 2012a). ACDC has been shown to be predictive under general conditions and to organize data well in previous experiments meant to test other concepts. In a new experimental setting, we provide the first systematic test of whether and to which degree credible deviations matter for the stability of cheap talk equilibria. Our principal experimental result is that in a setting where existing concepts are silent, credible deviations matter and matter gradually, as predicted by ACDC.

Keywords

Cheap talkRefinementSelectionExperimentNeologism proofnessAnnouncement proofnessACDC

JEL classification

C92: Laboratory, Group Behavior D83: Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief • Unawareness C72: Noncooperative Games D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 17 , Issue 2 , June 2014 , pp. 173 - 199
Copyright
Copyright © 2013 Economic Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

Electronic Supplementary Material The online version of this article (doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-013-9362-z) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

References

Agranov, M., & Schotter, A. (2011). Language and leadership: an experimental study of ambiguity and vagueness in the announcement game. Working paper, New York University.Google Scholar
Agranov, M., & Schotter, A. (2012). Ignorance is bliss: an experimental study of the use of ambiguity and vagueness in the coordination games with asymmetric payoffs. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 4, 77–103.Google Scholar
Blume, A., & Sobel, J. (1995). Communication-proof equilibria in cheap-talk games. Journal of Economic Theory, 65, 359–382. 10.1006/jeth.1995.1013CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blume, A., Kim, Y.-G., & Sobel, J. (1993). Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication. Games and Economic Behavior, 5, 547–575. 10.1006/game.1993.1031CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blume, A., DeJong, D. V., Kim, Y.-G., & Sprinkle, G. B. (1998). Experimental evidence on the evolution of meaning of messages in sender-receiver games. The American Economic Review, 88, 1323–1340.Google Scholar
Blume, A., DeJong, D. V., Kim, Y.-G., & Sprinkle, G. B. (2001). Evolution of communication with partial common interest. Games and Economic Behavior, 37, 79–120. 10.1006/game.2000.0830CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cai, H., & Wang, J. T. (2006). Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games. Games and Economic Behavior, 56, 7–36. 10.1016/j.geb.2005.04.001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cason, T. N. (1995). Cheap talk price signaling in laboratory markets. Information Economics and Policy, 7, 183–204. 10.1016/0167-6245(94)00041-4CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Charness, G. (2000). Self-serving cheap talk: a test of Aumann’s conjecture. Games and Economic Behavior, 33, 177–194. 10.1006/game.1999.0776CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Charness, G., & Dufwenberg, M. (2006). Promises and partnership. Econometrica, 74, 1579–1601. 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00719.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chen, Y., Kartik, N., & Sobel, J. (2008). Selecting cheap talk equilibria. Econometrica, 76, 117–136. 10.1111/j.0012-9682.2008.00819.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Coles, P., Kushnir, A., & Niederle, M. (2013). Preference signaling in matching markets. Am. Econ. J. Microecon., 5, 99–134. 10.1257/mic.5.2.99CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Crawford, V. (1998). A survey of experiments on communication via cheap talk. Journal of Economic Theory, 78, 286–298. 10.1006/jeth.1997.2359CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Crawford, V., & Sobel, J. (1982). Strategic information transmission. Econometrica, 50, 1431–1451. 10.2307/1913390CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Croson, R., Boles, T., & Murnighan, J. K. (2003). Cheap talk in bargaining experiments: lying and threats in ultimatum games. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 51, 141–159. 10.1016/S0167-2681(02)00092-6CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Daniel, T. E., Seale, D. A., & Rapoport, A. (1998). Strategic play and adaptive learning in the sealed-bid bargaining mechanism. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 42, 133–166. 10.1006/jmps.1998.1220CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Davis, D. D., & Holt, C. A. (1988). Conspiracies and secret discounts in laboratory markets. The Economic Journal, 108, 736–756. 10.1111/1468-0297.00312CrossRefGoogle Scholar
De Groot Ruiz, A. W., Offerman, T., & Onderstal, S. (2012a). Equilibrium selection in cheap talk games: ACDC rocks when other criteria remain silent. Working paper, University of Amsterdam.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
De Groot Ruiz, A. W., Offerman, T., & Onderstal, S. (2012b). Power and the privilege of clarity: an analysis of bargaining power and information transmission. Working paper, University of Amsterdam.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
DellaVigna, S., & Gentzkow, M. (2010). Persuasion: empirical evidence. Annual Review of Economics, 2, 643–669. 10.1146/annurev.economics.102308.124309CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dickhaut, J. W., McCabe, K. A., & Mukherji, A. (1995). An experimental study of strategic information transmission. Economic Theory, 6, 389–403. 10.1007/BF01211783CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ellingsen, T., & Johannesson, M. (2004). Promises, threats and fairness. The Economic Journal, 114, 397–420. 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2004.00214.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Farrell, J. (1993). Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games. Games and Economic Behavior, 5, 514–531. 10.1006/game.1993.1029CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Farrell, J., & Gibbons, R. (1989). Cheap talk can matter in bargaining. Journal of Economic Theory, 48, 221–237. 10.1016/0022-0531(89)90125-7CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fischbacher, U. (2007). Z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Experimental Economics, 10, 171–178. 10.1007/s10683-006-9159-4CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Forsythe, R., Kennan, J., & Sopher, B. (1991). An experimental analysis of strikes in bargaining games with one-sided private information. The American Economic Review, 81, 253–278.Google Scholar
Gilligan, T. W., & Krehbiel, K. (1990). Organization of informative committees by a rational legislature. American Journal of Political Science, 34, 531–564. 10.2307/2111460CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gneezy, U. (2005). Deception: the role of consequences. The American Economic Review, 95, 384–394. 10.1257/0002828053828662CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kartik, N., Ottaviani, M., & Squintani, F. (2007). Credulity, lies and costly talk. Journal of Economic Theory, 134, 93–116. 10.1016/j.jet.2006.04.003CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kohlberg, E., & Mertens, J.-F. (1986). On the strategic stability of equilibria. Econometrica, 54, 1003–1037. 10.2307/1912320CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lundquist, T., Ellingsen, T., Gribbe, E., & Johannesson, M. (2009). The aversion to lying. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 70, 81–92. 10.1016/j.jebo.2009.02.010CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Matthews, S. A. (1989). Veto threats: rhetoric in a bargaining game. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104, 347–369. 10.2307/2937851CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Matthews, S. A., & Postlewaite, A. (1989). Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions. Journal of Economic Theory, 48, 238–263. 10.1016/0022-0531(89)90126-9CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Matthews, S. A., Okuno-Fujiwara, M., & Postlewaite, A. (1991). Refining cheap-talk equilibria. Journal of Economic Theory, 55, 247–273. 10.1016/0022-0531(91)90040-BCrossRefGoogle Scholar
McKelvey, R. D., & Palfrey, T. R. (1995). Quantal response equilibrium for normal form games. Games and Economic Behavior, 10, 6–38. 10.1006/game.1995.1023CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McKelvey, R. D., & Palfrey, T. R. (1998). Quantal response equilibrium for extensive form games. Experimental Economics, 1, 9–41.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Miller, R. M., & Plott, C. A. (1985). Product quality signaling in experimental markets. Econometrica, 53, 837–872. 10.2307/1912657CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Morgan, J., & Stocken, P. C. (2003). An analysis of stock recommendations. The Rand Journal of Economics, 34, 183–203. 10.2307/3087449CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Morris, S. (2001). Political correctness. Journal of Political Economy, 109, 231–265. 10.1086/319554CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Myerson, R. B. (1989). Credible negotiation statements and coherent plans. Journal of Economic Theory, 48, 264–303. 10.1016/0022-0531(89)90127-0CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Oosterbeek, H., Sloof, R., & Van der Kuilen, G. (2004). Cultural differences in ultimatum game experiments: evidence from a meta-analysis. Experimental Economics, 7, 171–188. 10.1023/B:EXEC.0000026978.14316.74CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rabin, M. (1990). Communication between rational agents. Journal of Economic Theory, 51, 144–170. 10.1016/0022-0531(90)90055-OCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rabin, M., & Sobel, J. (1996). Deviations, dynamics and equilibrium refinements. Journal of Economic Theory, 68, 1–25. 10.1006/jeth.1996.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Radner, R., & Schotter, A. (1989). The sealed bid mechanism: an experimental study. Journal of Economic Theory, 48, 179–220. 10.1016/0022-0531(89)90124-5CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rapoport, A., & Fuller, M. A. (1998). Coordination in Noncooperative Three-person Games under Different Information Structures. Group Decision and Negotiation, 7(4), 363–382. 10.1023/A:1008690222964CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rapoport, A., Erev, I., & Zwick, R. (1995). An experimental study of buyer-seller negotiation with one-sided incomplete information and time discounting. Management Science, 41, 377–394. 10.1287/mnsc.41.3.377CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sánchez-Pagés, S., & Vorsatz, M. (2007). An experimental study of truth-telling in a sender-receiver game. Games and Economic Behavior, 61, 86–112. 10.1016/j.geb.2006.10.014CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sánchez-Pages, S., & Vorsatz, M. (2009). Enjoy the silence: an experiment on truth-telling. Experimental Economics, 12, 220–241. 10.1007/s10683-008-9211-7CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schotter, A., Snyder, B., & Zheng, W. (2000). Bargaining through agents: an experimental study. Games and Economic Behavior, 30, 248–292. 10.1006/game.1999.0728CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Selten, R. (1975). Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games. International Journal of Game Theory, 4, 25–55. 10.1007/BF01766400CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Serra-Garcia, M., Van Damme, E., & Potters, J. (forthcoming). Lying about what you know or about what you do? Journal of the European Economic Association.Google Scholar
Valley, K. L., Moag, J., & Bazerman, M. H. (1998). A matter of trust: effects of communication on the efficiency and distribution of outcomes. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 34, 211–238. 10.1016/S0167-2681(97)00054-1CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wang, J. T., Spezio, M., & Camerer, C. F. (2010). Pinocchio’s pupil: using eyetracking and pupil dilation to understand truth telling and deception in sender-receiver games. The American Economic Review, 100, 984–1007. 10.1257/aer.100.3.984CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Supplementary material: File

de Groot Ruiz et al. supplementary material

de Groot Ruiz et. al. supplementary material
Download de Groot Ruiz et al. supplementary material(File)
File 531.5 KB