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Evidence on learning in coordination games

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

John B. Van Huyck*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Texas A&M University, 4228 TAMU, College Station, TX 77843, USA
Raymond C. Battalio*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Texas A&M University, 4228 TAMU, College Station, TX 77843, USA
Frederick W. Rankin
Affiliation:
Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO 80523-120, USA

Abstract

This paper reports an experiment designed to detect the influence of strategic uncertainty on behavior in order statistic coordination games, which arise when a player's best response is an order statistic of the cohort's action combination. Unlike previous experiments using order statistic coordination games, the new experiment holds the payoff function constant and only changes cohort size and order statistic.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 2007 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

R.C. Battalio deceased.

Related research available at http://erl.tamu.edu

Electronic Supplementary Material The online version of this article (http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-007-9175-z) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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Van Huyck et al. supplementary material
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