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Do control questions influence behavior in experiments?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Catherine Roux  and
Christian Thöni
Catherine Roux*
Affiliation:
FGN-HSG, University of St.Gallen, Varnbüelstrasse 19, 9000 St.Gallen, Switzerland
Christian Thöni*
Affiliation:
University of Lausanne, UNIL-Dorigny, 1015 Lausanne, Switzerland
*
catherine.roux@unisg.ch
christian.thoeni@unil.ch, URL: http://sites.google.com/site/christianthoeni
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Abstract

Outcomes and strategies shown in control questions prior to experimental play may provide subjects with anchors or induce experimenter demand effects. In a Cournot oligopoly experiment we explore whether control questions influence subjects’ choices in initial periods and over the course of a repeated game. We vary the framing of the control question to explore the cause of potential influences. We find no evidence for an influence of the control question on choices, neither in the first period nor later in the game.

Keywords

Control questionsExperimenter demand effectsAnchoringExperimental design

JEL classification

C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior B41: Economic Methodology C72: Noncooperative Games
Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 18 , Issue 2 , June 2015 , pp. 185 - 194
Copyright
Copyright © 2014 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-014-9395-y) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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