Hostname: page-component-7b9c58cd5d-9klzr Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-03-16T21:41:37.182Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Coordination and transfer

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

David J. Cooper  and
John Van Huyck
David J. Cooper*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, USA
John Van Huyck
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, USA
*
djcooper@fsu.edu
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

We study the ability of subjects to transfer principles between related coordination games. Subjects play a class of order statistic coordination games closely related to the well-known minimum (or weak-link) and median games (Van Huyck et al. in Am Econ Rev 80:234–248, 1990, Q J Econ 106(3):885–910, 1991). When subjects play a random sequence of games with differing order statistics, play is less sensitive to the order statistic than when a fixed order statistic is used throughout. This is consistent with the prediction of a simple learning model with transfer. If subjects play a series of similar stag hunt games, play converges to the payoff dominant equilibrium when a convention emerges, replicating the main result of Rankin et al. (Games Econ Behav 32:315–337, 2000). When these subjects subsequently play a random sequence of order statistic games, play is shifted towards the payoff dominant equilibrium relative to subjects without previous experience. The data is consistent with subjects absorbing a general principle, play of the payoff dominant equilibrium, and applying it in a new related setting.

Keywords

CoordinationTransferLearning

JEL classification

C90: General C92: Laboratory, Group Behavior C73: Stochastic and Dynamic Games • Evolutionary Games • Repeated Games
Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 21 , Issue 3: Special Issue in Honor of John Van Huyck , September 2018 , pp. 487 - 512
Copyright
Copyright © 2017 Economic Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-017-9521-8) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

References

Alfieri, L, Nokes-Malach, TJ, & Schunn, CD (2013). Learning through case comparisons: A meta-analytic review. Educational Psychologist, 48(2), 87–113. 10.1080/00461520.2013.775712CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bednar, J, Chen, Y, Liu, TX, & Page, S (2012). Behavioral spillovers and cognitive load in multiple games: An experimental study. Games and Economic Behavior, 74(1), 12–31. 10.1016/j.geb.2011.06.009CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brandts, J, & Cooper, DJ (2006). A change would do you good: An experimental study of how to overcome coordination failure in organzations. American Economic Review, 96(3), 669–693. 10.1257/aer.96.3.669CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Camerer, C (2003). Behavioral game theory: Experiments in strategic interaction, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Cameron, C, Gelbach, J, & Miller, D (2008). Bootstrap-based Improvements for Inference with Clustered Errors. Review of Economics and Statistics, 90(3), 414–427. 10.1162/rest.90.3.414CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cason, TN, & Gangadharan, L (2013). Cooperation spillovers and price competition in experimental markets. Economic Inquiry, 51(3), 1715–1730. 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2012.00486.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cason, TN, Savikhin, AC, & Sheremeta, RM (2012). Behavioral spillovers in coordination games. European Economic Review, 56, 233–245. 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2011.09.001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cooper, DJ, & Kagel, JH (2005). are two heads better than one? Team versus individual play in signaling games. American Economic Review, 95(3), 477–509. 10.1257/0002828054201431CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cooper, DJ, & Kagel, JH (2008). Learning and transfer in signaling games. Economic Theory, 34(3), 415–439. 10.1007/s00199-006-0192-5CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cooper, DJ, & Kagel, JH (2009). The role of context and team play in cross-game learning. Journal of the European Economic Association, 7(5), 1101–1139. 10.1162/JEEA.2009.7.5.1101CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Devetag, G (2005). Precedent transfer in coordination games: An experiment. Economics Letters, 89, 227–232. 10.1016/j.econlet.2005.05.038CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Duffy, J., & Fehr, D. (2015). Equilibrium selection in similar repeated games: Experimental evidence on the role of Precedents. Working paper, University of California, Irvine.Google Scholar
Erev, I. Haruvy, E. (2016). Learning and the economics of small decisions. In Kagel, J. & Roth, A. (Eds.), The handbook of experimental economics (Vol. 2). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Fischbacher, U (2007). z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Experimental Economics, 10, 171–178. 10.1007/s10683-006-9159-4CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fudenberg, D, & Levine, DK (2009). Learning and equilibrium. Annual Review of Economics, 1, 385–420. 10.1146/annurev.economics.050708.142930CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gick, ML, & Holyoak, KJ (1983). Schema induction and analogical transfer. Cognitive Psychology, 15(1), 1–38. 10.1016/0010-0285(83)90002-6CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Greiner, B (2015). Subject pool recruitment procedures: Organizing experiments with ORSEE. Journal of the Economic Science Association, 1(1), 114–125. 10.1007/s40881-015-0004-4CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grimm, V, & Mengel, F (2012). An experiment on learning in a multiple game environment. Journal of Economic Theory, 147(6), 2220–2259. 10.1016/j.jet.2012.05.011CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Haruvy, E, & Stahl, DO (2012). Between-game rule learning in dissimilar symmetric normal-form games. Games and Economic Behavior, 74, 208–221. 10.1016/j.geb.2011.06.001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ho, T-H, Camerer, C, & Weigelt, K (1998). Iterated dominance and iterated best response in experimental “p-Beauty Contests”. American Economic Review, 88(4), 947–969.Google Scholar
Jehiel, P (2005). Analogy-based expectation equilibrium. Journal of Economic Theory, 123, 81–104. 10.1016/j.jet.2003.12.003CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kreps, DM (1990). Game theory and economic modelling, Oxford: Clarendon Press 10.1093/0198283814.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nash, J (1950). Equilibrium points in n-Person games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States, 36(1), 48–49. 10.1073/pnas.36.1.48CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Ochs, J Kagel, J, & Roth, A (1995). Coordination problems. The handbook of experimental economics, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Peysakhovich, A, & Rand, D (2016). Creating norms of cooperation and defection in the laboratory. Management Science, 62(3), 631–647. 10.1287/mnsc.2015.2168CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rankin, FW, Van Huyck, JB, & Battalio, R (2000). Strategic similarity and emergent conventions: Evidence from similar stag hunt games. Games and Economic Behavior, 32, 315–337. 10.1006/game.1999.0711CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rick, S, & Weber, RA (2012). Meaningful learning and transfer of learning in games played repeatedly without feedback. Games and Economic Behavior, 68(2), 716–730. 10.1016/j.geb.2009.10.004CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Roth, AE, & Erev, I (1995). Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term. Games and Economic Behavior, 8, 164–212. 10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80020-XCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Savikhin, AC, & Sheremeta, RM (2013). Simultaneous decision-making in competitive and cooperative environments. Economic Inquiry, 51(2), 1311–1323. 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2012.00474.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Van Huyck, J, John, B, Battalio, R, & Beil, R (1990). Tacit coordination games, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure. American Economic Review, 80, 234–248.Google Scholar
Van Huyck, J, John, B, Battalio, R, & Beil, R (1991). Strategic uncertainty, equilibrium selection, and coordination failure in average opinion games. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(3), 885–910. 10.2307/2937932CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Weber, R (2006). Managing growth to achieve efficient coordination in large groups. American Economic Review, 96(1), 114–126. 10.1257/000282806776157588CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Supplementary material: File

Cooper and Van Huyck supplementary material

Online Appendix
Download Cooper and Van Huyck supplementary material(File)
File 110.6 KB