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Bounding preference parameters under different assumptions about beliefs: a partial identification approach

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Charles Bellemare ,
Luc Bissonnette  and
Sabine Kröger
Charles Bellemare*
Affiliation:
Département d’économique, Université Laval, Québec, Canada
Luc Bissonnette*
Affiliation:
Department of Econometrics and OR, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Sabine Kröger*
Affiliation:
Département d’économique, Université Laval, Québec, Canada
*
e-mail: cbellemare@ecn.ulaval.ca
e-mail: l.bissonnette@uvt.nl
e-mail: skroger@ecn.ulaval.ca
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Abstract

We show how bounds around preferences parameters can be estimated under various levels of assumptions concerning the beliefs of senders in the investment game. We contrast these bounds with point estimates of the preference parameters obtained using non-incentivized subjective belief data. Our point estimates suggest that expected responses and social preferences both play a significant role in determining investment in the game. Moreover, these point estimates fall within our most reasonable bounds. This suggests that credible inferences can be obtained using non-incentivized beliefs.

Keywords

Partial identificationPreferencesBeliefsDecision making under uncertaintyInvestment game

JEL classification

C81: Methodology for Collecting, Estimating, and Organizing Microeconomic Data • Data Access
Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 13 , Issue 3 , September 2010 , pp. 334 - 345
Copyright
Copyright © Economic Science Association 2010

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Footnotes

Part of this paper first appeared in Bellemare et al. (2007). An OX code with files implementing all the procedures discussed in this paper can be downloaded at http://www.ecn.ulaval.ca/charles.bellemare/. We thank Jim Cox and the Economic Science Laboratory in Tucson, Arizona, for financial and technical support, Urs Fischbacher for his support in programming the experiment, Wafa Hakim for her research assistance in conducting the experiment, and two reviewers for comments.

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