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40 years of tax evasion games: a meta-analysis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

James Alm  and
Antoine Malézieux Open the ORCID record for Antoine Malézieux [Opens in a new window]
James Alm*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Tulane University, 208 Tilton Hall, New Orleans, LA 70118, USA
Antoine Malézieux*
Affiliation:
CEREN, EA 7477, Burgundy School of Business, Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté, 29 Rue Sambin, 21000 Dijon, France
*
jalm@tulane.edu
antoine.malezieux@bsb-education.com
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Abstract

We collect individual participant data from 70 papers that use laboratory experiments to examine individual tax evasion behavior (or “Tax Evasion Games”), in order to use meta-analysis to estimate the impacts of different public policy, experimental design and individual level variables on tax evasion choices. Our results show that standard enforcement variables like audits (including audit rules) and fines perform differently on the extensive and intensive margins. We find that other fiscal variables like a flat tax system, tax rates, and tax amnesties have unambiguous negative impacts on tax compliance, and that specific features of the experimental setting, such as how subjects are directed to report income, or whether taxes are redistributed to the participants or to a real life public good, have significant impacts on tax compliance. Our results also indicate that the demographic characteristics of the subjects (e.g., gender, experimental income, occupation, risk attitude) affect compliance.

Keywords

Tax evasionTax complianceMeta-analysis

JEL classification

C9: Design of Experiments H3: Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 24 , Issue 3 , September 2021 , pp. 699 - 750
Copyright
Copyright © 2020 Economic Science Association

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