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Taxes and bribes: assessing the extraction burden in orderly and disorderly societies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 July 2003

DANIEL TARSCHYS
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, University of Stockholm, S-10691 Stockholm, Sweden. E-mail: daniel.tarschys@statsvet.su.se
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Abstract

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Countries with a low GDP per capita generally have a much lower fiscal quota than OECD countries, but many other factors push up the transaction costs in poor economies. High-tax societies provide more security, predictability and organizational discipline. The absence of such conditions is a powerful breeding-ground for corruption. If fiscal payments and bribes are added up to arrive at a composite measure of the ‘extraction burden’ in different countries, we might find that the costs of doing business do not diverge so much in various parts of the world.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© Academia Europaea 2003