The Background of the Dispute

Before addressing the matter of the conditions and possible merits of political arbitration in the Cyprus dispute, it is perhaps reasonable to summarize and asses the facts of the fate of the island even though they may be well known.

Some 2000 years ago, an undoubtedly Greek-speaking Cyprus came under the rule of the Roman Empire, and then, after the latter split into two, the predominantly Greek-speaking Eastern Roman Empire. After the fall of Byzantium, Cyprus, like many other Greek-language areas, was conquered by the Crusaders, then the Venetians, and, finally, although only as late as 1570, the Ottomans, who remained in control for over 300 years. In the course of these centuries, Muslim Turks settled in the island, making up about 1/5 of its half-million population. Then it was occupied by Great Britain as a result of the Berlin Congress in 1878, and it became a British colony after the First World War. During the Great War, it was seriously considered that Greece would acquire it as a reward for taking part in the war effort, but Greece hesitated, and, when it was finally dragged into the War, Britain made no such commitment. During the Second World War, Greek Cypriots increasingly came under the sway of the movement to attain unification for the whole island with Greece, Enosis. However, the Turkish Cypriot minority and Turkey taking up its cause challenged the Greek intent with growing fervour, demanding, at least, the incorporation of the Turkish areas of the island into Turkey. What territories this demand actually meant, Turkish politics found it difficult to establish on account of the scattered Turkish minority in the island; at first, it claimed the entire island, then almost half, the area above latitude 37°, and, finally, it settled to demanding 1/5 in proportion to Turkish islanders, with population exchanges to finalize the separation.

In this situation, Britain initially focused on its sovereignty and military bases, and thus failed to make use of its position as arbiter and facilitate a final settlement. By the time it became clear that old-style colonial sovereignty was no longer tenable, decision making slipped out of British hands with respect both to the unruly islanders and the two countries laying claim to the island. As a backlash, terrorism, retaliation, and guerrilla fighting ensued, and both Greece and Turkey intervened by sending voluntaries. Worn out, the parties ultimately reached an agreement and concluded the Treaties of Zurich and London in 1959. As a result, Cyprus became an independent state jointly guaranteed by Britain, Greece and Turkey; its government was to be formed by the two nationalities at par, and to institutionalize their presence, Greece would deploy 950, Turkey 650 troops, and Britain retain its bases. Enacted under these treaties, the 1960 constitution prescribed a Greek president and a Turkish vice-president and separate elections for both national communities at every level; it also established the proportion of representatives, ministers and civil servants for both groups, although more or less favouring the Turkish. Turkish Cypriots were given the guarantee against the Greek majority that no constitutional or fundamental change was to be passed without the consensus of both national communities. So created, Cyprus became a member of the British Commonwealth and the United Nations, although not of NATO.

The Recent Crises of the Independent Cypriot State

Although intended as a settlement, the foundation of the Cypriot state sparked the current (1970s) dispute, and indeed the history of that state is made up of conflicts, crises and dead ends. The authors of the Cypriot state presented it to the world as a reasonable compromise meeting all just demands; however, all parties had gone into it with quite different, even contradictory expectations; the Greeks regarded it as a step towards Greek rule over the entire island and as a guarantee against the Turkish threat of carving it up; the Turks deemed it an assurance against Greek majority domination; and finally Britain thought it had gained a long-term respite from having to surrender its bases. Thus, indeed from the outset, the construction was bound not to work. Greek Cypriots would not give up beating the Turks down to simple minority status, objecting to their disproportionate representation and rights of veto, and, whenever the latter exercised these rights, they charged them with filibustering, and obstructing the government. Knowing Turkey was behind them, Turkish Cypriots made every use of their rights, charged the Greeks with majoritarianism and even designs to exterminate them. Mutual mistrust soon flared up and led to regular civil war, with voluntaries coming from both neighbouring countries, particularly Greece. Greek Cypriots declared the 1960 constitution void, and set up a purely Greek government after the Turkish members had stepped down. Thus, Turkish Cypriots withdrew to a closed territory which they govern alone, in the interest of which they extorted some population exchanges – their largest area now extending from the Turkish part of the divided capital, Nicosia, to the northern coast around the city of Kyrenia.

So turned purely Greek, the Cypriot government acted as the successor of the two-nation one set up under the Treaties of Zurich and London, which, after some hesitation, the United Nations accepted by virtue of an unchanged president, who embodied the Greek national community of Cyprus. With a Greco-Turkish war threatening to break out, the Greek Cypriot government, enabled by its state authority and UN membership, declined intervention by Britain and the British Commonwealth and requested UN peacekeeping forces. UN troops have sought to intercept clashes between opposing forces, and have more or less managed to pacify the island, cementing the state of affairs.

This is how the current, highly complicated and precarious situation of Cyprus came about. It is thus an independent state, a member of the British Commonwealth and the UN; its government is no longer based on the two-nation consensus prescribed at its foundation; held by the Greek national community, it cannot exercise its power over the closed Turkish areas. Apart from the UN peacekeeping forces, there are British bases, as well as Greek and Turkish troops – in other words, troops from three NATO member states, while Cyprus follows an expressly non-aligned, even Afro-Asian policy, which has the backing of the Warsaw Pact and Arab countries.

Unusual for an otherwise non-leftist government, its associating with non-NATO forces stems primarily from the disagreement that broke out in the outset between the Cypriot Greek leadership and the governments of Greece over what direction the island should take to fulfil Greek national aims. Both sides agreed that their final aim was unification. Having to face the ‘inimical’ neighbour directly, Cypriot Greeks have doggedly insisted on majority rule over the entire, un-divided island, and maintaining it when incorporation in Greece follows. Although desiring the same in principle, the governments of Greece have put more emphasis on rapid territorial gain; and, backed by Atlantic powers who want to see the whole island in their sphere of power, they have held several rounds of negotiations with Turkey, with territorial swaps reportedly arising. On account of the expected public row in both national communities, these negotiations have never led anywhere, both parties having made proposals the other would necessarily rebuff. Nevertheless, Greek Cypriots, quite paradoxically due to their rather irate nationalism, regard the temporary independence of their island as a better solution than an irreparable deal to divide it struck behind their backs; hence they have pursued a foreign policy independent of NATO, and which sometimes seeks the support of the Warsaw and Arab blocks.

The disagreement between Greek Cypriots and Greece gained new momentum with the coup d’état in Greece in 1967, establishing a dictatorial government, which has made Enosis seem, in the eyes of Greek Cypriots, not only inexpedient in terms of national strategy, but also deterring for the time being; and thus they have come to reject it, though still temporarily, but for longer than formerly conceived. On the other hand, the new regime in Greece, urged on by being internationally condemned, increasingly wants to achieve a major national success in the matter of Cyprus. Due to these policy shifts, the crisis came to a new head at the end of 1967, bringing into play intentions to change the unstable situation by force, which, however, has turned out to be more difficult, indeed next to impossible, to achieve.

Through the troops it gradually deployed, the regime in Greece tried to engender a coup d’état in Cyprus, which would be close to the current government, yet follow a definitely pro-NATO and rapid Enosis policy. However, for this it would have needed an agreement at least with Turkey, which it failed to obtain. On the other hand, the increasing threat of Enosis prompted Turkey to consider military action or occupation – obviously in the part controlled by the Turkish minority to expand it to at least 1/5 of the island, alongside forcing the exchanges of population. Many Turks believed it was the time to act, an opportunity never to be recaptured to deliver a fait accompli. Finally, prospective international repercussions, the staunch opposition by Greek Cypriots and their government, the likewise international consequences and the doubtful outcome of a Turkish-Greek armed conflict discouraged either party from intervening. Thus, Greece agreed to reduce the troops it had hitherto significantly increased to the level laid down in the Zurich and London agreements; this in turn did away with the pretext for a Turkish intervention, reduced the international pressure on the Greek Cypriot government, and restored the former, temporary and precarious balance.

This brought up a third, peaceful way of achieving change, one that would perhaps try and fend off the ones mentioned – a compromise between Greek and Turkish Cypriots themselves. For the time being, this seems to be the most desirable solution for all parties concerned except for the isolated regime in Greece. However, such a compromise could hardly contain any more than the Treaties of Zurich and London, a restoration of the two-nation government, the gravest difficulty of which had been the Greek Cypriots’ sharp rejection of the Turkish requirement of parity. Such a compromise would thus have to result in an insignificant amendment of the 1960 constitution, e.g. establishing genuinely proportionate numbers of ministerial posts and representatives, which would save face for the Greeks insofar as it reduced Turkish demands to justifiable levels, and would uphold the guarantees against majoritarianism for Turkish Cypriots. However, such a deal has failed to be struck yet. Should it be agreed, it is unlikely to bring fundamental changes. Due to the weariness of the parties, it might prove workable for a while, but it could just as well founder at the very points the 1960 constitution had. The situation thus remains as unstable as ever, whether such a compromise is reached or the current state of affairs is maintained. Any minute sign, any shift in the balance of forces or any personal change in international, Greek, Turkish or Cypriot politics may spark a crisis. And so one occurred in 1972 – under the same conditions and with the same alternatives arising.

Artificiality and External Factors

That the Cypriot conflict is artificial is broached more often than usual, and not only as a punch line in the tabloid press, but as an assessment founded on unbiased analysis. The most widespread version of the thesis is that the conflict between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots was kindled by Britain to be able to retain colonial rule and its military bases for as long as possible, and continues to be so by NATO so that no compromise between the two peoples would enable the proper functioning of an independent Cypriot state pursuing a non-aligned policy. Essentially going along with the artificiality argument, British critics have censured the policy of supporting the Turkish minority movement against Enosis because, had Britain allowed the island to unite with Greece at the end of the First World War or, at least, the Second World War, Turkey, as an enemy after WWI or as a neutral state viewed with suspicion after WWII, would have acquiesced, and the whole situation would have consolidated itself by now.

This is not the occasion to dwell on the various meanings of the adjective ‘artificial’ and the condemnatory emphasis it might carry in assessments or explanations of historical events, yet it often seems to refer to historical Evil. In the given context, the label undoubtedly implies that the Cypriot conflict and the warlike nationalism it manifests are accidental and not necessary outcomes, only the results of express intent, small-minded self-interest, and malevolence. We have no reason to regard these history-shaping factors, accidence, arbitrary intent and harmful self-interest, as insignificant. It would indubitably be easy to find evidence to support this thesis; we can take it for granted even without seeing that, as the Enosis movement gained ground, British statesmen at home and in Cyprus, whose duty it was to uphold British sovereignty, immediately struck on the self-evident counter-move of acting against Enosis not in the name of foul-tasting colonial rule, but in that of the Turkish counter-claim of self-determination, and surely believed this was cunning realpolitik.

The thesis that it would have been more advantageous for Britain if it had consolidated the situation by opening the way to Enosis and not playing off the Turkish minority against it remains a supposition. Facts do not support it, though, by virtue of analysis and analogy, it could be argued that Turkish Cypriots would have acquiesced, and even if they had laid national claims, they would have been resigned to seek redress for their just claims in the provisions on mutual minority protection of the Treaty of Lausanne. Needless to say, it could equally be argued that the circumstances of the Turkish minority would have worsened if Cyprus had been incorporated in Greece, and would have affected even the internal development and international standing of both Greece and Turkey, and, by way of other sets of causes, resulted in bloodshed, as it has in our day.

The decisive question is not whether the suppositions and facts brought up in support of the ‘artificiality’ of the Cypriot conflict are authentic, convincing or possible, but whether fomentation of the conflict, apart from being one in the set of its causes, has been powerful enough to be a crucial cause, to persistently and evidently channel events, and to give the decisive thrust at critical moments; put more generally, whether the argument that the policy of instigation brought about the conflict from, as it were, nothing holds or not, which also implies that should this policy be given up, the problem could be discharged back into nothingness.

Attributing a key role to external power policy seems all the more doubtful because the activities it regards as so decisive were in fact proven failures, had no control over the unfolding of events and actually led to what they were meant to have averted: first, British rule over the island ended; then Britain managed to manoeuvre itself or be manoeuvred out of the position of arbiter, and, in its stead, the Cypriot state gave the UN and thus the Soviets the opportunity of interfering. What gratification can the Atlantic Alliance extract from fomenting trouble when it has thereby managed only to turn a situation, in which a newly established island state is under the guarantee, indeed protectorate of three of its members, two neighbouring countries and a colonial power formerly in control of the area now disputed, into one where it cannot goad Greece and Turkey into reaching an agreement it would deem desirable? What can it gain from having to helplessly gaze at the national conflicts it fuelled which now prompt Cyprus to follow a non-aligned policy and turn the island into, if not a base, a partner of the Soviet Block and the Arab countries, which have made no major political effort for such an achievement? Furthermore, NATO has no use of the collapse of the Greek-Turkish agreement, which has crippled the Cypriot state, because the international community has, after all, recognized the solely Greek Cypriot administration as the legal successor of the two-nation Cypriot government, which now pursues an independent foreign policy. Moreover, on the other side, there are no success-sure levers at work in the Cyprus policy of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Alliance either, which, to wreck NATO objectives, would support a compromise between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, but block an agreement between Greece and Turkey, or in other words, ‘foment’ their conflict. Such a policy, the aim of which would be to establish an independent Cypriot state based on the self-determination of the people of Cyprus, the removal of military bases and occupying forces and on non-alignment, is likely to founder, even if all other obstacles were to be eliminated, partly on the unwillingness of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots to behave themselves as a ‘single’ people, partly on a possible deal between Greece and Turkey, which has failed to come off as yet for reasons other than Soviet demur. Nor is Soviet policy protected against being drawn into an international conflict due to Cyprus, in circumstances or at a moment it regards undesirable.

Can then fomentation or the like power-policy activities explain conflicts when they can so easily cut themselves free of them, and run counter to the designs of those who are said to have artificially created them to their own ends? For all the role of external power politics in creating it, the Cyprus conflict, by all signs, has a much stronger inner dynamic than any external force that might have been brought to bear on it. Had the island had a single-nation population or had its two peoples been separated by clear boundaries, no foreign power politics could have stopped it from uniting in full or part with the neighbouring country of its nationality or nationalities, and no external policy could have established it as an independent nation. It is quite clear from the situation that the ill- or well-conceived, harmful or useful self-interests of the powers concerned can only be brought into play through the likewise ill- or well-conceived Greek and Turkish national interests. Now, these, however much they may be under the influences of external power policy from time to time, depend far more than anything else on their mainland and island national publics and their concepts of national interest on decisive issues and at crucial moments. It is quite obvious from the foregoing that the inability of Greek and Turkish Cypriots and of Greece and Turkey to reach an agreement, with diametrically opposed external power policies behind them, the former being spurred by NATO and quelled by Warsaw, the latter vice versa, can actually be explained not by contrary, but by identical reasons: national conflict with a dynamic greater and more constant than external power policy. In what follows, we will attempt to find the components of this.

The Cyprus Dispute as Part of Greek-Turkish National Demarcation

A review of the history of Cyprus clearly shows that its historical problem and fate differ from those of the rest of the originally Greek-language areas that fell under Ottoman rule and underwent Turkish settlement only in respect of the interlude of the five-decade British occupation and its consequences. For over half a millennium, Turkish–Greek coexistence in the Ottoman Empire, where the Greeks had the role of the vanquished, seemed inevitable and final in the eyes of Greeks, all the more so because the Ottoman Empire inherited almost the exact territory of the Byzantine Empire, and the Greeks themselves were even afforded not insignificant roles in its administration. With the rise of modern national mass movements, it turned out that this forced coexistence could not be turned into voluntary political coexistence, and thus the two nations separated both in terms of state and territory. The separation however ran into difficulties, partly because of the long-lasting Ottoman predominance, and partly because of the complexities of establishing ethnic territorial borders. Although language and religion clearly marked off the two nations, their settlements were both scattered and mixed due to the near territorial identity of the two empires. The process of separation took a long time, and was often bloody and painful, beginning with the Greek freedom fight of the 1820s and ending with the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, which closed most of the pending issues. In this, Greeks, being the losers in the previous war against the Turks, had to concede a population exchange of 1.2 million Greeks (mostly from Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace) for 400,000 Turks, which effectually sanctioned the unilateral expulsion of the Greeks. In spite of the inequalities of the population exchange, the Greek–Turkish conflicts quickly abated, the Greeks accepting, by all signs, the territorial and ethnic conditions established by the Treaty of Lausanne. As part of the Greek–Turkish demarcation, Greece obtained the purely Greek-inhabited Rhodes and Dodecanese, which had been captured by Italy from Turkey, without objection after the Second World War.

As a result of the process of separation, the Greek and the Turkish nations, each bound together by its own respective religion, language, more or less shared historical fate, shared political and cultural traditions, and relative territorial closeness, became sharply distinguished national entities in the European sense, in marked contrast to the nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America with their still blurry and unstable state frameworks.

Seen in this light, the Cyprus dispute belongs to and is the last pending issue of the Greek–Turkish territorial separation. It was only the interlude of British rule that prevented the issue from surfacing in the century-old Greek–Turkish contest; without the British, the question would most likely have been solved by the Treaty of Lausanne at the latest. The historical process of Greek–Turkish separation is the backdrop of the positions taken on Cyprus; the parties involved see the case not only with a view to the island, but also as part of a larger spatial and temporal complex: the Greeks see it from the point of view of a New Greek State annexing all Greek areas, while the Turks from the point of view of the New Turkish State are forced to forgo all alien areas, yet attempting to retain as much of them as possible, particularly all Turkish populations. Thus, both parties have started out from territorial borders or entities where they can regard themselves as the majority meant to decide and the other as the minority meant to acquiesce. This is reflected in the characteristic argumentation of the islanders: Greek Cypriots are perfectly aware that they have lived on the island for over 3000 years and are now the undoubted and indigenous majority; and Turkish Cypriots are perfectly aware that they have never lived under Greek rule, that they never came to the island seeking permission to stay there in exchange for their allegiance to the majority, but they arrived there in their own ‘Turkish’ state, where as a whole the Greeks were a minority.

The Venomous Effects of the Old Turkish Conquest

That the Turks were the vanquishers and the Greeks the subdued had venomous consequences. If a ruling group is ethnically different from the subdued majority, its fate is sealed under the conditions of modern mass society: it is either absorbed in the majority or it accepts is minority status; if, however, it does not acquiesce in either, it either emigrates or engages in a hopeless and devastating struggle. More complicated is when the ruling ethnic group is made up of not only ‘masters’, but also ‘people’, i.e. it can have recourse to a territorial and ethnic ‘replacement’ or ‘rear guard’ even though a minority, as Turkish Cypriots were. This is the type of situation that unleashes the most venomous and least resolvable ethnic and territorial conflicts, where final demarcation is, at best, tortuous. The first and foremost reason for this is that the ruling ethnic group finds it insufferably difficult to give in to the demand of self-determination by the majority unavoidable and unquestionable in a modern mass society. By the time it is forced for one reason or another to concede, the formerly subdued majority begins to regard its self-determination and majority status as ‘rule’, rejects any proportionate territorial demarcation, and uses its majority to overwhelm and oppress. This arouses a fear of annihilation in the former ruling group, which no objective precondition, historical precedent or emotional base will compel it to pledge allegiance to the new state, which the majority wants to mash it into, because it has a living and active allegiance towards its own ethnic group and its body politic. It therefore sees no meaning in usual minority rights, and the least it demands from political coexistence is a guarantee against majoritarianism, some sort of parity. For the majority, the very existence of the minority recalls memories of oppression; and it sees simple citizens’ equality, more so special minority rights, not to mention disproportionate or parity claims, as attempts to re-establish the former predominance.

This type of ethnic and territorial dispute seldom finds a smooth conclusion. In the case of Southern and Northern Ireland and that of India and Pakistan, bloody struggles preceded the partitioning of territories that had previously been believed to be indivisible, and left behind long-seething territorial disputes. In the dispute between Hungarians and Romanians over Transylvania, the formerly subdued Romanians now dominate the entire disputed area, while the ‘people’ of the former ruling minority, the 1.5 million Hungarians who remained there, have found themselves in the position of citizens with suspect loyalties, which has had its sometimes severe, sometimes abating, but always grievous consequences. In the case of Bohemia and Algeria, bloody struggles and takeovers were followed by the expulsion of the ‘people’ of the former ruling minority. From among the other similar cases, South Africa is best known, its minority still believing it can maintain its privileges and attempting to do so through the phantasmagorical, cruel and hopeless constructs of apartheid and Bantustans, which is an implicit acknowledgement of the fact that the old, ‘self-evident’ superiority can no longer be maintained of itself. Sooner or later, this ruling minority will face the rather awesome state of affairs, the demand for apartheid against it, and it will be happy if it receives its own share of apartheid in a territory proportionate to its numbers. There are very few examples when two separate ethnic groups, having gone through such history, develop a common state consciousness and peacefully coexist. Finland is one with its Finnish majority and Swedish minority, though even their cooperation has had its low points. Nevertheless, what made this possible were the relative gentleness of the last period of Swedish rule and a high-level political culture on both sides, but there was also a particular uniting factor: the shared century-long resistance to and fight against czarism.

The Cyprus dispute, being part of the process of Greek–Turkish separation, is likewise an antagonism burdened by the memory of conquest, and it has reopened the old wound of separation that had seemed to have healed. Greeks recall not only their oppression by the Turks, but also the expulsions of their compatriots from Asia Minor, while the Turks are driven by the fear of being ruled by those formerly subdued and even of being exterminated. Both sides have their major or lesser experiences in recent Cypriot history to undergird their mindsets.

It is thus these dark memories that burden and poison the last Greek–Turkish territorial dispute, the Cypriot one, and render it so unbalancable, acrimonious and unready for voluntary compromise. This is why no Greek government in Greece or Cyprus is capable of undertaking to relinquish, before its public, the sacred Greek land of Cyprus or its fifth demanded by the Turks, nor can any Turkish government deliver their kin into the hands of aliens, particularly those formerly subdued.

In contrast, however, it remains true that peaceable Greek and Turkish Cypriot peasants, craftsmen and intellectuals have no intention of combining to rule the other or to exchange populations; they want to plough the land of their fathers and pursue their professions in peace. This is true, and simple folk never burn with the desire for being ‘aroused’ or organized for any national, religious or social strife; yet, at critical moments, community action is always defined by a more self-asserting, warlike and active minority, formulating aims and organizing defence or attack. It should be added that Greek and Turkish Cypriots had lived in relative peace before the animosities began, not only because there had been no evil instigators to inflame them, but also because they had lived under a lasting and relatively stable, if nevertheless temporary arrangement. And, whenever the question of the final political belonging and status of the island surfaced, hostilities broke out between them.

The Cypriot State, Nation and People

It is in this light that we should address the questions of the existence of an independent Cypriot state and nation, as well as the programme of self-determination for the people of Cyprus.

The independent Cypriot state is of course a fact under international law, which is all the more interesting because Cyprus itself has been instrumental in raising the issue before an international forum; but, irrespective of this, having come into being, it can no longer be relegated into nothingness. We must nevertheless be aware of the fact that this state is not the result of a nation's intention to establish a state, but ‘a solution to a problem’ by people who momentarily deemed the separation of the nations irresolvable. It is nowadays fashionable to create states for ‘solving’ problems with no genuine national base or state-founding will; in other words, to piece together formal legitimacies without substantive legitimacy rooted in self-determination. States so made seldom have a developed and unified national or community public opinion that would provide a backbone to a conduct necessary for international existence, the political stance of rejecting interference in its internal affairs.

In our case, there is no doubt that the Cypriot nation has never existed in either the Wilsonian or the Leninian sense; Cypriot political unity was achieved by belonging to a broader state formation or foreign invasion. Shared historical fate never meant a shared historical experience, a shared state or national consciousness that could have bound together Greeks and Turks, in the way history forged a single nation out of the Germans, Frenchmen, Italians, and Rhaeto-Romans of Switzerland or the Finns and Swedes of Finland. Quite to the contrary, the experience of these two peoples paralleled all-Greek and all-Turkish historical experience; put otherwise, whatever brought victory and liberation for one, meant subjugation or downgrading to the other. The only historical experience that could have welded them together would have been a shared struggle against British colonization. However, Greek Cypriots saw the appearance of British power as liberation, and, by the time they had their fill of it, they embraced not the idea of an independent Cyprus, but that of incorporation in Greece, and started the Enosis movement, against which, in turn, Turkish Cypriots sought the support of the colonial power until they could rely on Turkey. It is therefore highly unlikely that a Cypriot nation or even a shared will to uphold a single state can unfold within the framework of the Cypriot state; and people are unlikely, now or in the future, to have an allegiance to the Cypriot state. Under such circumstances there is little plausible meaning in the otherwise correct thesis that disputes are to be settled on the basis of the self-determination of the ‘Cypriot people.’

By the same token, no separate ‘Greek Cypriot’ nation can be spoken of, or even a separate ‘Turkish Cypriot’ nation or micro-nation; in spite of being temporarily separated, neither group went through experiences that would cut them away from the all-Greek nation or the all-Turkish one. The differences between the governments of mainland Greece and Greek Cypriots are not the signs of national separation, but have to do with the actions concerning the immediate political future of the island. To date, no Greek Cypriot politician has had or will have the daring to publicly state that he has given up Enosis as a final aim or that it could be given up. Even if we supposed that an elite benefiting from Cypriot independence has come into being and might even not regret that the current style of government in Greece has made unification seem unwanted for the majority of Greek Cypriots, it could hardly summon considerable resistance in the face of a major move towards Enosis if the situation were to change in Greece, just as the personal ambitions of a Modena or a Württemberg minister could not stand in the way of Italian or German unification; in fact, this elite would be the first to protest that they had no such ambition.

All this must be considered if we want to be correct in assessing the possible positions the opposing sides might take on the issue of the existence of the Cypriot state. It follows from the above that whenever a Cypriot group takes a stand in favour of the Cypriot state or its independence, it is not driven by a national loyalty towards Cyprus, but by tactical considerations in the national struggle for Cyprus. The Cypriot state is valuable for the Turks insofar as it protects them against Greek majoritarianism; it is valuable for the Greeks insofar as it helps avert Turkish claims for parity, surrendering 1/5 of the island to them, or subjection to the current regime in Greece for the time being. All international, great-power or other external factors, which categorically stand for maintaining the Cypriot state or its independence, are now threatened by the possibility of being disowned by the very persons they believe to have thus taken sides with at the moment a change in conditions occurs.

Recognizing the non-existence of a Cypriot nation sheds new light on the relationship between the independent Cypriot state and foreign military bases and troops in the island. In terms of great-power conflict, the attempt to split Cyprus between Greece and Turkey seems to tie in with maintaining foreign bases on the island; emphasizing Cypriot independence is apparently linked with efforts to remove bases and troops. The actual and deeper relationship however is paradoxically and precisely the other way round. It is quite likely that Greece and Turkey, genuine nation states as they are, if they come into possession of the island in whole or part with international relations improving, are sooner or later going to request and even demand the removal of the bases and troops, as nation states are wont to regard the presence of foreign forces as an embarrassing burden. In contrast, however, there is almost a necessary link between the existence of the independent Cypriot state and the presence of foreign troops. It could hardly be imagined that the Greeks and Turks sustaining the state would simultaneously require the removal of foreign bases and troops; Greeks would do so only if they could wield their majority without them, in which case, however, the Turks would insist on the presence of foreign forces, and would only give in to their removal if they were sure that Turkey was ready to intervene and capable of doing so at once, which, in turn, would prompt Greek Cypriots to not let foreign troops go.

The Cypriot Deadlock

The contradiction between the existence of the Cypriot state and the non-existence of the Cypriot nation is only one of the factors bringing about the characteristic deadlock of the Cypriot situation. Even if Greeks and Turks were to reach a compromise, it will no doubt lead to an unstable state of balance. In other words, there is little leverage but only that between various dead-ends or the perpetuation of provisional arrangements, and there is no knowing whether peace can be best safeguarded by maintaining or undoing them. Although the causes of this stalemate are clear from the above, it is perhaps worth summing them up.

1. 1. External causes: geographical situation, settlement structure and political givens:

   • • The scatteredness of Turkish Cypriot settlements making clear political demarcation difficult;

   • • National power relations wherein Greeks form the majority in the island, but Turkey is geographically closer and has superior military strength, whereby neither side is really capable of creating a fait accompli;

   • • The status of the countries concerned in international relations: the two countries in conflict being members of the same alliance, NATO, while they themselves and the disputed island are surrounded by countries opposed to NATO, which again and again blunts the conflict, but turns it into a fix.

2. 2. Mental causes:

   • • The burdens of Greek–Turkish historical past, the Turkish conquest and the difficulties of separation, which have prompted Turkish Cypriots not to acquiesce in a minority status in a country with a Greek majority and Greek Cypriots to insist on the Greek character of the entire island in spite of the significant Turkish minority;

   • • There is no and not likely to be a Cypriot nation of mixed nationality and language with a shared political consciousness;

   • • Both sides have a sense of being exclusively in possession, making them feel that any concession means giving up existing positions, when, in fact, they exist only in part.

1. 3. Legal causes:

   • There is no fundamental fact of law that could be used to establish a starting point or legitimacy. True, there is the legal source of the Treaties of Zurich and London, which is invoked by all legal arguments, and which continues to be the basis of two important elements in the present state of affairs: the Cypriot state and the British, Greek and Turkish military presence. However, the decisive provision of these treaties, one meant to have been the solution to the problem, the government of the two national communities at par, is what does not work. By now, all those concerned cite single points of the treaties taken out of their contexts, regarding them to have an absolute effect and the rest as contingent; Greek Cypriots refer to its establishing Cyprus as an independent state where they constitute the majority; Turkish Cypriots to the point that Cypriot independence is conditional on its parity-based government; NATO to the clause that states that three of its member states may station forces on the island; and the Warsaw countries to the requirement that, Cyprus being an independent state, all foreign troops must be removed from it. No one believes any longer, however, that the implementation or interpretation of the treaties in their entirety would lead to a satisfactory solution.

2. 4. International relations:

   • Both camps have manoeuvred themselves into the traps of their short-term tactics; neither can assert its own long-term interests, nor can they come within reach of or give up their objectives concerned. NATO cannot achieve undisturbed political control over the island due to the inability of Greece and Turkey to reach an agreement; Warsaw countries cannot achieve the stabilization of the island state pursuing a non-aligned policy due to the inability of Greek and Turkish Cypriots to reach an agreement, and to the non-existence of a Cypriot nation. Developments depend less on the influence the two power blocks can bring to bear than on the dynamics of the national forces and conflicts themselves. Still, neither of the power blocks wants to give up the game for fear the other would benefit by it, when the actual cause of the failure of both is the same: the Turkish-Greek inability to agree, the Greek–Turkish national strife, which they have no or only limited ability to influence.

This is the fix those seeking to resolve the Cyprus dispute as an international dispute have had to face.

The Failures of International Dispute Resolution

A national conflict becomes an international issue in proportion not to the greatness of the clash of interests or the oppression involved, but to how far it fills a power void, creates a contested or unguarded field. There are cases of much greater conflict and oppression than Cyprus, but it has brought about an uncertainty as to who is entitled to dispose of the area, which immediately raises concerns in the international community, the essence of which is the clear demarcation of states and their territorial scopes. Such concerns are allayed only when the formal legitimacy of state belonging is clearly established, and ceases to exist finally only when formal legitimacy squares with the substantive legitimacy of self-determination. The procedures of settling international disputes that have yet been applied to the Cyprus issue have foundered. A new approach is required due to the following reasons.

1. (1) International interference with the Cyprus dispute cannot be rejected on the principle that it is the internal affair of a sovereign state because the Cypriot state has not been a sovereign state since its very inception, not only because of the foreign troops stationed in its territories, but because of the lack of a Cypriot state-founding and state-sustaining will.

2. (2) The dispute cannot be hoped to be settled as one between two opposing states either, because mental factors and power relations render either a peaceful or a forced final settlement unlikely, indeed impossible.

3. (3) There is also little prospect of an impartial legal tribunal, international court of law, resolving it as an international legal dispute, because neither the general rules of international statute law nor the interpretation of the single concrete instrument, the Treaties of Zurich and London, are capable of grasping the essence of the dispute.

4. (4) There is also little likelihood that the UN, which has already attempted to deal with the issue, including its forces having carried out peacekeeping tasks, is going to be able to engender an international will that would have a final effect and count as a source of legitimacy. However advantageous it is for UN intervention that no one is exclusively in possession and that the situation is deadlocked, the precondition of shaping international will, the agreement of the great powers, is lacking, because the parties concerned and the opposing power blocks have bound themselves to conceiving and asserting their interests in diametrically opposed ways. Nevertheless, should the great powers reach a broader agreement, the structural conditions of the international community would allow for only pacification and seeking compromise based on the balance of power, and would hardly be able to bring about a common will stable enough to be the source of legitimacy, particularly if it cannot invoke an existing legitimacy, a recognized territorial status and claim to self-determination.

These circumstances call for impartial international political arbitration. This is not among the current procedures of the international community, though it has been urged for over a century. The time is now ripe for putting it into action, as it is capable of establishing lasting legitimacy through the power and authority of the final international principles, self-determination in particular, that it applies impartially by its nature.

Political Arbitration, the Parties and the Great Powers

There are several reasons why all four directly concerned parties, the two Cypriot national communities and the two kindred nations, would accept the principled ruling of an impartial tribunal. First, an impartial tribunal would necessarily consider all the just elements of their positions, and, though it could not guarantee one party that it would accept its position completely, it could guarantee that it would not assert the position of the other party as much as a unilateral fait accompli would. All parties have reasons to be afraid of such an outcome, even if none of them are forced to yield at the moment. Procrastination also has dangers for all because the surge of events can also lead to faits accomplis; none of them can be sure that time is on its side. The passage of time may have its dangers for the Turks due to their being a scattered minority in Cyprus and their disadvantageous population growth; the Greeks, however, are threatened by the greater political and military weight of the Turks. A principled ruling by an impartial tribunal with an international authority can thus be assumed to be able to influence the parties, even though they would not go into such settlement under a voluntary agreement, into relinquishing genuine or supposed positions. Even if the parties did not agree to subject themselves to a binding ruling or a mere resolution at first, such a ruling would pave the way for raising further questions and claims, taking steps and fostering new developments, and thus bring final settlement closer.

As far as the power blocks involved are concerned, no impartial ruling could promise them total success, but it could shed light on their mutual long-term interests, which may show them that resolving the problem is more advantageous than deferral. The final conditions an impartial tribunal could establish is in the interest of NATO even if it upholds Cyprus as a state because, Cyprus's situation being finalized, NATO would no longer have anything to gain from continuing to play games in world politics, and thus the political uncertainty of the island state would also cease. Such a decision would also be in the long-term interest of the Warsaw countries, even if the island ceases to exist as an independent state and becomes a national territory or national territories, as the military bases will have a time limit and gradually cease; and, more importantly, both Turkey's and Greece's need for NATO assistance would be greatly reduced because, even now, what keeps these countries in NATO is the hope of benefiting by it in the matter of Cyprus. A non-NATO assisted final arrangement could open the way to major domestic and foreign policy developments and shifts – this would be the real game for the Soviet Union and not supporting an unstable Cypriot independence and urging the self-determination of the Cypriot ‘people’, which has no real merit. In other words, a principled ruling on Cyprus would force both power blocks to conceive of and formulate their interests and conflicts not small-mindedly in obtaining, advancing and guarding overblown local positions, but at a higher and more comprehensive level.

A final settlement of the Cyprus dispute would, needless to say, bring great relief and growth of prestige to the United Nations, for which, among the four or five major currently unresolved issues, this entails a significant financial burden and military commitment.

The most important winner of a final arrangement would naturally be the cause of peace, which is furthered neither by fleeting deals, which leave critical questions unresolved and only perpetuate instability, nor by a solution based purely on power consideration. It would be a tragic misconception to leave matters unresolved or badly resolved due to the conflicts of power blocks, which last ten, twenty or, at most, thirty years, while these matters left seething can be a threat for as long as a century, and while a lasting and legitimacy-inspiring arrangement could bring peace once and for all or, put more humbly, within humanly reasonable time.

The Merits of Arbitration in the Cyprus Dispute

The Effects of All-Greek and All-Turkish Demarcation on Cyprus

If we look at the claims to self-determination by the two Cypriot national communities on these grounds, it is quite understandable that the Turkish minority, in spite of its scatteredness, resists living as a minority in a Greek national state, and it seems justified in holding that Cyprus should be divided in proportion to its nationalities, that the Turkish part should include as many Turks as possible, and that the same number of minorities should remain in both parts, enjoying minority rights, but if they wish, they can relocate. This is the point where the history of all-Turkish and all-Greek demarcation has a special bearing on the Cypriot dispute, which is only a chapter of the whole.

It is well known that all-Greek and all-Turkish demarcation was not assisted by an impartial tribunal, which could have circumspectly drawn the borderlines, but was a painful and bloody process, with a disproportionate population exchange at the expense of the Greeks as its coda. Insofar as these past facts have any consequences that an impartial tribunal could take into consideration, three outcomes, three rulings, can be envisaged.

1. 1. The first one would be based on an assessment that the disproportionateness of the Greek–Turkish population exchange half a century ago has had consequences lasting to our day, partly in the objective factor of Greek overpopulation and partly in the still living memory of its ruthlessness and painfulness. This is not to justify any move to revise the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne in the name of self-determination, but it could be taken into account by an impartial tribunal when ruling on Cyprus, namely on whether the half-million disproportion would justify the subordination to Greek majority rule of 100,000 Turks – a relatively small number in comparison with the forced population move. Such a judgment would essentially accept the Greek or Greek Cypriot position but not on the grounds of the indivisibility of the island, but to counterbalance the population exchange. In this case, Turks could choose between asserting minority rights and resettling.

2. 2. The second possible decision would be based on a contrary assessment that the population exchange took place half a century ago, it is a concluded fact even the Greeks do not seek to undo; those personally aggrieved by the injustice are in their 50s at least, i.e. only a smaller, annually decreasing, soon deceasing part of those forced to move; not to mention the fact that no decision on Cyprus would redress the injustice they suffered. As far as overpopulation is concerned, this may have been caused by the unevenness of Greek development just as much as by the forced relocation, all the more so because these Greeks were settled at the expense of yet others. Under this assessment, the Greek–Turkish demarcation should be made irrespective of the Greek–Turkish population exchange, considering the situation in Cyprus alone, and, as both populations are deeply rooted, a proportionate division of the island is justified, each area providing for as many Greeks and Turks as possible, and the relatively even number of minority populations having the option of mutual exchange. In other words, if the impartial tribunal is of the opinion that the disproportionate population exchange has no current effect, it will essentially take sides with Turks or Turkish Cypriots.

3. 3. The third decision would be based on a midway and more realistic assessment that it would be unjust to force into a minority status or relocate the part of the Turkish population of the island that lives in a relatively compact and contiguous area north of the capital and along the northern coast; this should therefore be declared a Turkish national area without further ado; however, in respect of the Turkish population that lives in scattered areas, which would anyway have to resettle to be able to belong in a Turkish state, the disproportionate population exchange can be taken into account; and the areas beyond the contiguous Turkish areas should therefore be declared a Greek national territory. Naturally, the means of relocating and minority rights should be ensured. As a result of a ruling midway between the Greek and the Turkish positions, Cyprus would be politically divided, but not strictly in proportion to population distribution.

An impartial tribunal, if it is to seek to divide Cyprus between or award it to its two national groups, will have to choose between the three options outlined, depending on whether it regards the consequences of the population exchange as still effective, void or partly void. In our opinion, the midway decision can be supported by the most convincing arguments.

These possibilities of national demarcation do not imply that an impartial tribunal would necessarily have to divide the island between or award it to two disputing states, and that no other arrangement, including an independent Cyprus, is conceivable. This only means that, if it intends to find a comprehensive solution to the problem, it will have to take its stand in the matter of Greek–Turkish national demarcation should an independent Cyprus turn out to be unviable.

The Statistical Criteria of National Demarcation and the Omissibility of a Plebiscite

The foregoing discussion focused on how an impartial tribunal could rule in the matter of national demarcation on the basis of the principle of self-determination. We did not take a stance on or only alluded to whether such a forum should base its ruling on procedures it initiates – plebiscites, opinions of representative bodies or other forms. In our opinion, census records of Greek and Turkish speakers and the roughly parallel Greek Orthodox and Islam believers, as well as the likewise parallel and still prevailing ethnic features and different customs clearly show the personal scope of national belonging in Cyprus, who the Greeks and Turks are, what their numbers are, and where they live. The special cases of native Greek speakers who are Muslims and native Turkish speakers who are Christians, quite numerous elsewhere in the former Ottoman Empire, are few enough not to question demarcation as such.

Consequently, in the matter of national demarcation in Cyprus, the principle of self-determination can be replaced by the nationality principle, which itself can be replaced by the ethnic principle, i.e., more precisely, the criteria for ethnic separation, primarily language. In other words, if an impartial tribunal is to decide on the national belonging of the island, marking off the territories of its two national communities and its borders, it can rely on the statistical data available, and can come to a correct decision without recourse to a formal act of self-determination, a plebiscite. In the case of disputed statistics, it would probably have to make a separate decision on what set of data to consider. In the case of Cyprus, however, the statistics available provide ample grounds for a comprehensive assessment of the actual situation.

Should an impartial tribunal treat not only the demarcation of the Greeks and the Turks of Cyprus, who have had an established separate existence for a long time, but also other possibilities, the need for a formal act of self-determination, a plebiscite, will look quite different.

A Two-nation Independent Cyprus and the Need for Plebiscite

Apart from national demarcation, the establishment of a special political framework could be another possibility for self-determination, taking into account the fact that the two similarly deep-rooted groups lay claim with equal determination to the same territory, the territorial demarcation of which is not by any means straightforward. The solution to this problem could hardly be other than a two-nation Cyprus state, which is independent of both Greece and Turkey, and which recognizes both Greek and Turkish Cypriots as sustainers of the state. This is what the Zurich and London Treaties sought to establish in 1959, the constitutional and international-law structure of which, however, has not functioned since 1963. Could this experiment be repeated, perhaps in an amended form? The oddity in this respect is that there are weighty arguments against it, yet it needs to be thoroughly considered for various other reasons.

The recognition spelled out above, is that no shared national consciousness and not even a supra-national, federal loyalty is likely to develop in Cyprus because two well-established national groups face each other, whose historical experiences not only do not unite them, but pit them against each other. It is therefore justified to assume that no agreement on a two-nation Cypriot state has been or will be founded on a realistic and honest will to establish a shared state, but on contrary national tactics. Lacking genuine finality and substantive legitimacy, such a two-nation makeup is bound to be transitory and a permanent source of crisis.

However, there is an obligation to consider the two-nation independent Cypriot state as a solution because Cyprus, although no longer in a two-nation form, does have an actual (though not always enforced) international legal status due to the still effective Treaties of London and Zurich and the constitution they established (though declared void by Greek Cypriots). True, the distortion and crisis of this makeup sparked the international conflict over Cyprus; yet this is why it holds true that the two national communities, should they grow weary of their current fix, can agree to set the two-nation makeup into motion again, and thereby end the crisis and the international discussion on it: the UN would be delighted to drop the case from its agenda and send home its troops; and we could shelve whatever we have said and are about to say about the need for and the possibility of intervention by an impartial tribunal even though we are convinced the crisis will surface again.

This is because only a case that upsets the international order between states can be expected to be referred to an impartial international political tribunal as an extraordinary body even if great-power agreement and the balance of power is granted. As soon as a development ends this internationality of the case, for all its long-term insufficiency, it ceases to be negotiable by international factors, and falls back into the limbo of hidden tension, national conflict, majority oppression, and minority grievance – from where international conflicts tend to spring.

Even if the Cyprus case remained unresolved and called for resolution, an impartial tribunal could still not pass over its being an independent state. Due to the characteristic structures of the international community, the inertia of a state with only a formal existence, particularly if it also has UN membership, is extraordinarily great, even if it owes its existence not to a state-founding will, but a will to solve a problem that had seemed irresolvable, and even if it has failed to solve the problem its establishment was meant to have solved.¹ The problem is that an impartial tribunal would necessarily have to rule on the two-nation Cypriot state as a solution, but it would thereby approve or disapprove, propose or reject the existence of a state already established. Now, the international community is a community of states, and international discussion is one between states, and an international tribunal is expected to administer justice between states in dispute, and not deliver its opinion on the existence of one of them. True, we would be justified in saying that the real parties in the Cyprus dispute are the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and the two states, Greece and Turkey; that the Cypriot state in its current setup is the political organization of only the Greek Cypriots; that its original setup under the 1959 agreements was not that of a participant in, but a possible solution to, a dispute; and that, being conceived of as a solution, it can always be assessed as a solution. However, as it is also a state, should a competent tribunal pass a ruling on its ‘right to be’ and its ‘ability to function’, the question immediately rises: who disposes of the existence of state in the international community?

In the matter of the existence of a state recognized by the international community, the state itself has the right of disposal through an international treaty; however, absolute aggression also has the ability to do so, which, for all the pronouncements to the contrary, usually wins the approval of the other states if the situation stabilizes itself, because it is a respected rule of international law that the international community admits only states with durable power. The cessation of a state is only creditable and legitimate if it is declared or approved of by the population concerned in a manifestation of will based on the principle of self-determination. This is not a procedure regulated by international law, yet it is suitable in all circumstances of the life of the international community for closing disputes over the existence of a state and providing substantive legitimacy. An impartial international tribunal can therefore do no better than prescribe or propose an act of self-determination, a plebiscite, to ask the people of Cyprus for their opinion on the existence of a two-nation Cypriot state.

The Plebiscite Questions

The delicate and sensitive procedure of a referendum requires the clarification of a number of issues: what question should be put to the people? Who are to be the addressees? How are side questions to be ordered? As mentioned already, game theory has treated these problems in various types of voting; Robin Farquharson distinguished between ‘honest’ voting responses that express genuine emotion or will, and ‘sophisticated’ responses that are influenced by tactics or ulterior motives, and pointed out that, when asking a question promising an honest response, the later the question is put the more likely an affirmative answer is given, while, when asking a question promising a sophisticated answer, the earlier the question is put the more probable the affirmative answer.

The ultimate question to be asked can be no other than whether the voters want the continuance and re-activation of the two-nation Cypriot state. This formulation of the question however has further problems, particularly how far the constitution, the government and the two-nation institutions of the future state should be spelled out. I believe the question ought not to refer to the 1960 constitution or any other draft, because this would go into the details and thus sidetrack the issue. It would be most expedient to formulate the question in a general way, which would placate the concerns of the opposing sides about the two-nation makeup, declaring for example that voters would deliver their opinion on a Cypriot state wherein Greeks and Turks are proportionately represented, but are both state-founding national groups irrespective of their numbers, the institutions of which will be outlined following an affirmative result.

The question must not be addressed to the people of Cyprus as a whole, only to the two national groups separately, the reasons being: (a) there is no single Cypriot nation; Cyprus is not indivisible; (b) both national groups have roots deep enough to have a just claim to self-determination over the island; and (c), most importantly, the two national communities must separately want to set up the two-nation system. Putting the question to the two national communities separately should not cause any particular difficulty, the voter registries of the 1960–63 period being obviously available or easily updateable. Addressing the question separately to the two groups necessarily implies that a negative answer by either will rule out the two-nation makeup.

As far as the formulation of the question is concerned, it may be asked either whether voters approve or disapprove of a two-nation Cyprus or whether they choose the two-nation makeup or another arrangement. At first sight, the two ways of putting the question amounts to the same, because, should the two-nation makeup be ruled out, the only option remaining is national separation. In practice, however, there is substantial difference between the two because Greek–Turkish national separation, as shown above, can be decided on in several ways, not necessarily by way of a referendum. If, however, we include all these aspects into the formulation of the question, it would be far too complicated for voters to grasp, particularly because they would have no way of telling what solution their response not getting the required majority would lead to. In all reasonable likelihood, the question requiring an affirmative or negative answer on the two-nation makeup, clearly separated from the possible varieties of national separation, would produce a clearer situation and provoke a clearer response.

This does not however eliminate the problems arising from asking for a response on the two possible solutions at once, but only shifts them to the question of sequence: how is the choice between the two-nation makeup and national separation to be related? How should they be ordered or sequenced? Asking for a response on the two-nation question first seems to be sensible at first sight, and, after its rejection, the question on separation can be answered. However, this sequence raises the issue that voters responding to the two-nation question cannot tell along what lines demarcation will take place should they reject the two-nation makeup, and, if those lines turn out to be disadvantageous for either group, one will be in the grotesque situation of having facilitated the very situation it wanted to ward off by voting against an independent Cyprus.

These disadvantages prompt us to believe that it would be better to choose the option less logical at first sight: the tribunal should first adopt a conditional ruling on the lines of demarcation and then initiate a plebiscite on the two-nation makeup. This would yield two advantages: first, if a conditional ruling is needed, it will precede, not follow the vote; and, second, the addressees will know what national demarcation they will generate by their negative answer.

This dizzying array of varieties might seem to justify scepticism: the difficulties involved in the practicalities of exercising self-determination and in defining the question to be asked at a plebiscite look insurmountable. This is true insofar as the Cypriot dispute is more difficult than usual self-determination disputes. The relative difficulty, however, arises not from the difficulties of applying the principle of self-determination, but from the formal legitimacy of an existing Cypriot state. In point of fact however, the problem is quite usual: a state does have a formal international legitimacy, but it has become doubtful whether it has an authority out of common conviction, will and self-determination that is the basis of all international legitimacy; in other words, formal legitimacy has lost substantive legitimacy to such an extent that it has become an international problem. The added difficulty in Cyprus is that the formally legitimate state came into being not to represent a genuine national will, but to resolve a problem, and has lacked the living will of the people to back it on several counts. In terms of self-determination, the part of the question on the two-nation makeup is not in the same order and quality as the one on national demarcation: the latter is a genuine problem of self-determination, which can be expected to elicit ‘honest’ responses; moreover, the national belonging, emotions and intentions of those concerned can be known even without asking; the former, however, is a construction born out of perplexity, one that shuns rather than solves the problem, and the responses it is likely to prompt in almost all variants are ‘sophisticated’, driven by political or voting tactics.

Apart from the variants we have tried to think through in view of current givens, an impartial tribunal will have to consider all the potential and past elements of the international-law and political environment at the moment of decision making, including all the possible ideas, solutions, scenarios, ways of asking, and aspects that may grasp reality and its opportunities, assert governing principles, cut one Gordian knot or another, foster agreement, assent and legitimacy better than what will have been thought up and negotiated until that moment. This requires both impartiality and political judgment.

An Independent Greek Cyprus and the Current Greece

If both or either of Cypriot national communities reject the two-nation makeup, and if the two national areas are separated, the question of the independence of a Greek Cyprus or the Greek part of Cyprus arises. This amounts to asking whether Greek Cypriots want to uphold today's situation in their future territory, i.e. actual existence of a Greek Cypriot state. Originally, when the problem arose, this question would have had no meaning; at that time it was perfectly clear that the rejection of a two-nation makeup would mean the separation of the Greek and the Turkish territories, and their integration into Greece and Turkey respectively. This continues to hold for Turkish Cypriots, but not so for the Greek Cypriots, and two serious reasons have arisen justifying an independent Greek Cyprus.

As discussed in relation to the two-nation makeup, the first reason is that the international community is made up of states, and it cannot terminate a state or deem it non-existent forthwith. The independent Cypriot state as governed solely by Greeks has been recognized by most states, it is a member of the United Nations, and, as pointed out above, its termination would require some act of self-determination by Greek Cypriots, a referendum.

This would have been pure formality as long as it was self-evident that, if national demarcation were concluded, rendering the Greek national tactic of an independent Cyprus meaningless, a plebiscite would result in joining Greece. This assumption has ceased to be self-evident since the putsch in Greece in 1967, and thus there is a second, no longer formal reason for both Greek Cypriots and impartial political fora with a say to raise the question of an independent Greek Cyprus after national demarcation. Now, the issue seems no longer to be whether a plebiscite should be held in the matter, but whether the independent Greek Cyprus should be maintained for the time being without a plebiscite on account of a style of government internationally condemned. The Saarland plebiscite in 1935 was the most glaring and warning example of the double-edged outcome such an act of self-determination might have: a people, given the opportunity of choosing their political status in the spirit of democracy and driven by ill-conceived national interests, expressed their democratic will and chose to subject themselves to a government set against the institutions of freedom, thereby lent it undeserved political success and helped its consolidation, while it gave up much of its former freedom.

To avoid this kind of outcome, it turns up automatically that the procedures and rules to be adopted for plebiscites should include the principle that anti-democratic governments are not to be afforded the political advantages of territorial gain by the democratic principle of self-determination. This otherwise correct principle is restricted, however, by a characteristic rule of the international community – non-interference. Hence the adjective ‘anti-democratic’ is not applied at international level to all military juntas, suspensions of constitution and tyrant-minded politicians, only those conspicuously oppressive regimes that the majority of the international community expressly condemns. Now, the military government in Greece is expressly condemned by all, if not with equal intensity by all. It should also be noted that express condemnation should not necessarily mean no or disadvantageous application of the principle of self-determination because this would mean that political arbitration is no better than the practice of the great powers to take sides with parties according to their political sympathies in state-establishment or territorial disputes, which would otherwise require impartial judgment.

It would seem an obvious solution to postpone the plebiscite or ruling based on self-determination until the internal situation is sufficiently clarified. Again, this otherwise correct principle should be qualified by the interest in quick stabilization and undoubted legitimacy, which discourages temporary situations from being maintained because they have a tendency to occasion faits accomplis, coups and occupation attempts so long as the shakiness of the great-power agreement leads to impunity. No doubt, the current situation of the world has its dangers resulting from the Cyprus dispute; however, upholding the independence of Greek Cyprus and postponing a plebiscite on its joining Greece would be much facilitated if there were a final ruling on national demarcation, which would close the Greek–Turkish conflict both within Cyprus and in respect of the two countries, i.e. a settlement of the more significant and decisive part of the dispute.

All in all, it seems appropriate to postpone a decision on incorporation into Greece and to operate temporarily with an independent Greek Cyprus, the reasons being: first, the not entirely unrealistic hope that this would spare Greek Cypriots the grievous interlude of oppression; and, second, the perhaps less sure, yet long-term hope deriving from the intrinsic truth that an independent Greek Cyprus and its unresolved problem might engender causes that finally challenge the authority of Greek autocracy, resolve the Greek political crisis and engender a freer type of government. An impartial tribunal should in no way aim at such an eventuality, but its rulings can contribute the preconditions of such beneficial internal developments and of agreed action by the great powers. Should the issue of incorporation into Greece be raised in a situation less grave than the current one, but still not fully reassuring, it will be the duty of an impartial tribunal to circumvent it with realistic caveats (national amnesty, self-government, etc).

The tribunal will have to consider and balance these when making its decision, regarding all givens, with an impartial and objective view to an appropriate and principled outcome, yet tactfully taking the effectively obtainable into account.

Minority Rights and Population Relocations

After deciding substantive issues, an impartial political tribunal will have to rule also on related matters, as well. First among them will be the situation of the minorities left on either side of the new border. This will not be topical if the two-nation makeup is retained or re-established, because, in spite of being outnumbered, the Turkish community will not be a minority in the constitutional sense, claiming the usual rights of national, linguistic, racial, and religious minorities, but one of the state-sustaining communities, and, as such, it will be a body politic established under the constitution.

Obviously, an impartial tribunal will have to rule on minority matters if it has made a decision on Turkish–Greek demarcation, leaving minority groups on either side of the border. If the territories marked off are incorporated in Greece and Turkey, it would be convenient to fit the issue into the system of mutual minority protection provided by the Treaty of Lausanne, which has proved efficient. If, however, an independent Greek Cyprus is maintained with a Turkish minority, it would be apposite for an impartial tribunal to outline its rights in a separate judgment, taking into account not only the usual minority rights provided by international law, but also the particularities of Cyprus.

Due to the renowned bad relation between the two peoples, the precedent of the Turkish–Greek population exchange, a final national demarcation, will undoubtedly elicit proposals for the relocation of people left in a minority status. The Turkish demarcation plans, where both national territories are to have an equal number of minority populations, include the advancing of extensive, mutual population exchanges, all the more so because, if this plan is accepted, relocation will be confined to Cyprus. However, if the Turkish minority in a future Greek national territory in Cyprus is to be larger, it would require relocation also to Turkey. In the event, an impartial tribunal would have to apply the self-evident principle already mentioned that, obligatory relocation being repressive and voluntary relocation ineffective, an intermediary solution should be sought based on voluntarism, but assisted and arranged internationally, which would need appropriate political and financial support by the great powers.

Alongside the relocation of people, the possible transfer of national treasures, relics and works of art may also arise, including the movement of national monuments. Police, experts and special arbitration might be needed to handle these matters. In the case of Cyprus, these objects are usually religious, and are thus unlikely to foment competing claims on either side.

The Foreign Military Bases and Occupying Forces

The presence of external military forces defines or, at least, modulates the situation in Cyprus, but it would be an exaggeration to blame them for all problems and conflicts. As a left-over from the colonial past, there are British bases, and, under the Treaties of Zurich and London, Greek and Turkish troops, although only symbolic in number; and finally, the UN has also deployed peacekeeping forces. What would an impartial tribunal have to say on this? It would certainly be desirable if it did have something to say, though it is doubtful whether it would be conferred the powers to deliver a binding ruling on it. Even without such powers, it could hardly be forbidden from delivering an opinion on the presence of the various armed forces.

The advantages or disadvantages of the presence of foreign troops can hardly be appraised abstractly, only in the knowledge of the concrete context. Generally, however, it can be said that the presence of external armed forces or military bases usually causes more harm than advantage, because order and balance in the international community rests on the clear demarcation of borders, scopes, sovereignties, and legitimacies. In times of crisis, the presence of a disinterested third force may be advantageous insofar as it is truly disinterested, but this can only be warranted by international forces.

As far as the British military presence is concerned, this was the only army in the island at one time, and it could have played a major role in obstructing civil strife and underscoring possible British arbitration. Britain, however, trying to maintain its colonial power over the island too long, manoeuvred itself out of its position as arbiter, and left it to a much weaker UN. The British bases now serve only British and thereby NATO interests, their significance and role in improving the situation are steadily decreasing; their sole effect is to make Britain and NATO be ‘interested’ in the bad sense of the word, distort their view of the matter, and prompt the opposing great power factors to judge the entire situation from the point of view of the bases, which have only a secondary and temporary import. Thus, impartial arbitration cannot but express the opinion that the sooner they left the better.

The Treaties of Zurich and London provided for the presence of Greek and Turkish contingents obviously because of wanting to signal that, first, the exclusive British sphere of influence over the island had ceased, and, second, the security needs of primarily the Turkish community would be met by at least a symbolic number of troops from the kindred country as the power of the British forces receded. If an impartial tribunal seeking a final resolution divided the island between the two neighbouring nations, it would have no problem with the presence of their troops as long as they remained exclusively where they would thus be at home. Should it rule in favour of the two-nation makeup, it would have to decide on the maintenance or termination of the symbolic protection of kindred communities. In doing so, it will have to give due consideration to the mental condition of the national communities, the mistrust and fear in between them, but, even having done so, it would in all likelihood conclude that the presence of the force strains rather than appeases relations.

As far as the security needs of Turkish Cypriots are concerned, a politically potent kindred nation will obviously be ready to intervene to protect them in case of crisis regardless of their having or not having a 650- or 950-strong company on the island; and if the nation is lame for some reason, it can do no more than send a battalion or two to reinforce the self-defence corps of the islanders. As expounded above, we have doubts as to the viability of a two-nation government, but, should an impartial tribunal find reasons to rule in favour of it, it will have to do away with all factors impeding it, including these contingents. The real concern will be how far the island communities, again particularly the Turks, will want to have their self-defence corps, and how far this would conform to the requirements of a shared government, which boils down to the question of the viability of the two-nation makeup in the field of law enforcement.

The military bases can pose problems if the island or its parts are incorporated into Greece and Turkey, and remain members of the Atlantic or other Western alliances. International law does not preclude states from having foreign troops or bases in their territories, but, as pointed out, these tend to cause more problems than they solve. The Cypriot situation being currently brittle or transitorily unstable following possible arbitration, it would certainly seem reasonable to provide that the foreign troops are maintained temporarily or removed finally, or that neutral or military-free zones are established, as they have been in the border regions of both Turkey and Greece. This would also eliminate the grounds for any great power to assess the situation in the non-germane terms of the bases.

Finally, the UN forces now certainly have a useful role; however, their stay becoming permanent would also be unhealthy, symptomatic of the paralysis of the international community. It goes without saying that the UN forces would have a role in implementing the ruling of an impartial tribunal, but only to be able to leave for good.

Arbitration Procedure and Implementation

The Cyprus dispute would enable an impartial arbitration tribunal to draw up its procedure. This would naturally allow parties to advise the tribunal on what matters it may not be aware of; in the Cyprus case, however, a tribunal would be unlikely to expect to learn particularly new details form the parties, nor would it want to be turned into a forum for public demonstration. It would therefore need to clearly state the problem and formulate the questions to be decided, to perhaps make interim decisions to assist such formulations, and to take care not to allow witnesses to testify how many times the other party breached the ceasefire, and scholars to expound the priority of one nation in terms of settlement history or pre-Greek ethnic composition, etc. The most important duties an impartial tribunal will have to fulfil are to clarify the prospects of success for the two-nation makeup of an independent Cyprus and to identify a set of undisputed statistical data or, if the parties dispute it, decide on an objective and balanced set to ground its final ruling.

The implementation of its ruling raises further issues, including holding a plebiscite, ensuring minority rights, the principles and procedures of possible population relocations, the possession and safeguarding of national treasures, supervision of the fulfilment of caveats (e.g. amnesty), and the need for UN or other impartial law enforcement troops, observers, experts and their bodies. The authorization of an impartial tribunal and its own determination will define how far it will have a say in these matters, or whether it will make use of or delegate other organizations and committees.