A glaring lack of actionable etiological progress has revived a nosological nihilism, which proposes a downplaying of the traditional nosological classes and focusing elsewhere, e.g., on “descriptive syndromes” (e.g., “depression”, “reality distortion”), proxy-variables (endo-phenotypes), or behavioral constructs with partly known neural underpinnings (e.g., RdoC). However, another type of response may consist of a re-examination of the ontological and epistemological assumptions involved in the massive oversimplification of psychopathology, which took place as a part of the so-called “operational revolution”. This lecture will advocate a revival of psychopathology, which, if equipped with adequate epistemological ressources to address consciousness in its experiential and behavioral dimensions, is urgently relevant and acutely needed for psychiatry as a clinical and academic enterprise. As an illustrative example, the concept of self and its disorders will be briefly examined.