The capability approach is a broad normative framework for the evaluation of individual and collective well-being, policy design and social reform. Initially conceived by political economist and philosopher Amartya Sen in the 1970s as a human-centred alternative to traditional utilitarian economics (Sen Reference Sen1977; Reference Sen1979), it has become increasingly influential across the social sciences, from politics and economics to philosophy, and has since been developed by Sen, Martha Nussbaum and many other authors into a rich, complex, but loose body of theoretical and empirical work. The capability approach has inspired a vast and growing literature in diverse fields of academic and policy research, evaluation and practice, most notably in the fields of development, international justice and human rights. More recently, capability-informed research has been undertaken by specialists in welfare, social policy, the labour market, education, gender, health and disability. Capability-driven ideas have also had a notable political and policy influence, both via the direct personal and theoretical involvement of Sen and Nussbaum in policy initiatives, and through the theoretical and policy-related research of other scholars and practitioners. The capability approach underpins the annual Human Development Report of the United Nations Development Programme (undp) since 1990, as well as over 500 regional or country-level Human Development Reports. It has filtered through to national and local policy evaluation and policy making, and informed various initiatives, such as the report on poverty and social inclusion of the German Ministry of Health and Social Security (bgss 2005, see Volkert Reference Volkert2005) and the Equality Measurement Framework (emf) in Britain led by the British Equality and Human Rights Commission (ehrc) and Government Equalities Office (geo).
The humanist appeal of the capability approach has helped Sen earn a Nobel Prize for economics (in 1998). Even though the approach has not managed to dethrone other more mainstream economic theories, Sen’s work has, nevertheless, opened up a “capability space” in economics that allows a richer, more nuanced understanding of social justice and human well-being. Economist Peter Evans (2007) has drawn on Sen’s work in arguing that economics must be more active in deliberative democracy, more engaged with publicly important questions and more sensitive to local issues. In a similar vein, sociologist Michael Burawoy (Reference Burawoy2005, Reference Burawoy2007) acknowledges that Sen’s work is part of the tradition of public sociology—an open sociology that draws on public debate and informs and enables public action. Despite Burawoy’s endorsement, however, the capability approach has remained largely unnoticed by sociologists (with some minor exceptions such as Sen’s argument with British sociologist Peter Townsend over the definition of poverty, see Sen Reference Sen1985a; Townsend Reference Townsend1985, and very recent developments in the sociology of human rights, discussed below). Given that the capability approach engages with issues that are of central concern to sociology, such as freedom, social justice, inequality, public deliberation and individual and communal well-being, why are there so few links to sociology in Sen’s work, and why has mainstream sociology remained largely capability-blind?
The capability approach is not a theoretical panacea: it has led to important methodological and epistemological controversies (which will be discussed below). However, these controversies—or, indeed, the reputation of the capability approach as a normative tool more suited for policy research and practice, rather than an explanatory tool suited for critical social theory—may have distracted sociologists from important work in areas such as welfare, social policy, employment, gender, health and disability, and education research. Much of that work has been done by sociologically-minded researchers and theorists, for example by historians and social policy analysts using sociological analytical frameworks. Despite the caveats and shortfalls, the capability approach nevertheless has theoretical and empirical potential for tackling historical and contemporary issues relevant to sociology. It can contribute to the important task of reinvigorating a critical, engaged and public sociology in today’s globalised, increasingly neoliberal world.
John Holmwood (Reference Holmwood2013) notes that the capability approach has had its greatest academic impact in philosophy and politics because those disciplines share the analytical assumptions of Sen’s home base in economics (welfare economics and the theory of social choice)—despite the fact that Sen’s work challenges those assumptions. In the British context, Holmwood argues, this separation has been reinforced by institutional arrangements within UK higher education institutions whose current focus on interdisciplinary degrees has left sociology with “at best, a marginal role” (ibid.). Holmwood argues that the problem in bringing Sen and sociology into dialogue “concerns the relation between economics and sociology” on the one hand, and the internal fragmentation within sociology, on the other. I would add, siding with Alice Mah (Reference Mah2010), that this opens the question of the relation between sociology and the academic field of social policy—a cross-disciplinary field that is rich in topics, methods and theoretical findings, but which nevertheless sits uncomfortably on the margins of sociology as a discipline. This article argues that the fact that sociology has remained largely immune to the influence of Sen’s ideas is revealing both of the limitations of the capability approach and of the problematic state of contemporary sociology. Drawing on existing capability-based theoretical and empirical work which has been carried out recently in fields closely related to sociology, this article argues that the neglect of the capability approach in sociology is unwarranted, both from the view point of public sociology and of critical social theory.
In support of this argument, the article maps out the general directions of recent capability-informed theory, research and policy evaluation, and reviews some of the key methodological and epistemological weaknesses demonstrated in these existing applications. I begin with a brief summary of the main tenets of the capability approach in the work of Sen and Nussbaum and note their differences. The following section reviews several existing strands of application and the debates that the capability approach has provoked. I then conclude by elucidating what I argue are the main ways in which the capability approach can contribute to sociology.
A comprehensive discussion of capabilities-inspired literature is beyond the scope of this text, as is an extensive discussion of the far-reaching theoretical claims of Sen and Nussbaum. A detailed theoretical overview of Sen’s approach has been provided by Ingrid Robeyns (Reference Robeyns2005, Reference Robeyns2007, Reference Robeyns2008). Sabina Alkire (Reference Alkire2002, Reference Alkire2005), Thomas Wells (Reference Wells2012) and a number of other texts provide detailed introductions to the terminology and theoretical frameworks of the capability approach. The introduction to Deneulin et al. (Reference Deneulin, Nebel and Sagovsky2006) contains a nuanced discussion of the capability approach, followed by articles applying Sen and Nussbaum’s ideas to different spheres of social enquiry, while Deneulin and Shahani (Reference Deneulin and Shahani2009) provide a detailed introduction from the point of view of international development.
Capability basics in the work of Sen and Nussbaum
Sen’s core claim is that a person’s well-being depends on her capabilities to be or do something that results in her leading the kind of life she has reason to value (Sen Reference Sen1999: 285). Sen critiques mainstream economic approaches for focussing solely on economic growth, available resources and the way rational individuals act on the market, because this leads economics to neglect two important factors: the human being in his entirety and society as a moral environment in which individual and group actors can develop projects which they have reason to value. In contrast, a capability-focused approach to the assessment of well-being transcends simplified models and studies the scopes of “opportunities, resources, rights (entitlements) and the valuable functionings (doings and beings)”, which are made possible thanks to the combination of available resources and a range of different capabilities (see Zimmermann Reference Corteel, Zimmermann and Duhin2006, for a detailed discussion).
The origins of the capability approach are best understood precisely in this opposition to conventional neoliberal economics and neoclassical theories of progress (such as, among others, rational choice theory (rct) and human capital approaches). The concept of capabilities in fact pre-dates Sen’s work: it was introduced to welfare economics by Lancaster (Reference Lancaster1966), the first mathematical economist to formally distinguish between commodities and their characteristics in consumer theory. Lancaster revolutionised microeconomic demand theory by emphasising that consumers derive utility not from goods themselves, but from their characteristics (see also Salais and Villeneuve Reference Alkire2005: 207). Two years earlier, Sen had already criticised utilitarian economics for its “commodity fetishism” (1977), that is, its focus on the amount of accessible commodities and the utility derived from them, but it was Lancaster’s innovation that helped Sen develop his argument. In an article entitled “Equality of What” (1979), Sen argued against the “welfarism” of mainstream economics which judges a state of affairs only on the basis of utilities, neglects the “fundamental diversity of human” beings; as Sen wrote later, goods are not valuable in themselves but derive value from “the extent to which they help the person” (1985: 21). Welfarism is, therefore, insufficient for analysing real-life positions. Sen took inspiration from the social contract tradition and in particular from John Rawls’ work, but his thinking was beginning to diverge from that of Rawls and he concluded that even combining all three then-existing approaches to equality (utilitarian equality, total utility equality, and even the most nuanced of the three, Rawlsian equality) would be insufficient. Traditional economics, Sen (Reference Sen1979) argued, reverses the causal link between desires and values, and its analysis presents a simplified and wrong picture in which humans value things because they desire them. By focussing on commodities, utility-based analysis neglects important factors of well-being, such as the unique or general physical conditions, values, norms and societal conventions; and fails to notice that the diverse needs of humans vary “with health, longevity, climatic conditions, location, work, conditions, temperament, and even body size (affecting food and clothing requirements)” (1979: 215). This results in gross inequality for “hard cases,” such as disabilities, or underestimates the well-being of “people who are hard to please” (1979: 214).
If not the availability of resources and utility derived from them, what then is a better and less misleading indicator for human well-being? Economists, Sen argues, must understand individuals as social beings living in diverse historical, economic and cultural situations, instead of measuring their needs with a simple yardstick that neglects important differences of conditions, values and capabilities. He proposed a “capability and human rights approach” (Sen Reference Dean1979) based on a positive notion of freedom. Examples of personal capabilities include financial or geographical access to health care institutions or the capability for social participation, such as what Bonvin and Thelen (Reference Bonvin and Thelen2003) term “capability for voice”; social capabilities are provided by general social arrangements such as the absence of war, the rule of law, relevant and socially legitimate legislation, general security, road infrastructure, the availability of hospitals, etc. Each person’s capability set is unique, and her “set or vectors of functionings” represents the person’s freedom to lead different types of lives (Sen Reference Sen1992: 33, 40). The emphasis on functional capabilities and substantive freedoms gives a broader definition of human diversity and the meaning of humanity, and allows more complete capture of the necessary information about human needs, entitlements, personal and group well-being more fully. A capability approach enables us to make moral decisions more justly, in contrast to those judgements based only on the limited indicators of primary goods and utility. In his own empirical work (e.g. 1982), Sen has tested his approach to extreme cases of poverty and famine in “third world” countries. He has continued advocating that economics must be based on a richer human ontology in which human beings are an end in themselves, persons with the “capacity to act and the freedom to choose,” rather than being reduced to simplified categories, such as workers, unemployed, mothers, etc. (e.g. Sen Reference Sen1999: 295-296).
The notion of conversion factors captures the transition from access to a particular resource to the achievement of a valuable functioning and helps Sen to distinguish between resources and capabilities (e.g. Sen Reference Sen2010, 23’20”). The availability of conversion factors that can transform an individual’s (latent) capabilities into real functionings is what determines her well-being (Sen, Reference Sen1999). The process of conversion depends partly on each person’s specific abilities or experience, but is largely defined by the existing social conventions and the structure of local circumstances (similarly to Bourdieu and Wacquant’s (Reference Bourdieu and Wacquant1992) “fuzzy logic of practical sense”). Conversion factors are situated in people’s very specific and complex circumstances and can be both personal and social.
Functionings are defined in terms of positive freedom, as valuable “beings and doings”: what people really do, or could do if they so chose. Functionings range from broad ones, such as being well-nourished, having access to education, avoiding morbidity and premature mortality; to concrete ones, such as the availability of transport to a polling station; but include also sophisticated achievements, such as self-respect, the ability to entertain friends, closeness to people one likes, participation in community life, the ability to take a holiday, etc. (Sen Reference Sen2004). The capability approach addresses well-being not merely by what people are or do, but by what they are free to be or do:
a person’s ability to do valuable acts or reach valuable states of being... The capability of a person reflects the alternative combinations of functionings the person can achieve and from which he or she can choose one collection (Sen Reference Sen, Nussbaum and Sen1993: 30-31).
Thus freedom is in fact one of the central concerns for the capability approach. Importantly, this is positive “freedom to” achieve, and not merely negative “freedom from.” Sen is wary of making the ambiguous argument that more freedom can be disadvantageous to a person, and instead insists that the real conflict is not between freedom and advantages, but between different types of freedoms. In other words, the capability approach does not endorse either imposing limitations on the number of available choices, or aimlessly increasing it. Instead, it focuses on the fact that our choices are circumscribed by diverse social factors many of which are hidden and/or taken for granted, e.g. the gendered employment structure or social conventions of raising children. Importantly, freedom, according to the capability approach, also involves the meta-freedom to rethink and revise what we value and want to achieve in our lives. The capability approach acknowledges that all social action is performed by social actors—not as the simplified discrete free individuals that rct envisages, but humans in their various social roles. Hence, detailed analysis of the circumstances in which different choices are made includes identifying what restrictions and what enabling factors act upon them. Both individual and group capabilities result from those situated, circumscribed and often ad hoc choices:
The freedom to lead different types of life is reflected in the person’s capability set. The capability of a person depends on a variety of factors, including personal characteristics and social arrangements (Sen Reference Sen, Nussbaum and Sen1993: 33).
Linked to this is the issue of “adaptive preferences:” that is, the tendency to make a virtue out of necessity and to adjust down our preferences as a way of adapting to unfavourable circumstances (Nussbaum Reference Nussbaum2000; Reference Nussbaum2001; Reference Nussbaum2003; oecd reports on human development; Sen Reference Sen, Bruni, Flavio and Maurizio2008):
[People] tend to adjust their desires and expectations to what little they see as feasible. They train themselves to take pleasure in small mercies. The practical merit of such adjustments for people in chronically adverse positions is easy to understand: this is one way of making deprived lives bearable. But the adjustments also have the incidental effect of distorting the scale of utilities (Sen Reference Sen, Bruni, Flavio and Maurizio2008).
Another important problem is that of evaluation of what matters which is done using what Sen calls an “informational basis of choice” or “informational basis of judgement in justice” (ibjj). The ibjj serves to “stabilise the concerned agents’ mutual expectations” and “allow efficient and legitimate action” (Bonvin and Farvaque Reference Bonvin and Farvaque2003b; Bonvin and Thelen Reference Bonvin and Thelen2005). It is not known in advance which information should be used as ibjj: it is elaborated through procedures of public deliberation and, quite similarly to the list of important capabilities, it is a conventional agreement that must remain open to amendment (this leads Whiteside and Mah (2012) to develop their argument in favour of the compatibility of the capability approach with convention theory, discussed below). Thus, multiple ibjj s can coexist and a variety of others can potentially be possible. Judgements about well-being, equality and justice must primarily focus on whether capabilities are being fostered or forfeited, and not stop at registering utility, mental states, preferences, income and the distribution of resources, although those factors are also important. Sen proposes a broad classification of possible ibjjs (see Table) which allows us to analyse situations with incomplete and often conflicting information. Bonvin and Farvaque (Reference Bonvin and Farvaque2003b: 4) argue, developing Sen’s argument, that two perspectives should be considered in any decision concerning someone’s well-being: the agency perspective to the person as “a doer and a judge” (Sen 1985: 208) and the well-being perspective as “a beneficiary, whose interest and advantages have to be considered.”
Table Sen’s IBJJ classification (1993: 35, as cited in Bonvin and Farvaque Reference Agarwal, Humphries and Robeyns2003: 4).
Sen’s early arguments help to tease out two key ontological claims that enable a variety of applications, but also open up the capability approach to important critiques. Firstly, the fundamental ontological assumption that it poses in response to classical economics is that “how well a person is” depends not on the simple sum of the resources or goods available, but on the “kind of life” that they lead and on “what the person is succeeding in ‘doing’ or ‘being”’ (Sen 1985: 28). Secondly, the capability approach assumes that people are not “fundamentally similar in terms of utility functions” (like mainstream economists and even Rawls accept) but, in fact, “seem to have very different needs” (1985: 215). In Sen’s ontology, values are more important than “wants” and “needs” and there are crucial distinctions between happiness and well-being, on the one hand, and between valuing and desiring on the other.
The capability framework has undergone a complex development and it is important to recognise not only that there are differences between the two main capability theorists, but also that their own theoretical formulations have evolved over time, often through empirical application and academic debate. This is especially true in the case of terminology and arguments in Sen’s own and collaborative work, but also applies to Nussbaum and other capability authors (Sen 1977, 1979, 1988b, 1992, 1998, 1999, 2004b[1985], 2005, 2008, 2009 et al.; Arrow, Sen and Suzumura Reference Arrow, Sen and Suzumura1999; Sen and Nussbaum 1993; Nussbaum and Glover Reference Nussbaum and Glover1995; Nussbaum Reference Nussbaum2003). For example, the debate between Sen and Rawls is far from closed. Philosopher Thomas Pogge (Reference Pogge2002) later retorted with a strong Rawlsian critique of Sen and declared the capability approach non-viable. This, in turn, has led Oosterlaken (2013) to defend the capability approach and argue that Pogge’s rebuttal of the capability approach is based on a misunderstanding of capability arguments while relying on hidden capability arguments—a capability theory “in disguise.” Substantial differences exist between Sen and Nussbaum’s capability approaches and sometimes cause terminological confusion (Robeyns Reference Robeyns2005, 2007; Alkire Reference Alkire2002, 2005; Feldman and Gellert (Reference Feldman and Gellert2006) give a detailed sociological analysis of Sen and Nussbaum’s differences). Robeyns (2005: 104) argues that Sen is more empiricist, while Nussbaum’s capability approach is more open to qualitative applications; while Carpenter (2009) refers to Sen’s version as the “thin,” and Nussbaum’s as the “thick” capability approach. Nussbaum’s work in general has focused much more on gendered aspects of capability. Perhaps the most often cited difference is the strong and opposing opinions of the two main capability theorists on the issue of enumerating capabilities. Sen’s notion of “basic capabilities” (“a person being able to do certain basic things,” 1979) is directly linked to liberties and equality and is more open than Nussbaum’s classification of all capabilities into “basic, internal, and combined” (2000: 84-86). Unlike Sen, who opposes explicit definitions of the essential human capabilities, Nussbaum (Reference Nussbaum2000) insists on the usefulness of a (very open) taxonomy of basic capabilities and freedoms. Nussbaum’s provisional list includes ten basic capabilities: life, bodily health, bodily integrity, senses, imagination and thought, emotions, practical reason, affiliation, living with concern for other species, play and control over one’s political and material environment (Nussbaum Reference Nussbaum2003: 41-42). In part, she sees the basic list as a way of solving the problem of adaptive preferences (see above).
Beyond the parallel versions of Sen’s “capability approach” and Nussbaum’s “capabilities approach,” there is even less chance to find a united “Capability Approach”: as Alkire (Reference Alkire2002; Reference Alkire2005) notes, its applications vary greatly and occasionally stand in opposition to one another. This variety is rooted in the differences between Sen’s and Nussbaums treatments of capability, but differences develop exponentially, as the approach is applied in different contexts, operationalised for different research methods, or taken up more or less in-depth. I take the view that the work of Sen and Nussbaum is compatible; however, Sen’s capability approach contains more elements that make it a versatile “tool” for sociological theory, precisely thanks to its openness and its global applicability. Nussbaum’s contributions are no less valuable but, since they have remained largely closer to moral philosophy, development economics and the context of poverty, they are less “pliable” for application in different areas of sociological research. The debate about the list of basic capabilities is a case in point. Sen’s argument for keeping the notion open to public deliberation is more in line with a sociological recognition of the social construction of knowledge: there cannot and should not be a definitive list, because the full extent of our freedom to choose our “beings” and “doings” is never obvious, since different persons have reasons to value different things at different points in time; even the most basic list would still be socially constructed and therefore might impose norms that may be inappropriate to the situation.
For and against
Having briefly reviewed the core concepts and arguments underpinning the capability framework, the following sections review the critiques of the notion of capability and several characteristic examples of what Robeyns (2006) calls “capability-based theories.”
Alkire et al. (Reference Alkire, Comim and Qizilbash2008) summarises the main advantages of the capability approach: its conceptual breadth in accepting any intrinsically valued beings and doings; its unrestricted applicability to different contexts regardless of, e.g., affluence; its suitability for different types of data and research methodologies; and its focus on freedom and human beings as active agents. However, these are also its biggest caveats. Sen’s work and later capability applications have faced a number of criticisms: for suffering from internal epistemological contradictions, being overly prescriptive, normative and evaluative, and insufficiently explanatory (Sayer Reference Sayer2012), as well as vague and “underspecified” (Robeyns Reference Robeyns2003; Reference Robeyns2007), hard to operationalise (Zimmermann 2006), individualistic, placing too much emphasis on agency and too little on structure (Hill Reference Hill2003; Dean Reference Dean2009). Sen’s earlier work in particular has been criticised as too focused on individual agency and insufficiently attentive to social structures (Robeyns Reference Robeyns2005); ignoring human interdependency, the problems of the public sphere and the exploitative nature of capitalism (Dean Reference Dean2009); and lacking a sufficiently developed theory of power, dominance and subordination (Reference HillHill 2003). Hartley Dean (Reference Dean2009) describes capitalism as “the elephant in the room” in the literature on capabilities (see also Cameron 2000; Carpenter Reference Carpenter2009; Holland Reference Holland2008; Navarro Reference Navarro2000; Sandbrook Reference Sandbrook2000). In recent years Sen has developed a more comprehensive theory of social justice that incorporates capability and human rights as the central criteria for the appraisal of justice, and public deliberation as the central mechanism for justice-related judgements. In his 2009 book, The Idea of Justice, Sen responds to some of the earlier criticisms by positioning capabilities in this wider theory of justice in which the concept of capabilities is both a means for evaluating social justice and human rights, and a practical tool for democratic and ethical public reasoning.
One common critique of the capability approach is that it lacks a middle-range theory (Merton Reference Merton and Merton1949). Sen himself acknowledged the existence of “widespread doubts about the possibility of making actual empirical use of this richer but more complex procedure” (2005). Feldman and Gellert (Reference Feldman and Gellert2006) and Hill (Reference Hill2003) argue that the capability approach is not sufficiently developed. Somewhat contrarily, some think it is epistemologically better suited to quantitative than qualitative research methodologies, yet not precise enough and notoriously hard to operationalise (Comim 2001; Agarwal et al. Reference Agarwal, Humphries and Robeyns2003; Nussbaum Reference Nussbaum2003); Zimmermann Reference Zimmermann(2006) agrees it is hard to operationalise especially for quantitative research, but argues that it is better suited for qualitative research. The reason for both problems is, in fact, the same: that none of the identifiable capabilities, functioning or conversion factors are isolated factors, but they are mutually dependent and can reinforce or negate each other. For example, the capability for work depends on other basic capabilities, such as health, education or mobility; it is enhanced or limited by the capability of having a family; and it can limit or enhance other capabilities, such as the capability of being healthy or the capability of artistic expression.
Many authors who identify problems in the capability approach also attempt to enrich or refine it. Conceptual broadness can be seen as an advantage: as both Alkire and Robeyns point out, the capability approach is not a theory, but a “broad normative framework” (Robeyns Reference Robeyns2006: 353; see also Zimmermann on the qualitative potential of the capability approach); and Alice Mah (Reference Mah2010) argues that the openness of the capability approach makes it especially applicable in a global sociological and historical context. Deneulin and McGregor (Reference Deneulin and Mcgregor2009) acknowledge the significant contribution of the capability approach to social theory but identify several deficiencies in the capability approach (in a similar direction to Salais but through a more philosophical lens), namely in its treatment of the social construction of meaning and in its avoidance of “in-depth discussion of the political and power dynamics of reasoning processes and their unavoidable trade-offs” (513).
The issue of operationalisation has received much attention and different solutions have been proposed for the empirical observation and measurement of capabilities. Zimmermann suggests that the capability approach can be operationalised with a deeper empirical insight into important dimensions which remain abstract in Sen’s theory, namely concepts of personhood, agency and environment (which is what makes it suitable for qualitative applications). Sometimes, but not always, capability is a zero-sum game: some capabilities may be open to people, but only if other people do not also want to realise the same capability. Robeyns (Reference Robeyns2006) outlines three theoretical directions which have emerged from the literature: choice between functionings and capabilities, selection of relevant capabilities, and weighting the different capabilities (also called aggregation, indexing or trade-offs). In turn, weighting has been carried out in three main ways: justified allocation of weights; statistical weighting; and a social choice procedure in which a relevant group of people decides on the weights of different elements of the study. The construction of the Human Development Index is a characteristic example: its three equally-weighted functionings are educational achievement (composed of literacy, two-thirds; and school enrolment, one-third), life expectancy, and economic standard of living (Robeyns Reference Robeyns2006: 357). In some empirical cases it is easier to focus on functionings directly and not on capabilities. The demarcation between capabilities can also cause dilemmas, for example, which capabilities are morally and economically relevant. Engerman (Reference Engerman2003) raises an important issue about the trade-offs between capabilities in his paper on “Slavery, Freedom, and Sen.” Sen (2009) makes a strong case that it is better to focus on realisable capabilities than to neglect what is feasible by over-focussing on ideal cases. As already discussed above, Nussbaum and her followers argue that this can be done by selecting a list of basic capabilities or “central human capabilities” to which every human being is entitled (although she insists on the list being “humble and open-ended”), while Sen (2004a) disagrees strongly and prefers to leave the issue entirely open for ad hoc debate in each new case, rather than risking a list that may not be legitimate.
Robert Salais sets out from the viewpoint of convention theory (Salais and Thévenot Reference Salais and Thevenot1986). He develops the idea of capability further and critiques Sen for remaining “trapped in the dominant positivist approach to social reality” and neglecting the socially constructed dimension of knowledge and its implications (Salais Reference Salais2009, see also earlier works). Salais establishes what he sees as a missing link in Sen’s theory: the connection between deliberative democracy and the capability approach. In Salais’ interpretation, the capability approach has two “breaking points”: “capability as the power to be and to do” and “the table of the situation as an instance of cognitive representation” (2009). (The “table of the situation” is a translation of a French play on words in which “tableau” means both picture and diagram and has to be just “in the twofold sense of objectively right and socially fair” (Salais 2009)). To this end, Salais defines capability as the real “power to choose alternate ways of being and doing” (2009: 3) and emphasises the need to include the missing notion of a common good in the conceptual framework. Salais maintains that the “establishing” and “production” of public knowledge through a democratic deliberative process is intrinsically connected to the achievement of the common good (“[k]nowing and achieving the common good thus become the two sides of a single social process rooted in a situation,” 13; 341). Researchers are “go-betweens” (Salais rejects the term “translators”) between the public and the politicians; militants also play an important role as those who initiate change; and the aim of deliberation is not political consensus, but objectivity in common judgement and a compromise on the content of the common good. To this end, public knowledge of reality in its diversity must be extended through empirical observation of a variety of situations. Salais also provides a further argument for the importance of democratic deliberation: not only is it important due to the “virtue of the democratic model itself,” but because of the “real value of the knowledge arising from social practice that citizens possess” (14).
Some critics go beyond critiquing the approach itself and focus on the problematic aspects of existing practical results of its applications, misapplications, or its potential for misuse. Robeyns (Reference Robeyns2006) lists the main measurement techniques that have been explored so far (descriptive statistics of single indicators, scaling, fuzzy sets theory, factor analysis, principal component analysis and structural equation modelling) and points out that, unfortunately, all previous research relies on existing data sets, rather than on data gathered specifically within a capability theoretical framework. Walby (Reference Walby2012) notes that Sen’s work has become “an open signifier”; Dean (Reference Dean2009) deems capability a “beguiling concept”; it is “susceptible to dilution” according to Sayer (Reference Sayer2012); and Lindley (Reference Lindley2008) notes that some of its applications have been superficially reliant on the central capability insight (the recognition of the fact that different agents use resources differently) or even just on the core term “capability,” without making full use of the capability framework. However, the fact that a theoretical approach has been misinterpreted, or that it lends itself fairly easily to superficial application, should invalidate the misapplications only, and not the approach itself. The use of any theory invariably involves adaptation, modification and operationalization and constructive critique is more fruitful than an outright negation. Sayer’s (Reference Sayer2012) critique is among the most salient and nuanced in this sense. He argues that the reason why the radical implications of the capability approach have not been sufficiently recognised is that it has been combined with “inadequate theories of society, particularly regarding the external conditions enabling or limiting capabilities.” Sayer warns against using the normative theory of capability “without an adequate account of the social structures that enable or limit human capabilities in particular situations.”
With these directions of critique in mind, the following section examines several strands of constructive applications of the capability approach.
Capability-based theories and applications in empirical research
Although the analytical system of the capability approach is still a work in progress, capability-driven conceptual frameworks underpin much new comparative and national research. It appears that, to date, the capability framework has been most enthusiastically applied in interdisciplinary research fields closest to policy practice, such as critical social policy, welfare and labour market studies, and health and disability; and that it has been most popular among researchers in (and of) Europe.
The capability approach, French convention theory and the sociology of human rights
One of the few explicitly sociological applications of the capability approach is the recent work of authors such as Salais (2009) and Whiteside and Mah (2012) who link the capability approach with French convention theory (fct, see e.g. Salais and Thévenot 1986; Thévenot 2004, 2005) in the context of the sociology of human rights. Whiteside and Mah note that although capability has been influential in shaping the un Development Programme, it has been unduly neglected in the sociology of human rights (2012: 924), and that it is a valuable tool for the sociological analysis of issues of social justice, human rights, deliberative democracy, and of the ways in which decisions affecting the common good are made and judged. They point out that the notion of capability is central to two implicit conceptions of human rights: the capability to act and the capability for voice and public reasoning, that is “the ability to express one’s opinions and to make them count in the course of public discussion.” Mah and Whiteside identify two main points of cross-over between fct and the capability approach. Co-ordination is the first point in which the ideas of capabilities and conventions meet. In Sen’s work, the notion of ibjj is at the core of decision-making and social co-ordination—and it is also at the core of convention theory. In policy terms, the evaluations that governments make of policy effectiveness and efficiency provide a prominent empirical example. Critique is the second common point. The capability approach provides both a theoretical framework and the motivational potential to create a viable critique which could expose the problems of capitalist society. The tension between capitalism and humanism visible in Sen’s work, they argue, is akin to the tension that transpires in Boltanski and Chiapello’s (Reference Boltanski and Chiapello2007) openly critical analysis of the new spirit of capitalism. The poor achievements of recent labour market policies, both passive and active, especially after the global financial crisis since 2008, are a case in point. Developing a capability critique based on the local situation would also be a step away from the problem of short-term policy horizons which hinder long-term adaptability in politics in the European Union (eu) and elsewhere.
To illustrate the point that resources do not determine well-being, Sen (2004b [1985]) provides the examples of a person starving during a famine and a fasting monk. A current example that extends this comparison further and links it directly to the global sociology of human rights is the public hunger strike of non-citizens in the centre of Berlin (October 2013, ongoing at the time of writing). Sen and Nussbaum’s capability approach is implicit in the striking non-citizens’ arguments which focus on the global nature of social inequality, the interdependence of geographic areas, and the fact that many individuals are compelled to seek refuge abroad due to the loss of basic human rights and capabilities in whole regions of the world as a result of (non-)actions by powerful regions. The non-citizens appeal to common humanity and refuse to accept being “deprived” of “[our] very basic human rights, which are equal life conditions like [the ones that] Citizens have” (rsf 2013). Whilst the striking non-citizens are using their capabilities for action and voice strategically, as potential conversion factors, in order to achieve other valuable capabilities (basic human rights and decent life conditions), they are also facing resistance: on the one hand, their concrete protest actions are circumscribed within the remit allowed by the police; on the other hand, the scarce media reporting of the event limits the refugees’ capability for public voice, in effect limiting their chances of provoking wide public debate.
Social policy, welfare and work
Since recently, the capability approach has been explored in critical welfare and social policy studies and created an interest in “a politics of capabilities” in Europe (e.g. Whiteside Reference Whiteside, Robert and Robert2005, 2011; Salais 2005; Dean et al. Reference Dean, Bonvin, Vielle and Farvaque2005; Salais and Villeneuve 2009; Guillen and Dahl Reference Guillen and Dahl2009). The capability approach lends a new perspective on security and the working life in a number of recent studies. These developments follow the earlier work of Whiteside and Salais (1998) and Browne et al. (2002) who were among the earliest to recognise that Sen’s “non-dogmatic,” context-orientated approach to defining the meaning of capabilities offers a viable framework for understanding the current tension between market rights and social rights in the eu. A capability-informed approach to welfare understands social policy as more than “safety-nets” for “rescuing casualties,” as Whiteside and Salais (1998) call them. Whiteside and Salais were among the first to argue convincingly that a broader alternative vision of welfare and labour policies is necessary for any long-term strategy for welfare provision and governance in Europe. They argue that traditional passive social assistance and the more recent active labour market policies are insufficient and even harmful when they fail to unlock their beneficiaries from vicious circles of poverty and destitution, while draining public resources rather than creating them. Capability-based social policies would instead coordinate—without monopolising—the public provision of educational institutions for the adaptation and upgrading of old capabilities and skills, participation facilities, public spaces for debate and any other infrastructures needed for the maximum achievable “common good.” This, however, would require redefining concepts such as “basic means of subsistence” as more than water and shelter: Whiteside and Salais appeal for policies to provide “conversion factors” allowing citizens to break vicious circles, actively convert their own capabilities into real “doings and beings” and achieve a better living according to their personal standards. Policies should aim at enabling “virtuous circles”: preconditions necessary for the emergence of success stories by providing an integrated complex of public services to which everyone is entitled, and to “help[ing] those who help themselves.” The eu’s recent focus on life-long learning (Lisbon strategy, 2000) is an attempt into the latter direction, but its practical implementation is still in the making. In relation to employment policy—and indeed, to the sociology of labour—the capability approach turns the usual answer to the question “what is a good job” upside down, in contrast to current employment policies, and exposes the distinctions drawn between social welfare measures and broader public service provision as unsustainable. Capability would be achieved if policies were designed in such a way as to intervene where the market cannot enable the best possible development and realisation of personal and group capabilities. The capability approach reveals that policy can (and should) create positive freedoms, opportunities and access to relevant resources which can be used by individuals and groups as conversion factors in achieving whatever each person and group “has reason to value.” To this end, paid employment is only one—not even the main—possible way. Whiteside has applied the capability framework to a socio-historical analysis of capabilities in public service provision in Britain and France around the turn of the 20th Century (2007). Other examples of capability-inspired research frameworks in sociological and socio-historical studies include Schmit’s (2013) historical study of public services in Prussian towns in the same period (1890-1914) and Gascoigne and Whiteside’s (2011) analysis of employment activation policies in Swedish shipyards in the 1970s. In France, Corteel, Zimmermann and Duhin Reference Corteel, Zimmermann and Duhin(2006) studied the capabilities and inequalities among workers in French firms, while Farvaque and Oliveau’s (Reference Farvaque and Oliveau2004) study of the opportunities and constraints of early careers analysed the extent of choice available to young people in finding a career trajectory. A research dialogue has been attempted between recent developments of the capabilities approach (de Munck and Zimmermann Reference De Munck and Zimmermann2008) and the Transitional Labour Markets (tlm) approach (e.g. Gazier and Gautié Reference Gazier and Gautié2009; Schmid Reference Schmid1995; Schmid and Auer Reference Schmidt1997). Rogowski et al. (Reference Rogowski, Salais and Whiteside2011) have applied both the tlm and the capability approach to analyse European Employment Policy. Carpenter (Reference Carpenter2009) has explored the capability approach in critical social policy in the contemporary uk context. He partially endorses the capability approach because it provides a potential way forward for progressive social policy analysis going beyond the “Keynesian—Westphalian” frame of nation-states. Carpenter, however, critiques it for being prescriptive and evaluative, rather than explanatory, and fraught with problematic philosophical, political and sociological areas related to central enlightenment themes. He suggests that the capability approach has “an in-built optimism about the possibilities for rational action and achieving fair results” such as namely progress, reconciling liberty and justice, and a blindness for the complicated controversies between the procedural and substantive requirements of ensuring social justice (the latter criticism, however, only applies to earlier versions of the capability approach). Carpenter, Freda and Speeden (Reference Carpenter2009) explore inequalities and human rights on the labour market, using the capability framework and the idea of a “virtuous circle” of capability to argue that the “workfare” approach to employment policy is philosophically reductionist, counterproductive and can stifle well-being by promoting job placement at any cost, instead of enabling individuals to fulfil their potential and contribute to the labour market to the best of their abilities. Bonvin and Farvaque’s (Reference Bonvin and Thelen2003) analysis of contemporary employment policies sums up the potential of the capability approach for the analysis of the labour market:
The Capability Approach provides a theoretical and empirical framework to assess how, at the local level, the institutional tools such as the legal welfare system (legal claims against the state) or the collective norms and conventions (e.g. about the distribution of rights and responsibilities between the state and the individual) translate or not into valuable functionings and real freedoms for the selected beneficiaries. A critique of tough employability-based policies is thus possible. The causal link between, on the one hand, employability or capability and on the other, access to employment and social integration, however remains a controversial issue (Bonvin and Farvaque, Reference Bonvin and Thelen2003).
Other social policy fields (health, disability and education studies)
In health and disability studies, disability is often defined as the deprivation of capability or functioning (theoretical foundations are reviewed e.g. in Mitra’s (Reference Mitra2006) study of children’s disabilities). Building on Sen and Nussbaum’s work, Jennifer Ruger (Reference Ruger1998, Reference Ruger2004, Reference Ruger2010) advances a “health capability paradigm.” Ruger’s theoretical framework focuses on “what individuals are actually able to be and do in an optimal environment (health capability) versus their current environment (health achievement)” (Ruger Reference Ruger2010) in order to provide tools for appraising and understanding the gap between optimal and real capabilities. Similarly to policy studies, health studies ultimately aim to “improve our ability to foster health capability” (Ruger Reference Ruger2010).
Lynn Tang’s (Reference Tang2013) doctoral thesis applies the capability approach to the experiences of Chinese mental service users in the uk. Grounding her argument in a critical-realist epistemology (Archer Reference Archer2000; Sayer Reference Sayer2012), Tang argues that the capability approach has the potential to define a scope for critique and negative resistance, but also for positive alternatives, especially when combined with intersectionality theory to reveal the generative mechanisms leading to capability expansion or deprivation and resulting inequalities. Tang points out four reasons for using capability as both a theoretical framework and as an evaluative element in a structural policy approach to recovery. First, seeing capabilities as “substantive freedoms” allows space for human agency as the basis for achieving flourishing and well-being, in line with those theories of mental recovery that emphasise aspects such as process and self-determination. Second, the capability approach can bring political leverage to the social model of mental health; it is sensitive to diversity, multiculturalism and allows for a plurality of values: it goes against attempts at the “assimilation” of ethnic minorities and does not see paid employment as the only legitimate goal of mental health recovery. Furthermore, it has advantages over “strength models” and social capital theory (Rapp 1998; McKenzie, Whitley and Weich 2002; as cited in Tang Reference Tang2013). Last but not least, Tang notes the sociological value of the notion of “adapted preferences” for health and disability studies and its potential to raise a critique of consumerist views of “choice.”
In education and child development, the capability framework has been underused, but several recent examples demonstrate its considerable potential for understanding how gender, ethnicity, class and other inequalities are related to educational choices and student educational attainment. Saito’s (2003) article offers one of the first reviews of the capability approach in relation to the study of education. Watts and Bridges (in Deneulin et al. Reference Deneulin, Nebel and Sagovsky2006) draw on Saito’s (Reference Saito2003) framework to put forward the capability approach as a tool for understanding “why and how young people make educational choices.” They analyse the “personal and societal characteristics that influence the construction and achievement of aspirations” (157) on the basis of a detailed case study of a female British Traveller student which feeds into a nuanced capability-driven sociological analysis of the impact of widening participation on young people’s educational choices. In a similar direction, Unterhalter (Reference Unterhalter2003a, Reference Unterhalter2003b) has written on gendered education in South Africa and Walker and Unterhalter (Reference Walker and Unterhalter2008) apply a capability-inspired framework to the context of social justice in education.
Conclusions
The world contains inequalities that are morally alarming, and the gap between richer and poorer nations is widening. The chance of being born in one nation rather than another pervasively determines the life chances of every child who is born. Any theory of justice that proposes political principles defining basic human entitlements ought to be able to confront these inequalities and the challenge they pose, in a world in which the power of the global market and of multinational corporations has considerably eroded the power and autonomy of nations (Nussbaum Reference Nussbaum2004).
That the capability approach has contributed to the conceptualisation, definition and general development of a “language” for the analysis of social problems in many different spheres of research and policy evaluation practice, shows that its conceptual potential has not been exhausted. For social policy, the capability approach has been a non-dogmatic tool for both theoretical analysis and practical policy reform; for economics and the quantitative side of sociology, capability is valuable because it breaks away from the “rational individual” model in several major ways. Sen’s (1999) formulation of development as a “process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy” remains among the most humanist approaches to well-being in economics. Social policy, welfare, labour market, health and disability and education researchers have been employing and developing elements of the capability approach in their work. What is the value of the capability approach for sociology?
First, the capability approach focuses on positive freedoms (to achieve something) and not merely on negative freedoms (from constraints). It recognises that different agents use different resources differently and that the mere possession of certain resources or characteristics does not necessarily mean that they will be used effectively (or at all)—leading Lindley (Reference Lindley2008) to call this “the central capability insight.” The capability approach also recognises that different functionings may be seen as valuable in different circumstances, by different individuals and in different communities. However, as Zimmermann Reference Zimmermann(2006) argues, the capability approach has potential for the qualitative strands in sociology and historical sociology, as exemplified with studies in which it is applied to the understanding of social justice, human rights, labour markets, health and disability, and education. It has been operationalised within research frameworks ranging from interpretivist to positivist and using quantitative, qualitative and participatory research methods. It has been combined with the theory of convention and in the context of the social production of knowledge (Whiteside and Salais 1998; Salais Reference Salais2009; Whiteside and Mah 2012); the transitional labour markets approach (Rogowski et al. Reference Rogowski, Salais and Whiteside2011); a critical-realist ontology and the theory of intersectionality (Tang Reference Tang2013); and other theoretical frameworks. Within a Marxist tradition, the capability approach can be viewed as a valuable tool for transforming unjust structures, being conducive to participatory research and other types of enabling and publicly engaged sociological theory and practice. As Deneulin et al. (Reference Deneulin, Nebel and Sagovsky2006: 14) conclude, the capability approach is robust enough, but must be complemented with theories that enable a better understanding of social structure, human sociality, collective living and the meaning of social action, for example within the philosophical traditions of Hannah Arendt and Paul Ricœur. As Salais (Reference Salais2009) has shown, the capability framework has the potential to contribute to the understanding of the social construction of knowledge.
John Holmwood (Reference Holmwood2013) makes a strong argument that sociology’s capability-blindness reveals as much about the current state of academic sociology as a field of enquiry and research practice, as it does about the capability approach itself. In particular, Holmwood argues that the core of the discrepancy between contemporary sociology and the capability approach lies in the problematic relationship between sociology and economics, and in the internal fragmentation of sociology. In continuation of Holmwood’s argument, this article has argued that sociology also needs to review its relationship with areas within the discipline itself that are currently marginal, such as social policy, and has highlighted some current capability-inspired research which would be of use to sociologists in other subdisciplines. I have argued that the capability framework, and especially some of the “second generation” capability-based theories, have the potential to inform sociological theory and research tools in a number of thematic areas of sociology, not limited to policy-oriented studies. The capability approach has a strong potential as both a normative, and explanatory framework for issues related to social inequality and well-being, such as work, dignity, health and (dis)ability, gender, education, migration and others. This requires taking stock of sociologically relevant theoretical insights gained from welfare and social policy research, health and disability research and other areas of academic enquiry. Examples of important insights include notions such as the “capability for work” (Bonvin and Farvaque Reference Bonvin and Thelen2003) which allows for an understanding of the intersection of labour markets and the life course, and for an analysis of issues such as dignity in labour, meaningful work, gender inequalities, individual and typical career trajectories (Corteel and Zimmermann Reference Corteel, Zimmermann and Duhin2006). “Capability for voice” is another important and often neglected aspect of social justice and participation (Bonvin and Thelen Reference Bonvin and Thelen2003; Bonvin and Farvaque Reference Bonvin and Farvaque2003a, Reference Unterhalter2003b; Zimmermann Reference Zimmermann2006). The notion of capability is an important element of the assessment of social justice and of the public deliberative process, as Whiteside and Mah (Reference Whiteside and Mah2012) have shown, linking it with convention theory. Capability is a general constituent of different possible modes of well-being, and can constitute an element of indicators constructed for the appraisal of individual and group well-being (Salais Reference Salais, Salais and Villeneuve2005; Reference Salais2009). The capability framework is compatible with the health capability paradigm (Ruger Reference Ruger1998; Reference Ruger2004; Reference Ruger2010) and a useful concept for understanding the effects of mental health services (Mitra Reference Mitra2006; Tang Reference Tang2013) and educational choices (Watts and Bridges in Deneulin et al. Reference Deneulin, Nebel and Sagovsky2006). The list of applications is far from exhaustive. In conclusion, the capability approach is far from being merely an “empty signifier”: on the contrary, it can contribute to sociological analyses, sociologically-informed debates and critical, global, publically engaged sociological theory and research—provided that theorists, researchers and policy-makers are aware of its epistemological and methodological limitations and its historic origins as a normative framework, and wisely combine it with sociological theories dealing with social structure and the social production of knowledge.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to A. Mah, K. Lohman, T. Sullivan and reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article, and to the institute re:work for the ten-month fellowship which enabled me to work on this article. Responsibility for the arguments and any errors remains mine.
