No CrossRef data available.
Article contents
COMMENTS ON “WHAT THE INTERNALIST SHOULD SAY TO THE TORTOISE”
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 May 2015
Abstract
Richard Fumerton has provided two possible responses that the internalist might make to the “Tortoise problem.” I argue that the second of these two responses is preferable, and I suggest one way that it might be strengthened.
- Type
- Articles
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015
References
REFERENCES
Baehr, J. 2011. The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Blackburn, S. 2010. Practical Tortoise Raising: and Other Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Fumerton, R. 1995. Metaepistemology and Skepticism. Boston, MA: Rowman and Littlefield.Google Scholar
Fumerton, R. 2015. ‘What the Internalist should say to the Tortoise.’ Episteme, doi:10.1017/epi.2015.12.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gillies, D. 2003. ‘Probability and Uncertainty in Keynes's General Theory.’ In Runde, J. and Mizuhara, S. (eds), The Philosophy of Keynes’ Economics: Probability, Uncertainty and Convention, pp. 111–29. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Montmarquet, J. 1993. Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.Google Scholar
Wright, S. 2010. ‘Internalist Virtues and Knowledge.’ Acta Analytica, 25: 119–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wright, S. 2013. ‘A Neo-Stoic Approach to Epistemic Agency.’ Philosophical Issues, 23: 262–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Zagzebski, L. 2012. Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar