Introduction
Just before World War I, antisemitism and xenophobia in England skyrocketed, couched in the language of economic protectionism and nationalism.Footnote 1 World War I heightened these conditions. First- and second-generation Jewish immigrant–founded businesses faced an uncertain future in which they and their families were treated as foreigners within their own country. Politicians, angry mobs, reporters, and rival companies targeted business owners with German-sounding names, describing them as enemies within.
In their edited volume, Rozenblit and Karp state that “the war provided the first wide-ranging and global opportunity for Jews to demonstrate their patriotism through that central component of modern made citizenship: fighting for one’s country.”Footnote 2 Jews in Britain, through the struggles they faced, fit into the larger picture of Jewish experiences during World War I, not in the exact details of their struggle, but in being part of many Jewish communities dealing with the rise of the hyper-nationalist sentiment.Footnote 3 War both destroyed the imperial international umbrellas that most Jews lived under and gave Jews the opportunity to demonstrate patriotism and loyalty to nations through military service and other public displays.Footnote 4 Rozenblit address one of the driving forces of this opportunity being mass migrations and search for security and citizenship protections from nations who by their very nature were exclusionary to outside groups like the Jews.Footnote 5
Gideon Reuveni and Frank Trentmann remind us that in the late nineteenth century, an association between free enterprise and citizenship emerged.Footnote 6 “In generating and securing markets for their products, advertisers targeted potential customers according to different categories of belonging, such as gender, class, region, and religion. Citizenship was an additional, and pivotal, form of group membership.”Footnote 7 Jewish success was linked to economic liberalism; therefore, changes to the business environment that prompted boycotts based on race and religion were important.Footnote 8 World War I changed consumption to a central feature of life, invoking nationalism and citizenship.Footnote 9
Recent research has examined why and how Jewish populations have clustered together in the modern economy. Clothing, food, and entertainment have been documented by scholars as economic niches in which Jewish entrepreneurs established themselves. Andrew Godley, in Jewish Immigrant Entrepreneurship in New York and London, 1880–1914, compares immigrant businesses in similar locations to argue that success in business was due to a country’s cultural factors.Footnote 10 Adam Mendelsohn, in The Rag Race, argues that cultural factors did matter, but were not the sole cause of economic success. Footnote 11 Instead, he posits that Jewish immigrants in the United States were greatly aided by their association with particular market niches where other Jewish immigrants were working, thus crafting a cultural home within the new society that fit well with the Jewish population. In another work, Ted Merwin argues that Jewish identity and business became redefined by second and third generations.Footnote 12 Here, he examines the history of Jewish immigrants and their eating habits to demonstrate that it was actually second-generation Jewish immigrants in New York who created the stereotypical Jewish deli space and identity associated with certain meats, because first-generation immigrants could not afford them, except at home. Eating out in public became part of the assimilation process for second-generation Jews who, by claiming the deli space, could both engage in the commercial culture of the United States and do it in a way that was very Jewish.Footnote 13
Social and cultural capital and kinship networks were key ingredients in successful Jewish business enterprises.Footnote 14 However, with the emergence of nationalism, these formerly positive variables became questionable liabilities. Jerry Muller argues that diasporic networks worked well with capitalism, because they reduced trust issues and trade barriers, but that with the advent of nationalism, Jews found themselves in conflicted political situations as dominant nationalistic majorities clashed with diasporic minorities.Footnote 15 In his last chapter Muller builds on the work of Ernest Geller and Dov Borochov, who argued nationalism was the consequence of capitalism and industrialization. This is not a new argument. Avner Greif discusses how Jewish networks allowed Jews to overcome issues of trust in business dealings because of informal business norms within the community.Footnote 16 Eli Berman argues that the Jewish religion was also a community with shared norms, pools of trust, insurance, and knowledge and that Jewish success in capitalism was due to this aspect.Footnote 17
While scholars have examined the political and cultural shifts of this dramatic era, they have not analyzed how businesses responded to this inward turn or to what degree Jewish immigrant–founded businesses were successful at defending their families and company interests from antisemitic attacks. Did Jewish immigrant–founded businesses have to modify how they portrayed themselves to accommodate this new environment? How did the relationship between Jewish business owners and their communities and the state change due to the onset of World War I? Rather than examining consumers as agents engaged in struggles of identity formation, this article examines actions taken by producers to defend against attacks on one part of their identity—their citizenship—thus flipping the perspective from consumers to producers and changing the focus from Jewish identity struggles to Jews struggling to claim a patriotic nationalistic identity.
Xenophobia and Antisemitism Before World War I
Tense Relations
During World War I, anti-German sentiment, often synonymous with antisemitism, became rampant in England, both in political circles and in the press. Relations with Germany were already complicated when war broke out, but there were still many cultural, political, and business ties between the two countries.Footnote 18 However, the rise of Germany’s military and imperial power was perceived as a direct threat to Britain’s international position of dominance, and free trade proponents in Britain resented Germany’s protectionist measures. Several political scandals, such as Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli’s policies toward Turkey leading up to World War I had already positioned some politicians into the antisemitic camp.Footnote 19 Critics claimed the Jews supported Disraeli’s anti-Christian actions and British interests were being subverted by Jews who were “unpatriotic” and potentially disloyal because they had only tenuous national ties to Britain.Footnote 20 This theme surfaced again in 1902 during the South African War; in 1912 with the Marconi scandal; and in 1913 with the Indian Silver Affair.Footnote 21 Jews were seen as committed to their own material interests through cosmopolitan international networks and unpatriotic.Footnote 22 As Todd Endelman has pointed out, none of the activities that critics accused Jews of in relation to the later of these two scandals were actually illegal; however, these political maneuvers and business decisions were seen as loyal only to Jewish rather than British interests.Footnote 23 Jewish immigrants were increasingly seen by some as a threat to domestic jobs and a cultural way of life in favor of an international Jewish network over British locals. War fueled hatred and fear of mass immigration that had been building in England for decades. Jewish immigration in the early to mid-nineteenth century consisted of Polish and German Jews, many of whom came from the “respectable” middle classes, who were drawn to Britain for economic opportunities.Footnote 24 But in the 1880s, waves of Eastern European Jews settled in England (somewhere between 120,000 to 150,000 from 1881 to 1914).Footnote 25 Immigrants fleeing Russian persecution flooded London, further increasing antisemitic attitudes from British citizens who viewed the new arrivals as culturally very different. Footnote 26
In 1911, the German immigrant community living in England and Wales totaled 53,324.Footnote 27 The two largest categories of German workers in London according to the census in 1911 were as follows: “Waiters (not domestic);” and “Bread, biscuit, cake, etc. makers, bakers, confectioners (dealers).”Footnote 28 Clerks and servants followed closely behind. Germans made up 10 percent of the waiters in London restaurants in 1911.Footnote 29 Some contemporaries made sweeping claims that the Germans undercut the British on wages, which not only took domestic jobs, but drove down salaries as well.Footnote 30 This kind of anti-German sentiment began before the war. In the years leading up to the war, the Daily Mail (under Alfred Harmsworth, Viscount Northcliffe) was heavily anti-German in its content. The paper published a series of xenophobic articles written by Robert Blatchford in 1909 and reprinted them in a pamphlet form that sold more than 1.6 million copies.Footnote 31 “[He] warned the people of England of the tremendous menace of Germany. ‘I write these articles,’ said Mr. Blatchford … ‘because I believe that Germany is deliberately preparing to destroy the British Empire.’”Footnote 32 When war broke out, the paper branded itself as the “paper that foretold the war.”Footnote 33 In 1911, L. J. Maxse, editor of the National Review, voiced negative opinions of Jews who took advantage of the benefits in Britain while working “for our German enemies.”Footnote 34
Antisemitism or Xenophobia?
Anti-German sentiment was frequently paired with active antisemitism. Historians agree that the years from 1899 to 1939 are in general the high point for antisemitism in Western societies.Footnote 35 However, it varied greatly over that time from country to country. Discussing antisemitism in England is difficult, because a general xenophobia was directed at immigrants, many of whom were also Jewish. People hated Jews for religious beliefs and practices, economic successes, alleged racial characteristics, and political reasons, sometimes all at once or interchangeably.Footnote 36 Reuveni notes that in Weimar Germany, whether a social anxiety matter became tied up with antisemitism was dependent on whether the matter was framed in consumer discourse or producer discourse. Those under consumer discourse rarely involved a Jewish component, but instead might focus on the trope of controlled middle-class consumers versus the uncontrolled masses and how people were targets of commerce.Footnote 37 Producer discourse, on the other hand, could bring in the Jewish question very quickly, because Jews were seen as producers, not consumers.Footnote 38 Reuveni uses the example of Jewish butchers who became the target of antisemitism when the question of animal cruelty became a social issue; they were targeted because the issue involved competition between sellers.Footnote 39 Antisemitism cannot be separated from other social challenges such as anti-modernism and fears for economic well-being.Footnote 40 Paul Lerner describes this phenomenon well in his examination of Jewish department stores in Germany at the turn of the twentieth century. Opponents of these new stores framed attacks in ways that “forged popular associations between department stores, Jews, and the specter of national decline.”Footnote 41 Not all opponents were active antisemites; some were small business owners who allied themselves with outspoken antisemites so as to focus on the Jewishness of the store to attract more attention and support.Footnote 42 Activists used the expansion of such stores to bring out fears of “the increasing influence of Jews over German economic and cultured life. The two types of critiques overlapped and cross-fertilized to the point that they were essentially indistinguishable.”Footnote 43 British citizens, politicians, journalists, and business competitors paired xenophobia, economic fears, and anti-modernism with antisemitism during the national panic of World War I. By the summer of 1915, the Times of London was using the terms “Jewish” and “German” interchangeably.Footnote 44 Looking specifically at antisemitism over time in Great Britain, Brustein and King’s data analysis depicts a constant, low level of antisemitic acts from 1899 to 1908, with an increase from 1908 to 1914.Footnote 45 The increased tension was a result of a major wave of immigration of Jews from Eastern Europe, which not only increased antisemitism, but transformed the makeup of Anglo-Jewry.Footnote 46
During the Edwardian years, some newspapers propagated hatred toward aliens in general. The use of the word “alien” usually referred to persons of Jewish origin and could be Russian immigrants or “established members of society, who had made their way from Germany in the mid- or late nineteenth century.”Footnote 47 After the war started, these same newspapers loudly trumpeted anti-Germanism and sustaining the war effort.Footnote 48 Riots broke out on five occasions: August 1914, October 1914, May 1915, June 1916, and July 1917.Footnote 49 Many German immigrants were in service and restaurant work. Waddington contends that violent anti-German sentiment against immigrants did not begin until 1914, but that in the years leading up to that moment, the “less violent forms of Germanophobia intensified as Germany was more and more perceived as an economic and imperial rival.”Footnote 50 Competition for jobs at home intensified this hatred during the 1880s as German clerks were seen as undercutting British workers and various publications called for the immigrants to be sent home.Footnote 51
Reactions to War
Perceptions of the Enemy Within
It has been well documented that World War I was a war of propaganda. Anti-German sentiment was paired with active antisemitism in the press, in politics, in material culture, and in business.Footnote 52 Popular sentiment could be seen in music hall songs and cartoons in which anti-German rhetoric focused on Germans entering the “catering trade and commercial sector.”Footnote 53 The phrase “German sausage” was used as a metaphor and a “slur on nationality” and was “widely understood” based on witness statements from assault cases involving antisemitism.Footnote 54 Racial insults were layered with meanings about free trade, economic rivalry, the war, domestic jobs, and economic security in the face of an enemy threat. Margot Asquith, Countess of Oxford and Asquith, discussed the wave of hate toward British citizens who had been born in Germany in her memoirs. “There was nothing too vile and too silly for people to believe.”Footnote 55 The material published in newspapers at the time clearly reflects these concerns.
In October 1914, the press ran a series of articles about German service workers in London. For example, the Daily Mail asked its readers for information on Germans working in hotels, citing a need to expel all Germans and Austrians from the country, because they were enemies within; even naturalized Germans should be expelled, because the naturalization form was “just a ₤5 scrap of paper.”Footnote 56 The article declared that German managers “systematically reject British labour in favor of German.”Footnote 57 However, instead of creating a “blacklist” of hotels and businesses that employed Germans and Austrians, the paper crafted a “white list” of some that did not.Footnote 58 The Daily Mail called its series of articles “the campaign for enforcing proper precautions against the enemy in our midst” and continued to expand the white list of hotels. They also published statements from readers and reminded people not to be fooled by a waiter claiming to be Swiss: “Once a German, always a German … If your waiter says he is Swiss, ask to see his passport.”Footnote 59
The shift in popular opinion had a dramatic impact on the way business had to be conducted. Before the war, companies that enjoyed an international reputation were well thought of. The war changed this for some companies operating in Britain.Footnote 60 Government reaction to German businesses in Britain during the beginning of the war led to the passage of the first Trading with the Enemy Act. On August 5, 1914, the law made it illegal to have transactions with anyone who was a resident of the German Empire.Footnote 61 There were no objections to companies trading with German businesses if a firm was established or at least had a branch to trade with that was in neutral territory.Footnote 62 None of these initial statutes, however, had much impact on an “alien enemy resident in Britain,” and they caused a lot of controversy and public calls for all-British firms to establish themselves as such.Footnote 63 In examining instances of entrepreneurs who did not understand this, it becomes clear that continuing with “business as usual” often led to failure when company owners attempted to defend their positions as British citizens through legal definitions and intellectual appeal to international reputation and quality.
In reality people always have multiple layers of loyalties and identities that shift in priority. A mother can be loyal to her family, her church, and even a cause such as women’s rights. She might identify, to her closest relatives, as loyal to her family first, but be seen by others as a neglectful mother who prioritizes her activities with the suffragettes before her children. In wartime, these loyalties come under question. During World War I, non-Jewish businesses and individuals with German ties could be and were often targeted as enemies within without also being targeted as Jewish. A good example of this was a famous piano company.
Bechstein Piano
The London firm of Bechstein, formally C. Bechsteinpianofortefabrik AG. Bechstein, was a German company founded in 1853 in Berlin in order to manufacture the best pianos in the world. With endorsements from international musicians, Bechstein grew in reputation and its pianos became a status symbol for concert halls. By the turn of the century, Bechstein had dealerships/showrooms in Berlin, London, Paris, Vienna, and Saint Petersburg, but London was the largest. Bechstein held a royal warrant to supply pianos to the Queen. In 1901 Bechstein opened Bechstein Hall next door to the piano company showrooms in London on Wigmore Street; the magnificent 350-seat hall had been built by Bechstein for £100,000.Footnote 64 After the outbreak of war, the family firm of Bechstein “confirmed that no more pianos would be received from the Berlin factory until after the war, and all proceeds of the business would remain in England.”Footnote 65
Carl Bechstein advocated for his company’s continued licensing with a long letter to the authorities. He explained that the company had “paid ‘enormous sums in rents, rates and taxes’ since its establishment in 1879; it had also given ‘employment to a very large staff of English assistants and work-people.’”Footnote 66 Bechstein emphasized that out of one hundred or so employees, only five were German, one of whom had two sons serving in the British Army.Footnote 67 In addition, many of the employees, he said, “were ‘either Reservists who have been called up, or are in the Territorial Force’… and the company was still paying the families in their absence.”Footnote 68 Unfortunately for Bechstein, the county council “refused to offer a license to the hall during wartime, even when the owners offered to replace the Bechsteins with British pianos.”Footnote 69 On April 13, 1915, the Lord Chamberlain canceled Bechstein’s royal warrant to supply to Queen Alexandra.Footnote 70 In 1916 the Board of Trade had all of the Bechstein property confiscated and auctioned; it was all purchased by the Debenhams company (for only £56,500), which renamed the concert venue Wigmore Hall.Footnote 71 This incident was at the core of a movement that affected musicians such as Sir Landon Ronald, principal of the Guildhall School of Music from 1910 until his death in 1938. After his death, the Musical Times’s obituary reminded readers that “one of the earliest occurrences at the G.S.M. after his appointment was the battle-royal in the Court of Common Council over his adoption of Bechstein pianos. A certain number of these fine instruments were hired, to the wrath of the ‘Buy British’ school.”Footnote 72 Even though the Bechsteins employed British citizens, of the three brothers (Carl, Johann, and Edwin), Johann and Edwin served in the German army, which led the county council to view the business as “an enemy concern.”Footnote 73 The international familial connections held more weight against the Bechstein company than the tax money paid locally or the hundred British employees.
Bechstein argued that it was not the enemy, but its passive rebuttal was not enough during war. It needed to aggressively argue and take action to prove it was a British company, not just that it was not loyal to the enemy. However, Bechstein faced a situation similar to companies like Singer and Royal Worcester Corset Company. As subsidiaries of multinational corporations, they represented heavy inward foreign direct investment by companies in other countries. In the prewar era of a free trade mentality in a global market, opportunity for acquisition of market share through a British subsidiary could be substantial. American and German firms invested heavily in the UK manufacturing and service sectors and waged extensive battles for market share through trademark lawsuits and creative marketing. Beckstein’s marketing focused on endorsements and luxury branding using its West End showrooms.Footnote 74 Unfortunately, that luxury branding was associated with German prestige in piano making.
Citizenship and Jewish Companies
Citizenship
For German Jewish businesses and the families behind them, the antisemitism already present was compounded and magnified, sometimes resulting in loss of financial security or cultural expulsion from the country they called home. For Jewish citizens, already under scrutiny, questions of multiple loyalties could spell disaster from several angles. T. H. Marshall framed the citizenship discussion as three spheres of activity: civil, political, and social.Footnote 75 While his analysis leaves much to be desired, the concepts are useful in this discussion. Civil and political rights were less of a struggle for Jews in Britain than in other parts of the world, and during the globalism period before World War I, focus was placed on those rights by a populace that embraced free trade and internationalism as an ideology. The legality of citizenship and contractual obligations of a company were significant. However, extreme nationalism and wartime panic changed this to questions about cultural insiders and outsiders. Social benefits and civil protections suddenly came under scrutiny for those who seemed to be cultural Jewish outsiders to Britain. German Jews could be hit with questions of loyalty to the enemy as Germans and as cultural outsiders through differences in dress, food, appearance, religion, and anything else that made them stand out, such as wealth. As nationality became a more prominent aspect of many people’s identities, the legality of citizenship took a backseat to cultural and racial norms of the imagined community of the nation-state.Footnote 76
Ideal Film
The British motion picture company Ideal Film was a family company run by Harry and Simon Rowson, two brothers of German Jewish lineage. Both brothers were English born and educated and highly involved in the British government. During the war, they produced The Man Who Saved the Empire, otherwise known today as The Life Story of David Lloyd George. The script for the film was written by Sir Sidney Low, a reporter (editor for St. James’s Gazette and the Standard), historian, member of the Ministry of Information, and a member of the Propaganda Committee for Enemy Countries under Northcliffe. Harry Rowson also worked for the Ministry of Information during the war. The Rowson brothers were legal citizens by birth, well placed in their careers and government connections, yet they were just as vulnerable as others to slanderous attacks.
On October 5, 1918, just after the film had been finished, but before its release, Horatio Bottomley, owner of the popular newspaper John Bull, attacked the film company for pro-German sentiment, employment policies, and blood ties.Footnote 77 Bottomley noted that he had “nothing to say” against Ideal Film Renting Company, that it “enjoys a first-class reputation,” but quickly followed with an attack against the families behind it.Footnote 78 Five of the shareholders of Ideal Film were listed by occupation, current name, and former name to display to the public that the shareholders were of German Jewish descent. Rowson for example, was actually Rosenbaum, a known Jewish family name.Footnote 79
Bottomley couched the attacks in a pro-British nationalist style, but also with a populist pro–working class bent. The article gave an account of how Ideal Film employed foreigners as extras, and specifically German actors as soldiers and sailors, instead of discharged British soldiers.Footnote 80 The overall claim tying these accusations together for the reader of John Bull was that this company of German Jews was taking money from the British economy and giving jobs to foreigners instead of true citizens. “It may be that each of these persons—despite the remarkable Teutonic flavor of their original patronymics—is a thoroughly loyal British subject, but the fact remains that, by some blood affinity, they were all drawn together into a trade organization in competition with firms of a truer All-British ring.”Footnote 81 The way in which citizenship and immigration interact with each other through civil, political, and social arenas is a complicated, messy, historically situated phenomenon, but here we see Bottomley used a tool of propaganda; he framed the argument in simple terms of two opposing camps, us or them. In reality, he linked economic fears, wartime enemy status, and being Jewish into one grouping, playing on antisemitic stereotypes with newfound panic over war and unemployment.
Ideal Film sued John Bull for libel and slander and immediately attempted to counter the accusations. Published in The Cinema on October 10, 1918, Ideal’s letter clearly did not understand the working-class populist political climate from which John Bull drew its power. The company used language and arguments that were meant to appeal to intellectual thought and worldly reputation, assuming the factual legal citizenship of the family members would be enough to assure the public of the company’s loyalties.
It is sufficient for the present to emphasise the very high reputation Ideal enjoys in the cinema world … [our] business relations with the [cinema world] generally have always been cordial and honorable.Footnote 82
The letter attempted to counter the argument in John Bull that the company members were Germans by providing a factual list. This list not only emphasized birth country, education, and military service connections, but also interfamily relations between the members. “E. Rowson, wife of S. Rowson … Hilda Jacobson … Sister of the Rowsons … J. Wilmot … nephew of S. Rowson …Leslie Rowson …. Son of S. Rowson.”Footnote 83 This approach put heavy focus on the families behind the business and tried to argue about individual legal citizenship status, ties, and loyalties. However, the list likely had the unintended consequence of playing into a stereotype regarding Jewish business practices as closed to nonfamily members.
Not long afterward, Ideal Film received notice from the government that Prime Minster Lloyd George did not want the film released. Pressure from friends and associates convinced the Rowson brothers not to release the film in America either in order to avoid “world scandal” and “to prevent this, at any cost, from being a Jewish question—the only way we could look at it.”Footnote 84 Rowson was released from the Ministry of Information, the brothers were never allowed to see the prime minister over the matter, and the government made them a financial settlement equal to the cost of the production (£20,000) in exchange for all negatives and positives of the film.Footnote 85 Harry described the feeling in the company as one of depression and humiliation. Eventually the libel case against John Bull was settled out of court; John Bull issued an apology, paid all court costs, and withdrew its allegations, but the damage was already done.Footnote 86 Instead of framing itself as a patriotic British business, Ideal Film accidentally emphasized its cultural foreignness, which far outweighed the fact that its members were legally British citizens.
J. T. Grein
Theater was no less anti-German than the newspapers during the war. Popular theater propelled and used the fear of German invasion and notions of patriotic duty in scripts and propaganda pieces. Often source material for the theater came from popular “invasion novels,” such as The Enemy in Our Midst (1906).Footnote 87 Between 1914 and 1918 the Lord Chamberlain licensed almost two hundred war plays dealing in propaganda about German spies.Footnote 88 There was a deliberate response to shut off German ties in the theater community. Thirty-nine British writers published an “Author’s Declaration” (1918) in the London Times and New York Times declaring allegiance to Britain and statement that that they believed Germany was the aggressor.Footnote 89 They also demanded that the theater people disavow German ties publicly and immediately; people responded in letters to the paper en masse doing so.
J. T. Grein was a major figure in London theater during this period. Educated in Germany and the Netherlands, he used German culture as an inspiration for establishing a theater in London that would introduce audiences to the influential works of German writers; he also targeted the German population living in the city for some of his audience.Footnote 90 In February of 1918 the Independent Theater, owned by J. T. Grein, announced upcoming performances of Salome with Maud Allan; these performances were private via a subscription to the Independent Theater. This drew the attention of a member of Parliament, Noel Pemberton Billing. Before this case, Billing had “organized a Vigilante Association, dedicated to the ‘purification of politics,’ and published” a popular newspaper that “specialized in abusive attacks upon the government.”Footnote 91 Billing played upon anti-German sentiment and antisemitism to rally his followers. In 1918 he called for the “government to denaturalize and intern all enemy-born subjects and to require all aliens to wear emblems on their coat lapels identifying their national origins.”Footnote 92 In 1918 he published an article in the Vigilante that claimed that “Germany has found that diseased women cause more casualties than bullets. Controlled by their Jew-agents, Germany maintains in Britain a self-supporting—even profit-making—army of prostitutes which put more men out of action than does their army of soldiers.”Footnote 93 Billing claimed there was a “black book” compiled of 47,000 British citizens who were “addicted to practices which ‘all decent men thought had perished in Sodom and Lesbia.’”Footnote 94 Next, Billing slandered Allan, Grein, and all members of the Independent Theater, linking them with abnormal sexual practices (very Victorian) and accusing them of being under the influence of the enemy. He stated they were among the 47,000 in the black book. Grein and Allan sued for libel. They lost.
Billing used the opportunity to accuse as many members of the government of being enemies within as he could (including the judge). British law was that any statements made by individuals in the courtroom could not be used as a basis for charges of libel or slander, so Billing could safely accuse anyone of anything, and the press reported on his remarks.Footnote 95 However, I wish to draw attention to the closing argument by Billing, which characterized Grein not just as a German agent but a German Jew. Billing accused the government of protecting German Jews and asserted that England was in danger.Footnote 96 During the trial, he suggested that Grein had “alien blood” because he had been born in Amsterdam and his name “sounded German.”Footnote 97 Billing also pointed out that the play performance would happen on a Sunday, which was another direct attack on Grein’s Jewish heritage.Footnote 98 Billing received a standing ovation from cheering crowds and was acquitted of charges.
Grein had other defensive strategies that could have been used, but he instead focused on the legality of his citizenship and his theatrical international reputation.Footnote 99 Grein defended himself in court by stating he had been living in England for thirty-three years and been a citizen for twenty-three years.Footnote 100 He also attempted to defend Allan and the play by reporting its international reputation. Once again, we see a legal defense of citizenship and claim or association with international positive reputation within the industry. Billing was able to attack Grein’s family name, cultural associations, and business actions as alien and branded Grein as an outsider, rather than a good British citizen.
General Attacks and Paranoia
Jewish immigrant–owned firms also had to fear attacks from competitors. Many types of businesses took advantage of the new patriotic feeling in the country by proclaiming themselves to be all-British companies, and others used it to attack their competitors as enemies. The newspapers in September 1914 had several advertisements from companies disassociating themselves from the Germans and reminding readers that they were British businesses selling British products. Shell Motor Spirit even offered a reward for information on anyone spreading libel against them in such a fashion.Footnote 101 The proprietors wanted to make it clear that they had “no German Shareholders, nor is there any German interest of any kind whatsoever represented in their Company.”Footnote 102 The makers of Mazda lamps posted a notice to the public on the same page of the Daily Express informing readers that “all Mazda Lamps are made in Rugby (England) by British Workers” and that customers should insist on having Mazda lamps, because they would then be sure to have “British-made goods.”Footnote 103 Mazda did more, however, to encourage sales by claiming that “Millions of the Electric Lamps supplied in this country have been imported from Germany.”Footnote 104 Without overtly stating anything regarding price or quality, the manufacturer of Mazda lamps insinuated a great deal about its competitors and attempted to attract customers by exploiting civic consumerism.Footnote 105 Other companies who took this tactic included Wolsey Underwear Company, which pointed out to consumers that there was a lot of “unmarked” German underwear around, and J.B. Side-Spring Corsets, which started an “All-British Corset movement.”Footnote 106
Foreign-sounding names were an easy target for competitors to attack. The threat of a family name was one we see with the Grein case and the Rowson brothers, who went to lengths to change their last names. This idea that the sound of a last name could signify cultural outsiders shows up in other cases in which little evidence exists to show how a company might have been impacted by the rise in antisemitism. For example, although newspaper advertisements do not tell a story of Marks & Spencer’s competition accusing it of being an enemy within, it was advised by attorneys on the matter behind the scenes. On November 29, 1915, the Marks & Spencer board of directors discussed the ramifications of the Trading with the Enemy Acts, and the next day, its solicitors sent the company advice on the matter.Footnote 107 The company was told to make sure none of its shareholders fell under the provisions of the act, but instead of leaving it there, the letter continued.
Your list of Shareholders contains names which in themselves are somewhat suggestive of enemy origin, and perhaps it would be well if your Secretary were given instructions to write to each Shareholder about whom there is any doubt, to supply the requisite information as to his nationality. Doubtless these Shareholders would be able to produce for your inspection Certificates of Naturalization, or other evidence that they are, if not British subjects, at least alien friends.Footnote 108
Even situated outside London in Manchester, Marks & Spencer was not immune from the damage it might be caused due to foreign-sounding names. The company archive holds a vast collection of physical items that were sold in the stores historically. Of the many items available from the period 1903–1920, sixty-four items have original tags on them showing where the item was made. Five of the earliest artifacts clearly state they were made in Germany: a box of pencils, a plate, coat and skirt hangers, knitting pins, and a set of 100 toilet pins.Footnote 109 Three items simply say they are “Made Abroad,” two more were made in Austria, two in Bavaria, and one in Czechoslovakia.Footnote 110 No doubt a few of these items could have been made from 1919 to 1920, but otherwise, they are dated to before and during World War I. A pencil with Marks & Spencer advertising written on it states “Stationary and Toys made in Bavaria.”Footnote 111 What we see from the other fifty-one tags available is a transition of supply to England/Britain and France.Footnote 112 Some of the labels, such as one on some packing needles, go further than simply saying “English Made” and declare “Best English Make.”Footnote 113 There was likely a dual purpose behind this shift, one being a supply cost decision and another being a legal and cultural one for the company’s safety.
The business and cultural strategies of immigrant-founded companies from 1870 to 1918 were heavily influenced by group identity affiliation. Before the onset of World War I, international business and social networks were characteristic of a modern, cosmopolitan, Western identity that was valued both by consumers and business. National citizenship was a legal framework, provable in court with the right paperwork. The global shift that occurred with the onset of World War I changed how British citizenship was viewed and portrayed.Footnote 114 The methods by which people approached the idea of citizenship changed, and immigrant businesses had to either renegotiate their relationships to the state and the community to fit this new paradigm or risk being labeled an “enemy within” rather than British. One example of a company that did this successfully was J. Lyons & Co.
J. Lyons & Co.
Despite being publicly accused of being an enemy within by its competition, Lipton, J. Lyons & Co. was not only successful, but thrived.Footnote 115 The company was founded by German Jewish families and its directors were German Jews. Lyons was an entertainment and food service company that had an international network and reputation. Despite being named after Joseph Lyons, the company actually grew out of the Salmon and Gluckstein families’ partnership.Footnote 116 The family members behind Lyons were English-born citizens, having immigrated in the mid-1800s. Lyons began as a catering company that provided refreshments to exhibitions, outdoor celebrations, and grand entertainment spectacles. Early success led to the opening of tea shops, Corner House restaurants, and hotels. The backbone of this expansion included a massive production facility at Cadby Hall.Footnote 117 In 1894 Lyons acquired the locally famous Cadby Hall, which had previously been a pianoforte manufacturing and showroom owned by Charles Cadby.
On August 21, 1914, just after the start of World War I, Lipton slandered Lyons as a German company run by German Jews.Footnote 118 Lyons took legal action and offered a reward of £1000 for information regarding the source of this “information.”Footnote 119 Lipton engaged in a massive cover-up and destroyed all physical evidence of the slander coming from the company headquarters as a coordinated event. Unfortunately for Lipton, several witnesses came forward, and two employees had kept their written instructions from the company, worried that they would be found personally liable.Footnote 120 In September the High Court of Justice granted an interim injunction to Lyons:
restraining Lipton Limited, their agents and servants from speaking or publishing or writing and publishing any words to the effect or of the substance that J. Lyons & Co., Limited, or the Directors thereof, is composed of Germans, and that by purchasing their commodities the public is assisting the enemies of Great Britain.Footnote 121
In June 1915, the case was settled in favor of Lyons. Lipton had to pay damages to Lyons and publicly apologize.
Lyons’s directors were rightly concerned that the publicity and trial would cause them serious problems. There were good angles for Lipton’s lawyer to attack them, including prewar sales of tea to Germany through Holland and the many Germans employed by the company. Like other companies, Lyons was prepared to talk about individual people’s legal citizenship, service, and international reputation. However, defending allegations in court with legal definitions was a different matter than defeating those accusations in the public eye. A document titled “Probable Line of Defence” from Lyons’s company archives sketched the arguments that Lyons’s directors (or attorney) believed the counsel for Lipton might use against them in court. The first point was that Lipton would try to show that the directors were Germans with German names and German ancestors, but moreover that they were German Jews, and thus the information spread about the company by Lipton employees was technically true.Footnote 122 They believed that Lipton would try to influence the jury by showing that Lyons had employed Germans after other companies had discharged any German employees and that Lyons had attempted to get its German employees naturalized after the beginning of the war.Footnote 123
When the Daily Mail ran the exposé on enemies within and attacked hotels and food service, Lyons responded immediately, because it was not on the white list of hotels without Germans. The manager of the Lyons-owned Trocadero Hotel promised the paper that by “noon to-day (Monday) not a single Austrian or German would be found to remain among the 500 servants in the building.”Footnote 124 Alfred Salmon, managing director of Lyons, issued a statement to be published in the same article regarding the issue. “Messrs. Joseph Lyons and Co. are able to announce that they have no German or Austrian subjects in their employ;” the journalist went on to clarify that this applied to the Strand Hotel as well, but the removal of German and Austrian employees did not include any British citizens of German or Austrian origin who had been naturalized.Footnote 125
Once the High Court granted Lyons an injunction against Lipton, Lyons ran a large advertisement declaring the court’s decision in more than 100 different newspapers across the United Kingdom; it appeared no less than 210 times.Footnote 126 This advertisement had multiple purposes. It informed the readers of the court’s injunction decision, effectively putting Lyons in the right against one of its rivals, but it also advertised Lyons’s products in such a way as to help establish the company and its products as a distinctly British brand. After the information rendering the court decision, the advertisement clearly stated that Lyons was an “All-British Company with All-British Directors, has 14,000 All-British Shareholders and 160,000 All-British Shopkeepers selling Lyons’ Tea.” Lyons also continued to use its connection to the Crown to its advantage by stating after its name “By appointment to His Majesty the King.”
After this national newspaper blitz declaring Lyons to be a British company, it ran regular print advertisements for the first time.Footnote 127 The company’s first attempt at visual branding was a majestic lion standing or sitting on top of a box of Lyons’s tea (see Figure 1). Here, the image of a lion is paired with the phrases “The Best That Money Can Buy,” “The Wealthy like it because it is the best,” and “The Quality of Supremacy.”Footnote 128 The symbolism of the lion was not a coincidence. The use of lions in the royal heraldry of England dates back to the twelfth century and the Plantagenet line. The symbolism is present in seals of royal warrants (which Lyons had) and other government documents and institutions. Lyons attempted to brand its tea not simply as superior quality, but superior English quality, all while reminding readers of the company’s connection to the Crown. This style of symbolic advertising is paired tightly to the culture from which the intended meanings arise.Footnote 129
Figure 1 Lyons’s lion advertisements.
Source: British Newspaper Archive.
In addition to a lion, the company used its signature appearance on tea boxes and shop fronts as a method of blending visual and textual marketing (see Figure 2). The physical façade of Lyons’s tea shops stood out in comparison to the buildings around them on the street, with the walls being stark white and the letters embossed in gold; the print advertisements used that familiar image to strengthen the brand association with those physical locations.Footnote 130
Figure 2 Lyons’s façade and tea box advertisements.
Source: British Newspaper Archive.
In addition to these images, the advertisements emphasized the product’s connection to Britain through word choice, company location, and slogans: “Sold by 160,000 Shopkeepers,” “One Cup of Tea in Every Four Consumed in London,” “Five Million Packets Sold Every Week,” “The Millions of Tea Drinkers in the British Isles,” The Approval of a Substantial Majority,” all indicate popular national approval for Lyons’s tea. Cadby Hall became associated with the name Lyons in these advertisements as well. This marketing associated the company with a historical London space, thus connecting the company’s history intrinsically to the history of England. Slogans used by Lyons attempted to appeal to the masses and everyday people by claiming it already did. “Because it suits the people’s taste at a price which suits the people’s pocket” is one example.Footnote 131 Lyons advertised directly to the masses to counter any inklings of a boycott, rather than attempting to appeal to international reputation. The slogans were short and easy to understand, unlike a long legal defense.
After Lyons’s favorable case settlement with Lipton, its branding took a more serious nationalistic turn. Beginning in July, tea advertisements were linked with war efforts (see Figure 3). They quoted war correspondents to link Lyons’s tea with the common soldier’s needs, and hence the nation’s needs.Footnote 132 They illustrated the national character of Tommy Adkins drinking Lyons tea.Footnote 133 “Tommy Adkins” was slang for a common soldier in the British Army and had been since the late eighteenth century. The origin stories of the name include a mythic story of how the Duke of Wellington was inspired by a common solider in 1794 at the battle of Boxtel. Wellington found the unit’s best soldier, Tommy Adkins, wounded after the battle, and Adkins responded that “it was all in a day’s work” before he died. Tommy Adkins was used as the subject for books, poems, and music hall songs, but here he was used to demonstrate how Lyons tea was by parallel, the most British tea on the market.
Figure 3 Lyons’s wartime brand image.
Source: British Newspaper Archive.
In August 1915, a new brand image, or what we now call a corporate mascot, was introduced of a walking, talking, box of Lyons’s tea that chides the president of the United States, looks after soldiers, and helps with recruiting efforts.Footnote 134 One important feature in these is that Lyons’s tea, as a person (or tea box) is talking directly to the reader using first-person pronouns, to give the company a face and voice that is distinctly British. He says “I am doing my bit … I am to contribute the largest share of several million sterling towards the equipment of our fighting forces, and the cost of this war, which will save the world from the greatest menace of all time.” Lyons invented an entity much like other company mascots we know—Tony the Tiger, Betty Crocker, or the Quaker on Quaker Oats—as a protective layer between the public and the family. This shows an effort to keep the family behind the company away from public view.
In addition to advertising, Lyons actively maintained business practices that reflected good corporate citizenship and loyalty. One method of publicly displaying loyalty was through human resources actions. The Military Service Act was passed in January 1916 and went into effect in March 1916, which made men from 18 to 41 able to be called up for military service with some exceptions (married, widowed with children, minister, etc.). However, in May of that same year, the law was changed to allow married men to be called up as well. In September 1916, the War Office issued a book titled Women’s War Work: In Maintaining the Industries & Export Trade of the United Kingdom; Information officially compiled for the use of recruiting officers, military representatives and tribunals. This text was meant to help military representatives talk to companies about hiring women instead of men eligible for the army. Specifically addressing women and “employers of labour” it stated,
(a) No man who is eligible for Military Service should be retained in civil employment if his place can be temporarily filled by a woman or by a man who is ineligible for Military Service.
(a) No man who is ineligible for Military Service should be retained on work which can be performed by a woman (for the duration of the War) if the man himself can be utilized to release to the Colours one who is eligible for Military Service and who cannot be satisfactorily replaced by a woman.Footnote 135
It was every citizen’s duty to both provide wartime needs and enable the service of able-bodied men. Companies employing young men were severely scrutinized by the public and government. The War Office documented the many industries and trades in which women had successfully replaced male workers. During the war, it would have been a given that companies should not take men who could serve, even if it did not always play out that way.Footnote 136 However, more than passively not employing potential soldiers, Lyons actively stated in help wanted ads that it would not consider hiring anyone eligible for the army. It was not the only company to do so, but many wanted ads either included sly descriptions or insinuated as much through asking for women to apply. As a Jewish immigrant–founded firm with a German-sounding family name, Lyons could not afford to be sly or passively insinuate. It was blatant and consistent. This served the human resources function of reducing costs of rehiring and retraining if a newly employed man then left for war. It was actively patriotic, nation-loyal, and a good business decision.
Even before the War Office issued Women’s War Work, Lyons had begun to explicitly state it would not hire able-bodied men. For example, on November 18, 1915, it placed an ad in the Edinburgh Evening News for an outdoor salesman, wholesaler, with the stipulation that only applicants “Married or ineligible for Army service” need apply.Footnote 137 Lyons advertised for van salesmen and travelers on November 13, 1916, in the Western Daily Press: Bristol. Besides needing a horse or motor, the ad noted that the applicant “must be ineligible for the Army.”Footnote 138 Of the thirteen help wanted ads under “Partners. Travellers. Agents.” only three others explicitly put such wording into an ad. Out of the twenty-one help-wanted ads in “Bakers, Confectioners, &c” only one explicitly stated such a requirement.Footnote 139 The trend continued with only two of five in “Printers, Stationers” doing so. “Carters, Porters, & Errand Boys” had two out of twenty-two, but here, employers used other language to convey a similar message. Many of them specifically asked for a “Lad,” and one got specific, “aged 14–16.”Footnote 140 Other ways the implied message was communicated in various categories included lines such as “Preference given to ex-soldiers” or just specifically hiring a “Lady.”Footnote 141 Many of these same ads were in the Friday edition from two days before.Footnote 142 In the Yorkshire Evening Post on November 17, 1916, Lyons advertised a tea salesman position that was a “good opportunity for reliable and energetic man: must be ineligible for Army.”Footnote 143 Another in the Manchester Evening News on December 28, 1916, advertised for multiple posts. “HORSE VAN and MOTOR SALESMEN WANTED, in various towns in Great Britain: qualifications, honesty, respectability, and selling ability… applicants must be ineligible for the Army.”Footnote 144 In that same section, titled “Clerks, Assistants, & c., Wanted,” 14 ads (including Lyons) out of 170, explicitly stated only ineligible or “over military age,” while 3 more preferred discharged soldiers, but did not clearly state that as a needed qualification There were a handful hiring just women as well.Footnote 145 In this way, Lyons actively displayed its patriotism to the public through the company’s hiring practices. Other nonimmigrant businesses might get the wrathful scorn of people for hiring men of military age, but they would not be labeled enemy aliens. If Lyons were to take the same actions, it would receive scorn and very likely a publicity campaign against it in some popular press.
Conclusion/Analysis
In Britain, when immigrant businesses were slandered as enemies within, many responded with public declarations of loyalty, lawsuits, and proof of citizenship for themselves and employees, relying on the fact that they were legally British companies. However, libel cases were often not fast enough to stop the public and political damage to the family and its business interests. They soon came to realize that mere legality mattered very little as a defense against public accusations, boycotts, or political fears. Immigrant entrepreneurs and family businesses that understood the dramatic shift in the country actively employed a new rhetoric centered on portraying themselves as British companies through more than just proclaiming legal citizenship.
Corporate personhood had been established in English common law and codified in the many Companies Acts (1862–1893) passed in the late nineteenth century, but this idea of corporate personhood was a legal definition used in relation to financial matters.Footnote 146 It did not craft a public persona of a company or establish any means for a company reputation to overtake the reputation of the people behind the firm. An important qualification on legal corporate personhood was that any statute unrelated to company law overruled the idea of the corporation being a separate entity from the people controlling it. We see this in 1916 when the House of Lords proclaimed that the character and actions of the people behind a company were the character of the company; therefore, a legally British company could be an “enemy” per the Trading with the Enemy Act, if it was invested with enemy character through its holders.Footnote 147 A corporate entity that was technically a legal person as a UK registered business, but in which the shareholders and/or directors were German, was a legal enemy, regardless of legal business status. We see this in the case of the German, non-Jewish Bechstein piano company, which was not only a registered, licensed company in Britain, but even held a royal warrant to supply pianos to the Queen. The company’s paperwork was all in order and it employed British workers, but in the end, the company was deemed to have enemy character.
Jewish immigrant–founded businesses could be seen as foreign by being both immigrants and Jews. This duality made them more susceptible to attacks, boycotts, and witch hunts in general. While records are slim to nonexistent for smaller Jewish businesses, we can glean from Abraham Mundy’s notes (long-term secretary for the Jewish Shelter in London) that they were just as, if not more, impacted by the hostile environment as larger companies.Footnote 148 German and Jewish were considered to be interchangeable by many and used as such in the popular press. There were attacks on people, property, and businesses perceived as either. Horatio Bottomley (owner of John Bull) noted in his account of the first twelve months of the war.
As the result of the Lusitania crime, there have been further serious anti-German riots all over the country and many disturbances in London, where at least 150 shops were wrecked. At Southend it was necessary to call out the troops, and at Liverpool it is estimated the damage done by the rioters amounts to £40,000.Footnote 149
Whether the number Bottomley gives is accurate or not is questionable, but the high number of shops that were attacked and the damage done certainly affected Germans, German Jews, and Jews with German-sounding names, among others.
How a company or entrepreneur responded to this environment often determined failure or success. Business for Jewish immigrant companies was no longer an even playing field, it was hostile territory, where passive, neutral, or incomplete reactions could result in ruin. Bottomley, Billing, and Lipton attacked not a company or product, but the family names of Rowson/Rosenbaum, Grein, and Gluckstein. It was assumed that any personal associations of the family were a reflection on the company itself. Public image was a personal matter, not simply a professional company matter. Ideal Film and J. T. Grein responded to these attacks with facts of legal citizenship and international reputation, seemingly not recognizing that legal citizenship was no longer enough for anyone associated with internationalism and cosmopolitanism, the very element that was underlying the touted reputation in their defense. Citizenship and demonstrated patriotism were parts of a multifaceted puzzle for immigrant-founded businesses. To thrive during World War I, these entrepreneurs had to actively promote and publicize their citizenship. Lyons proactively rebranded itself as an actively patriotic, all-British company; distanced itself from international networks; and developed a new type of corporate identity. This type of branding, through the multifaceted actions taken by the company, crafted the notion of not legal corporate personhood, but cultural corporate citizenship. Therefore, one method of achieving economic success in Britain (or defense) was corporate branding of a national image that cut away from Jewish economic niches and instead advertised within the scope of national markets as part of a defensive strategy against hostile attacks concerning their ethnicity. It is in this way that some Jewish immigrant entrepreneurs used the marketplace to actively assert their rightful citizenship.
