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SYMPATHY AND APPROBATION IN HUME AND SMITH: A SOLUTION TO THE OTHER RATIONAL SPECIES PROBLEM

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 November 2004

DAVID M. LEVY  and
SANDRA J. PEART
DAVID M. LEVY
Affiliation:
George Mason University
SANDRA J. PEART
Affiliation:
Baldwin-Wallace College
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Abstract

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David Hume's sympathetic principle applies to physical equals. In his account, we sympathize with those like us. By contrast, Adam Smith's sympathetic principle induces equality. We consider Hume's “other rational species” problem to see whether Smith's wider sympathetic principle would alter Hume's conclusion that “superior” beings will enslave “inferior” beings. We show that Smith introduces the notion of “generosity,” which functions as if it were Hume's justice even when there is no possibility of contract.

Type
Essay
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 20 , Issue 2 , October 2004 , pp. 331 - 349
Copyright
© 2004 Cambridge University Press

Footnotes

An earlier version was presented at the 18th-Century Scottish Studies Society, Arlington meeting in June 2001. We benefited from conversations with and comments from Gordon Schochet, Roger Emerson and Silvia Sebastiana. A letter from Leon Montes helped sharpen the argument. The readers for the journal contributed to the output. We remain responsible for the errors and omissions.