The claimant was a member of Worcester Cathedral's guild of ringers. After investigations by the cathedral chapter and advice from the Local Authority Designated Officer (LADO), it was concluded that the claimant had behaved inappropriately with children and young people, though there was no suggestion of criminal behaviour. In February 2015, the chapter revoked his membership of the guild and permission to ring at the cathedral (the first decision) and the bishop invited him to sign an agreement that placed conditions on him ringing bells in all other churches within the diocese (the second decision). The five substantive issues between the parties were these:
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i. The jurisdiction issue: did the decisions trigger a claim under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and/or were they amenable to judicial review?
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ii. If so, was the claim in respect of the first decision out of time?
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iii. If so, was the second decision a decision for the purposes of judicial review?
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iv. The substantive issue: had an Article 8 or judicial review claim been made out?
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v. Were the decisions procedurally flawed?
On the jurisdiction issue, Coulson J concluded that neither the chapter nor the bishop was a hybrid public authority for the purposes of section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 and Article 8 ECHR. Neither had stepped into the shoes of the local authority; instead, they had consulted the local authority through the LADO. Neither was exercising any sort of governmental or public administration function: the chapter was concerned with who would be permitted to enter the tower to ring the cathedral bells, while the bishop was giving pastoral advice to the incumbents in his diocese. The LADO was consulted because, unlike the defendants, he was exercising a statutory function; a body that consulted a public authority did not then take on the legal responsibilities of that public authority. The defendants had no statutory powers in respect of safeguarding, neither was subsidised by public funds and neither was democratically accountable. Nor would the United Kingdom would be liable at Strasbourg for the alleged breach. The defendants' decisions were therefore not amenable to judicial review. In addition, the claim for judicial review in respect of the first decision was out of time.
The judge found that the second decision was one that could be challenged, but the Article 8 claim failed because, inter alia, the findings of fact and the sanctions imposed were proportionate and the judicial review claim could not, therefore, hope to succeed. Because he had found against the claimant in respect of every element of the alleged Article 8 claim, the separate claim for judicial review at common law also failed. As to the allegations that the first decision was unlawful because it was in breach of the rules of natural justice and therefore procedurally flawed, the allegations of actual or apparent bias, predetermination and inadequate disclosure were all rejected on the facts. The claim was dismissed. [Frank Cranmer]
