There is a cliché that, as with Judaism, law occupies a central position within Islam. Islam possesses primary legal foundations to refer to, with the Qur'an and the example of Muhammad being the main two sources of revelation for the majority Sunni tradition. With the rise of the so-called modern Islamic resurgence to restore sharia, one cannot deny that Islamic law remains a significant foundation for establishing an Islamic identity as a cultural feature, not simply as a positive practice. This rise has also generated interest in Western scholarship, which was often previously wedded to colonial and imperial politics, as several scholars have noted.Footnote ¹

The Oxford Companion to Islamic Law attempts to provide a comprehensive up-to-date synthesis of the scholarship on Islamic law, with the intention of reflecting a counter-narrative to what the editors perceive to be a ‘colonial’ or ‘orientalist’ scholarship. This claim seems to be another way of proposing a revolution in Islamic legal studies but the result offers a scholarship that fits with modern liberal values. While the handbook has a section on ‘Origins’ (Part III), popularised by the classical discussions of Joseph Schacht among others and renewed by the scholarship of Wael Hallaq, who questioned the validity of earlier claims on the origins of Islamic law, the book starts, not with origins, but with a feminist critique of the discipline as situated in the Western world today. This is followed by a discussion of the location of Islamic law within the history of other Islamic disciplines, such as theology, philosophy and anthropology, and its posture towards understanding conceptual elements that constitute Islamic law and institutions. Parts IV and V provide an extensive and varied discussion on Islamic law and society today, covering various world contexts, as well as case studies in connection with the modern debates.

There are clearly some important and very strong contributions in this volume that will aid those who study Islamic law. Notably here one must refer to Robert Gleave's coverage of Shi'i legal theory and the clear and interesting chapter of Matthew Ingalls on the Mamluk period. While contemporary traditionalists see the application of sharia as governed by the classical schools of interpretation, Abdullah Saeed's chapter, reflecting on the Australian context, provides an example of a push for extending the liberty of Ijtihad, as in reasoning from first principles rather than a concoction of traditional judgments. This complements the critique of earlier chapters of the vexed question of Ijtihad among the various traditions in Islam. There is also a clear emphasis on engaging with Islamic law not simply as text but as a lived tradition that may often vary with traditional readings of sources (Chapter 3).

A number of contributors provide a synthesis of secondary sources, with little engagement with primary sources; thus, they give a descriptive analysis of the Sitz im Leben of post-colonial studies, lacking a nuanced critique of the literature, at times requiring more unpacking of certain questions, and other points with arguable comments that can be challenged further. Most importantly, the irony of these varied contributions rests on the emphasis given at the start on a feminist critique as a central method of engaging with Islamic law; by doing so, the editors implicitly suggest that, without secular feminism (with the help of colonialism), we might never have seen the urgency of this approach to Islamic studies or the inconsistency of the previous positions. It becomes deliberately ironic as it is still talking about and negotiating a way into the power struggles that prevail.

Questions about academic integrity arise from the opening chapter, a rather lengthy discussion about what constitutes ‘good’ or ‘bad’ scholarship, which appears with no academic references at all. The editors justify this lack of references with a note at the end (p 43) suggesting that they have an agenda with this publication: first, they are breaking with received academic practice and form; second, they do not wish ideas to be mistaken as attacks on individuals or institutions. Here lies another irony. To make what is said invulnerable by concealing its sources is a strategy for the retention of power too. This works at either end of the social and political scale of the academy. Those who are in control – ‘white supremacist’ scholars, to use the language of the first chapter – might wish to use it to assert their right to control. Those who are not ‘white supremacist’ scholars would claim that these are the definitions offered by the ‘powerful’ as the only means of access to their world. This can be subversive. Having integrity means that one should be able to speak in a way that allows for conversation and answers to develop. Honest scholarship should permit responses. If one does not have ‘references’ as to why and how these claims are made, then the chapter does not invite collaboration.

The question of academic integrity also applies to an unfortunate footnote in which the author claims to be ‘the victim of philological hegemony by a hungry ingénue publishing in a student journal’ (p 56 n 52). This is not the sort of language one expects from reading an Oxford handbook. If the author disagrees with his critic, he should explain why and provide a proper proof for his criticism, instead of using language that verges on bullying. The academy ought to be ideally modelling a cohesive political society. Here one ought to distinguish between cohesion and consensus. Academic communal life should allow for interactive debates and robust arguments to challenge one another without degenerating into verbal violence. To be in an academic position where no-one is allowed to challenge us is a sad academic reality. This footnote should not have appeared in its current form.

While there are important and valuable contributions here, the volume is hampered by a naïve understanding of modern methodology. The editors and some contributors use the words ‘modern’, ‘colonial’ and ‘orientalist’ without asking how such adjectives arose. The categories of ‘colonial’ and ‘orientalist’ are not as clear-cut as their use here implies and, therefore, they do not do justice to certain scholarship on Islamic law or indeed to a global political environment today.